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Abstract
In recent years there has been increasing interest in philosophical theories
which downplay the importance of the idea that our words and thoughts
represent aspects of the world. The best-known example of these non-rep-
resentational theories is metaethical expressivism, the view that ethical lan-
guage and thought is best understood not as representing or describing eth-
ical features of the world, but as expressing our attitudes towards it. Other
theories apply similar ideas to other kinds of language and thought, and
global versions apply it to all kinds. Non-representationalism has under-
gone a major shift in the last few decades, and lack of clarity about what it
now involves has led some to worry that it is either unintelligible, or else
indistinguishable from its representationalist rivals. In the first part of my
thesis, I offer a novel reading of the new kind of non-representationalism. I
argue that this reading, for the first time, makes the view both intelligible
and distinct from representationalism. However I also show that this read-
ing collapses one of the major debates in the recent literature – the debate
between global and local non-representationalists. This debate turns out
to be empty: properly understood, the disputants already agree with each
other.
Many writers think that non-representationalism threatens metaphys-
ics, particularly theories which purport to say what makes statements of
given kinds true, and to what various kinds of terms refer. Some take
this to be an advantage of the view, others a disadvantage. In the second
part of my thesis I argue that this common view is deeply mistaken – non-
representationalism does not undermine metaphysics. I respond to a num-
ber of recent arguments, showing that neither global nor local forms of
non-representationalism undermine metaphysics. I argue that non-repres-
entationalism is compatible with metaphysics, and that this is not a problem
for the view.
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chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is about a view I’m going to call non-representationalist pragmat-
ism, or sometimes simply non-representationalism or pragmatism. In the
broadest possible terms, this is a view which casts suspicion on the philo-
sophical importance of the idea that our thought and language functions to
represent the world. My thesis aims to make sense of recent versions of this
view, and then use this result to examine some questions about it. After giv-
ing a clear interpretation of non-representationalism, I will show how this
interpretation helps us solve two recent debates in the literature, one about
how to distinguish non-representationalism about ethical language from its
rivals, and one about whether non-representationalism can be true of all
kinds of language or only some. After that, I will turn to a bigger ques-
tion: what impact does non-representationalism have on metaphysics? In
this introductory chapter, I will set the scene for my discussion, providing a
non-specialist’s introduction to non-representationalism. I will then sketch
out the main results I will argue for in the following chapters.
1.1 From emotivism to expressivism
In his classic book Language, Truth and Logic (1936), A.J. Ayer defended
a radical view about ethical language and thought, known as emotivism.1
Emotivism is the view that ethical language expresses emotions, and as such
ethical mental states and sentences are not the kinds of thing which can be
true or false. Nor can they be said to express propositions, or state facts.
Here’s Ayer setting out his view:
Thus if I say to someone, ‘You acted wrongly in stealing that
money,’ I am not stating anything more than if I had simply
1 Other defenders of this view include Stevenson (1937), Barnes (1933), and Ogden &
Richards (1923).
1
2said, ‘You stole that money.’ In adding that this action is wrong
I am not making any further statement about it. I am simply
evincing my moral disapproval of it. . . . If I now generalize
my previous statement and say, ‘Stealing money is wrong,’ I
produce a sentence which has no factual meaning – that is, ex-
presses no proposition which can be either true or false. . . . For
in saying that a certain type of action is right or wrong, I am
not making any factual statement, not even a statement about
my own state of mind. I am merely expressing certain moral
sentiments. (Ayer, 1936, p.110)
According to Ayer, ethical language contrasts with language about the em-
pirical world in two key respects. Ethical sentences lack features sentences
like ‘grass is green’ have: they lack truth-conditions, they do not express
propositions, they do not attempt to state facts. But they have a role that
sentences like ‘grass is green’ do not have: they express or evince emotions.
Emotivism is controversial, and it has little support these days. But it
has a philosophical descendant in a view known as ethical or meta-ethical
expressivism. Expressivism is not just a position in ethics – you can be an
expressivist about other kinds of language, as we’ll see later. However its
best known application is in ethics. Its most prominent defenders are Al-
lan Gibbard (1990; 2003; 2013) and Simon Blackburn (1984; 1993; 1998;
2010a). Expressivism has undergone a huge shift in the last four decades or
so. Earlier versions of expressivism joined Ayer in saying that ethical sen-
tences lacked truth-values and so on. For instance here’s Gibbard in his first
book,Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (1990), discussing an expressivist theory of
the term ‘rational’:
[Expressivism] is non-cognitivistic in the narrow sense that, ac-
cording to it, to call a thing rational is not to state a matter of
fact, either truly or falsely. (Gibbard, 1990, p.8)
Gibbard and Blackburn also distinguished themselves by focusing on the
psychological notion of belief, and arguing that ethical mental states should
not be thought of as beliefs. For instance, in his book Spreading the Word
(1984), Blackburn introduces expressivist theories by saying that according
to them the commitments they discuss
3are contrasted with others – call them judgements, beliefs, as-
sertions, or propositions – which have truth-conditions (Black-
burn, 1984, p.167)
Early expressivist views are therefore very similar to Ayer’s in their rejection
of the applicability of notions like truth, proposition and belief to ethical
language. Note also Gibbard’s use of the term ‘non-cognitivistic’, which is
still used in these debates to refer to views like emotivism and expressivism.
In general ‘non-cognitivism’, at least within meta-ethics, is applied to those
views which deny (or are read as denying) that ethical sentences have truth-
conditions, express beliefs, and so on.
However, expressivism has undergone a shift in the last four decades or
so. Expressivists have begun to drop their original denials, the ones they
shared with Ayer. They no longer deny that ethical sentences are truth-apt,
or that they express propositions, and (when true) state facts. Indeed they
no longer deny that ethical mental states are beliefs. For instance, in a recent
paper Gibbard says:
As some writers use the term, being an expressivist regarding
ethics involves denying that ethical judgments can be true, and
denying that they are beliefs. In my first book . . . I did issue
such denials. Eventually, though, I was convinced—especially
by Horwich—that deflationary truth was the only kind of truth
I understood, and that I didn’t understand what I was denying
when I excluded ethical judgments from being ‘beliefs’. (Gib-
bard, 2015, p.211)
More starkly, in a recent paper on moral realism, Blackburn says that he
agrees to all three of the claims which Richard Boyd (1988) takes to be defin-
itive of realism:
So here are some things I can sign up to, exactly as Boyd ex-
presses them in that paper:
1. Moral statements are the sorts of statements which are (or
which express propositions which are) true or false (or ap-
proximately true, largely false, etc.).
2. The truth or falsity (approximate truth. . . ) of moral state-
ments is largely independent of our moral opinions, theor-
ies, etc.
43. Ordinary canons of moral reasoning—together with ordin-
ary canons of scientific and everyday factual reasoning—
constitute, under many circumstances at least, a reliable
method for obtaining and improving (approximate) moral
knowledge.
I agree to all these claims. (Blackburn, 2015, pp.842-843)
Gone, then, are all the denials which made Ayer’s view distinctive and rad-
ical.
Despite no longer denying that ethical language is truth-apt, expresses
propositions, and so on, expressivists still hold two distinct views. The first
is their core claim about ethical language, which is that it expresses practical
attitudes which are, in some way, to be contrasted with beliefs. The second
is their suspicion of notions like truth, belief, and others. This is best called
a suspicion because it doesn’t extend so far as denying that those notions
apply to ethical language. Instead it’s a suspicion of the utility of notions like
truth and belief in philosophical projects. For instance, Blackburn expresses
doubts about the philosophical utility of the notion of belief in ethics:
Should all these activities [of using ethical language] be herded
together as ‘expressing ethical beliefs’? It is hard to see how that
could be useful to do so. It would be labelling at a level of ab-
straction that makes the interesting detail invisible. (Blackburn,
1998, p.51)
We can find similar claims in recent work by Gibbard, when discussing the
expressivists’ explanation of ethical mental states:
The state of mind expressed by ‘Stealing is wrong’ can’t be spe-
cified, in the explanation, as anything like ‘believing that steal-
ing is wrong’ . . .We can’t just say that there’s a general rela-
tion of believing a proposition, and that believing that stealing
is wrong is standing in this relation to the proposition that steal-
ing is wrong. (Gibbard, 2015, p.212)
Here we see the idea that we can give a theory of ethical language without
invoking these notions. One of the main tasks of the first part of this thesis
is to give an account of this suspicion, and Chapter 2 is devoted to this task.
To sum up, then, Blackburn and Gibbard’s positions combine a sus-
picion of notions like truth and belief, at least as applied to ethics, with a
5positive theory of ethical language which doesn’t invoke these notions. This
is expressivism about ethical language. But expressivism’s core views fan out
in two different directions.
1.2 Other notions, other kinds of language
First, we can see this suspicion of notions like truth and belief applied to
various other features, including description and representation. This sus-
picion follows the same pattern; earlier versions of expressivism denied that
these applied to ethical language. For instance, Blackburn explicitly con-
trasts expression and description, characterising expressivism as
the attempt to explain the practice of judging in a certain way,
by regarding the commitments as expressive rather than descript-
ive (Blackburn, 1984, p.167, original emphasis)
Yet more recent versions do not deny this:
. . . we [expressivists] will end up applying talk of truth and rep-
resentation to [ethical sentences]. For with truth comes a fully
fledged vocabulary of representation: when we speak truly we
represent things as being thus and so, and the things we so rep-
resent are the things referred to or quantified over in our sayings.
In particular, notice that the word ‘description’ can go into the
deflationist pot along with ‘representation’. We describe how
things stand with norms and values, possible worlds, or num-
bers and sets. We believe the results of our descriptions. (Black-
burn, 2010b, p.4)
Nevertheless, the suspicion of such notions remains. Blackburn claims his
favoured approach is distinctive
. . . in holding that representation is nevertheless not the key
concept to deploy when the desire for philosophical explana-
tion of our practice in some area is upon us. (Blackburn, 2015,
p.851)
So it’s clear that Blackburn and Gibbard aren’t concerned merely with truth,
propositions, and facts, but with belief, description and representation too.
Second, we can find similar theories applied not to ethical language but
other kinds of language too. Consider for instance Amie Thomasson’s
6‘modal normativism’, which denies that modal claims are descriptive, or
have truthmakers, and instead says that
claims of metaphysical necessity primarily serve the prescriptive
function of expressing semantic rules for the terms used in them,
or their consequences, while remaining in the object-language.
(Thomasson, 2007, p.136)
This is similar to expressivism in taking modal language to express some-
thing distinctive; and Thomasson is clearly suspicious of the notions of de-
scription and truth as applied to modal language.2 Though like Gibbard and
Blackburn, she is not so suspicious as to deny that modal sentences can be
true:
If claims of metaphysical necessity are not descriptions, it seems
that they cannot be understood as true or false based on whether
or not they correspond to modal features of the world . . . Non-
etheless, they may be classed as true or false in a deflationary
sense. (Thomasson, 2007, p.148)
Thomasson’s view about modal language bears at least some significant sim-
ilarities to expressivist views about ethics.
Elsewhere we can find similar views about other kinds of language: epi-
stemic language:
. . . an epistemic expressivist holds that, as descriptive claims ex-
press factual beliefs, epistemic claims express a distinctive non-
representational kind of mental state. Again, we can call it a
pro-/con-attitude, a conative state, or an evaluative “belief.” It
doesn’t have to be the same kind of non-representational state
as expressivists think is expressed by ethical claims; and most
epistemic expressivists think there must be both cognitive and
conative elements in the state. What is important is that epi-
stemic judgments have, at least in part, a desire-like direction of
fit with the world. (Chrisman, 2012, p.119)
probabilistic language:
2 Blackburn has defended an expressivist view of modal language (Blackburn, 1987), as
well as a similar view of causal language (1990a).
7Briefly, it [the view Yalcin calls credal expressivism] develops the
thought that in asserting something like
1. Allan is probably in his office,
one may express an aspect of one’s credal state, without describ-
ing that state. One expresses one’s confidence, that is, without
literally saying that one is confident. The relevant credal state
expressed is of course a doxastic (hence ‘cognitive’) state, but it
is not a state tantamount to full belief in a proposition. Credal
expressivism is what I call this view. (Yalcin, 2012, p.125)
causal language:
On this view . . . causal claims project our inferential commit-
ments onto the world, rather than representing a mind-inde-
pendent relation that somehow licenses those inferences. (Bee-
bee, 2015, p.25)
semantic ascriptions:
To believe this claim [an ascription of meaning] is to be in a
state of planning (Gibbard, 2013, p.180)
and plenty of other kinds of language too. Bar-On and Sias (2013, n.7 p.710)
give a comprehensive list of references for distinctively expressivist views
about the above kinds of language, including some of the papers I have just
quoted from, and add references to similar views about aesthetic claims,
attributions of mental states, conditionals, epistemic modals, and logical
claims.
What we have here is a motley of related views. They are related in
two ways. First, they are related in virtue of some kind of suspicion of
truth, reference, belief, representation, and the rest, at least with regard to a
certain kind of language. This suspicion may or may not go as far as Ayer’s
did; it may or may not result in rejection of those notions for the language
in question. The second way in which these views are related is in the idea
that we should theorise about the relevant kind of language without using
the notions on which they cast suspicion.
81.3 At last: non-representationalist pragmatism
There is clearly a common thread which ties these views together, even if
only loosely. It would seem reasonable to have a label for views which
have this common thread running through them. This apparently trivial
problem, however, has caused perennial headaches. To start with, some
popular names inherit connotations of earlier theories like Ayer’s, which
denied the applicability of truth and others to the language in question. For
instance, ‘non-factualism’, ‘non-descriptivism’, and ‘non-cognitivism’ are all
used in the literature. The problem with these is that they don’t fit newer
theories whose suspicion of truth and the other notions doesn’t make them
deny that those notions apply. ‘Non-descriptivism’, for instance, sounds
like the view that the relevant claims don’t describe. But this would be a
misleading name for Blackburn’s view of ethical language, since as we saw
he thinks that ethical claims do describe. So these terms, while probably
appropriate for Ayer-style views, are very misleading as applied to the family
of views in general.
Other names on offer are too narrow. ‘Expressivism’ works nicely for
ethics and other views which focus on expression of mental states. But
it doesn’t seem to pick out the unifying feature of this family of theories,
which is their suspicion of the notions of truth, belief, reference, and so on.
Some philosophers like Paul Horwich and Huw Price, doubt that notions
like truth, reference and representation can ever help us in philosophical
theorising:
. . . truth is not, as often assumed, a deep concept and should not
be given a pivotal role in philosophical theorizing. It cannot be
the basis of our conceptions of meaning, or of justification, or
of logic. (Horwich, 2010, p.16)
In particular, it is open to us to take the view that at least by
the time we get to language, there is no useful external notion,
of a semantic kind—in other words, no useful, general, notion of
relations that words and sentences bear to the external world,
that we might usefully identify with truth and reference. (Price,
2011, p.21)
Writers like Price and Horwich do not go on to give any recognisably ex-
pressivist theory of any part of language. They are more interested in the
9notions of truth, reference and others themselves, rather than their applic-
ability to a limited range of language like ethical language.
What about leaving ‘expressivism’ behind and going for a more familiar
‘ism’ name: ‘anti-realism’, ‘irrealism’, ‘non-realism’? Admittedly these kinds
of names have been applied to the kinds of views we’re discussing, including
by proponents of those views. For instance, an earlier paper by Blackburn
is entitled ‘How to Be an Ethical Anti-Realist’ (Blackburn, 1988). But these
names are just as misleading as ‘non-cognitivism’ and similar names. For the
mark of anti-realism is often thought to be to deny the truth of the relevant
sentences, or to deny their objectivity and say that their truth is relative to
a perspective, or depends some way on us. Yet the contemporary work of
Blackburn and Gibbard, for instance, contains explicit denials of these kinds
of claims. Indeed some – like Dreier (2004) – have begun to wonder what
the difference is between Blackburn and Gibbard’s view on the one hand,
and the most staunch moral realist on the other. This will be the subject
of Chapter 3. Nevertheless I think that ‘anti-realism’ and similar labels are
unsuitable because of their misleading connotations.
What about ‘pragmatism’? At first it seems to suffer both of the defects
of the names above: it’s too broad, for one can find a great many different
views going under the name, and it’s misleading because it is strongly linked
with the American pragmatists like James, Dewey and Peirce. On the other
hand it is currently popular in the literature on these views.3 And some
recent historical work has tied modern day views like Blackburn’s, to these
earlier pragmatist views, often by way of Wittgenstein.4
Moreover, ‘pragmatism’ does seem to capture the approach of the views
I’ve been describing, which often focuses on how to account for our use
of the relevant kind of language. This is particularly strong in the more
influential voices in the literature. Blackburn describes what he calls the
‘pragmatic tradition’ like so:
It says that it is no good looking to see what laws or possibilities
or values or numbers are ‘made up of’. They are not substances
you can put under a microscope or on a petri dish or in a retort.
They are categories with which we think. The key to under-
standing them, therefore, is to see what such thinking does for
3 For instance see the title and the papers in Price (2013).
4 See Misak (2016) and the collected essays in Misak & Price (Forthcoming).
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us. What is its function and purpose? (Blackburn, 2015, p.850,
emphasis added)
Price describes it in a similar way, arguing that his aim is
to explain in naturalistic terms how creatures like us come to
talk in these various ways. This is a matter of explaining what
role the different language games play in our lives – what differ-
ences there are between the functions of talk of value and the
functions of talk of electrons, for example. (Price, 2013, p.20)
The focus here is on the role of the relevant concepts and language in hu-
man life. In the above quotations we can also see the influence of the later
Wittgenstein, with the ideas of language games and meaning as use. Both
Price and Blackburn have explicitly acknowledged this influence.5
But this doesn’t by itself seem to deserve the name ‘pragmatism’. For
not only do many other kinds of theory go under that name. It also seems
open for someone to claim that they are interested in the role of language
in human life, and to say things which echo what Blackburn and Price said
above, yet still reject the suspicion of truth, belief, representation, and so
on which seems to link all the theories I have been discussing. For this
reason I think a good name for this approach would be to follow the trail
of ‘representationalism’, an idea common in recent literature, and give the
extremely unlovely label ‘non-representationalist pragmatism’ to this family
of views. Alternatively, we can call it ‘non-representationalism’, ‘NRP’, or
just ‘pragmatism’ for short. In this thesis if I use any of these terms, I mean
‘non-representational pragmatism’ unless otherwise stated. I will also let
‘NRP’ serve as a count noun, so that we can call Gibbard and the like NRPs
too. This name seems to better capture the family of views: they are inter-
ested in accounting for the use or role of the relevant language and thought,
and doing it in a way which eschews truth, reference, representation, belief,
and so on, though this needn’t go so far as rejecting those notions entirely.
1.4 Making sense of suspicion
So far, then, we have a family of views which are only loosely linked by
some kind of suspicion of truth, reference, representation and so on. But
5 See Blackburn (1990b, 2013, 2015), (Price, 2011, ch.1, passim) and Price (2004) for
examples.
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it’s not clear what this suspicion amounts to. In Ayer’s view it amounted to
rejecting truth and the rest, in the case of ethical language at least. But in
this thesis I am going to focus on the more recent kind of NRP in which this
suspicion does not go so far as rejection. There seem to be two approaches
which NRPs take. The first is that they say that while ethical sentences (for
instance) express propositions, or represent the world, and so on, they do so
only in a ‘quasi’ ‘minimal’, ‘thin’, ‘deflationary’, ‘lower-case’ or ‘insubstan-
tial’ sense. Consider for instance these two short passages from Gibbard:
Are oughts, then, matters of fact? In a minimalist sense of the
term ‘fact’, there are of course facts of what a person ought to
do.
Plan-laden statements will be true or false in a minimal sense
. . . In the book I use “true” in this minimal sense (Gibbard, 2006,
pp.687, 690)
Sometimes this is contrasted with a more ‘real’ ‘robust’, ‘thick’, ‘inflation-
ary’, ‘upper-case’, or ‘substantial’ sense which the language in question is
said to lack.6 This might be a sense which NRPs say is as yet undefined:
Are these [ethical facts] just pseudo-facts, incapable of real truth
and falsehood? Are beliefs in them pseudo-beliefs, states of mind
distinct from beliefs, which we mistake for genuine beliefs? I
took no stand on this at the outset, but what do I now conclude?
I still weasel: I say that I need to understand the questions. Ex-
plain to me “real facts”, “substantial truth”, and “genuine be-
lief”, and I can think how to answer. (Gibbard, 2003, p.182)
For it is not as if we had a notion of what it would be to come
across ‘genuine’ causal, moral facts, but unfortunately have to
content ourselves with talking as if we had performed this feat,
when we have not done so. (Blackburn, 1986, p.206)
Here Blackburn and Gibbard are making some kind of distinction between
minimal and non-minimal senses of notions like truth, belief and the like;
6 For examples of the ‘thin’/‘thick’-style distinctions, see Williams (2013, pp.130-131)
(robust) Price & O’Leary-Hawthorne (1996, passim) (thick, substantial), Macarthur &
Price (2007, p.240) (substantial, thick), (Blackburn, 1999, p.217) (substantive, robust,
upper-case), Price (2013, p.24) (‘big-R’ – upper case). See also van Roojen (2014).
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though we can also see some doubt about any reasonable way of cashing out
any non-minimal sense of these notions.
Aside from this distinction, some NRPs focus on the role of the relev-
ant notions in philosophical theory and explanation; their suspicion is that
these concepts are in some way unhelpful in our theory:
Where pragmatism is distinctive is in holding that representa-
tion is nevertheless not the key concept to deploy when the de-
sire for philosophical explanation of our practice in some area
is upon us. It is not the way to understand the kind of thought
or the part of language in question, whereas a different focus on
the function of terms in the lives of thinkers and talkers, is the
better option. (Blackburn, 2015, p.851)
But what exactly do these two ideas – the minimal/robust distinction, and
the use of representation in our philosophical theories – really come to?
In Chapter 2 I will give a detailed explanation of what these are ideas are
and how they work. I outline three different stances non-representational-
ists have taken up regarding representation and similar features, at least as
they apply to a given area of language. These three stances are:
Rejection The language in question is not representational
Qualified Rejection The language in question is representational
in one sense but not others
Explanatory Scepticism The best explanation of the language in
question does not treat it as representational
The latter principle is, I claim, the core of non-representationalism: it is
the best way of cashing out NRPs’ suspicion of representation and related
concepts.
Explanatory scepticism, as I call it, is the idea that we can explain the
language we’re interested in without saying it is representational, ascribing
truth-conditions to it, saying it expresses beliefs, and so on. This raises the
question of what an explanation of some language is. As it turns out, non-
representationalists have a distinctive kind of explanation in mind. I argue
that they are interested in understanding two things: what the language in
question does, and why we have language which does that. This two part
‘what it does and why it’s there’ theory is the distinctive aim of NRPs.
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I argue that we can understand the ‘what it does and why it’s there’ using
material set out by James Dreier (2004). To say what a word does, I argue,
is to say what explains its meaning or use. Some non-representationalists
prefer explaining meaning, and as such think that to say what a word does
is to specify the feature of that word which constitutes its meaning, i.e. the
feature in virtue of which that word means what it does. Other non-repres-
entationalists prefer to explain the use of the word, its actual appearance in
our utterances. In their case they will be interested in the laws which ex-
plain that word use. For some, like Paul Horwich, these two explanations
coincide.
Having explained explanatory scepticism and explored the distinctive
‘what it does and why it’s there’ idea, I then explain rejection and qualified
rejection. As we’ve seen, rejection – the view held by Ayer – is no longer
popular among non-representationalists. Instead, qualified rejection is more
common. However, as I explained above, qualified rejection is often cashed
out using vague words like ‘robust’ and ‘minimal’. I explain the various
different uses of these words. I show what non-representationalists mean
when they say that a word represents in a ‘minimal’ sense, and I explain the
ways they typically understand words like ‘robust’.
Some non-representationalists deny that the language in question ro-
bustly represents the world, and they mean that it does not represent the
speaker’s environment: this is the environmental sense of robustness. There
is also a metaphysical sense of robustness, which applies not to representa-
tion but to facts, properties and truths. Metaphysically robust properties,
for example, are ones which ground genuine resemblances: things which are
green genuinely resemble each other in a way in which, say, things whose
English names begin with the letter ‘f’, or rhyme with ‘cat’, do not. Finally,
non-representationalists sometimes simply deny that there is anything more
than the minimal sense of representation and the like.
Having explained the three common non-representationalist principles,
established explanatory scepticism as the core of the view, and carefully
explained the ‘what it does and why it’s there’ explanation of an area of
language, I consider the view to be clear and to have eliminated the vague-
ness of words like ‘robust’ and ‘minimal’. In later chapters I take this clear
foundation of non-representationalism and use it to make progress in several
important and popular debates about the view.
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1.5 Creeping minimalism
In Chapter 3 I discuss the so-called problem of creeping minimalism, first
stated by James Dreier (2004). This is the problem that metaethical express-
ivists run into once they drop Ayer’s rejection of representation, truth, and
the like. The problem is this: expressivists now accept minimalist views of
these representational concepts, and such views entail that even by express-
ivists’ own lights, ethical language counts as representational, truth-apt, and
so on. Expressivism now looks a lot like its rival realism: it is hard to tell
the difference between the two views. The problem of creeping minimalism
is the problem of how to tell these views apart: the idea is that minimalism
creeps to cover all the representational concepts which we might once have
used to do this.
I argue that understanding metaethical expressivism in terms of the ex-
planatory scepticism I outlined in Chapter 2 resolves this problem. In the
paper in which he initially posed the problem, Dreier offered a solution
– the ‘explanation’ explanation – which I argue is more or less correct. I
defend Dreier’s view from an objection from Matthew Chrisman (2008).
Chrisman’s objection fails, but it prompts several interesting points. In-
deed Chrisman takes his objection to give us good reason to change our
whole approach to understanding ethical language, from one which focuses
on concepts like representation, to one which focuses on inference instead. I
accept that Dreier’s original solution does not accommodate the insights be-
hind Chrisman’s objection. Nevertheless, with a minor alteration, Dreier’s
view – which I interpret as explanatory scepticism – solves the problem. As
such we needn’t accept Chrisman’s shift from representation to inference.
Having established this, I then turn to several interesting problems raised
by Christine Tiefensee in a recent discussion of creeping minimalism and
its relationship with non-representationalism. Tiefensee’s argument is pess-
imistic. She criticises Chrisman’s inferentialist solution to the problem,
showing that minimalism collapses it in the same way Chrisman thinks
it collapses Dreier’s. She then goes on to examine potential solutions us-
ing recent materials from two prominent non-representationalists – Huw
Price’s (2013) concept of ‘e-representation’ and Michael Williams’s (2013)
concept of an ‘explanation of meaning in terms of use’ (an ‘EMU’). She
argues that these, too, fail, for more or less the same reasons that Chris-
man’s and Dreier’s failed. Tiefensee’s argument is cause for concern, since
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she purports to show that even the most promising and recent non-repres-
entationalist resources cannot solve the problem of creeping minimalism.
Using an argument very similar to the one I used to defend Dreier, I
show that Tiefensee’s arguments fail. We should therefore not be worried
about the fate of expressivism in the light of creeping minimalism. I show
how reading expressivism in terms of explanatory scepticism lets us avoid
the issues Tiefensee raises, and how this view can accommodate the different
solutions discussed in the chapter – those of Dreier, Chrisman, Price, and
Williams.
1.6 Global non-representationalism?
At the end of Chapter 3 I discuss potential problems with my solution to
the problem of creeping minimalism. One of them is that if expressivists ac-
cept minimalism about concepts like representation, then they themselves
cannot accept representationalist views about other areas of language, say
scientific language or words we use to describe our perceptions. This would
be a serious consequence for expressivists. However, it links closely to an-
other popular debate: that between local and global non-representationalists.
The former think non-representationalism is true in some cases but false in
others: some language should be explained in terms of representation. The
latter deny this: no language needs to be explained as representational. Some
globalists have argued for the very consequence I just sketched out: minim-
alism entails global non-representationalism.
In Chapter 4 I turn to this debate, which has recently seen exchanges
between localists like Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard on the one hand,
and globalists like Huw Price on the other.7 Indeed this debate has occupied
a great deal of the recent literature on non-representationalism, with Price
arguing that his globalist view is plausible, supported by the same reasons
that support local applications of non-representationalism, and has radical
consequences for philosophy of language and metaphysics.
I argue that the local/global debate is in fact merely verbal. Self-professed
localists already accept globalism as globalists define it, but self-professed
globalists already accept localism as the localists define it. This is simply
because localists and globalists have different views about what it is to ex-
plain language in terms of representation. More precisely, they differ over
7 See Blackburn (2013); Gibbard (2015); Price (2013, 2015a).
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which features count among what I call the representational features – the
features to be excluded from non-representationalists’ explanatory theories.
Localists take representational features to be relations between words (and
thoughts) and their subject matter, for instance a reference relation between
‘Ramsey’ and Ramsey, or a relation between a word like ‘tree’ and the mem-
bers of its extension, i.e. the trees. Price does not share this conception of
representational features: he thinks they are word-world relations which are
in some sense general.
After explaining the difference between these views, I show why glob-
alism is false if we define it using localists’ conceptions of representational
features, but that if we define it as globalists do, it actually follows from loc-
alism as localists define it. As such, localists and globalists are simply talking
past each other: they already agree that both the localist’s localism and the
globalist’s globalism are true.
These two chapters on creeping minimalism and the local/global debate
show that carefully understanding non-representationalism not in terms of
robustness and other similar ideas, but instead in terms of explanatory scep-
ticism, pays off. It helps us defend metaethical expressivism from the prob-
lem of creeping minimalism, and better understand several arguments in the
recent literature on that problem. It also allows us to completely undermine
the popular local/global debate, and thereby shows us that non-representa-
tionalists should focus on other topics.
1.7 Metaphysical impact
The final two chapters of this thesis are about the metaphysical impact of
non-representationalism. The view is meant to affect how we think about
metaphysics: more precisely, it is meant to undermine metaphysical inquiry
in some way. Earlier we saw Blackburn describing his pragmatic approach,
which he contrasts with what he calls a ‘truth-theoretic’ or metaphysical
approach which
identifies its problems in terms of questions of the form ‘what
is the ‘truth-maker’ or the fact involved in something or other?’
. . . ‘Analytical metaphysics’ looks at the elusive beasts in the
philosophical jungle, such as values, norms, natural laws, al-
ternative possibilities, numbers, and others in the same spirit.
Break them apart and see what they are made up of. This is the
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paradigm that has dominated recent philosophy to the point at
which other approaches are invisible to many writers. (Black-
burn, 2015, p.850)
On his pragmatic approach, he says, we can account for an area of language
‘without ever getting a picture of what the apparent subject matter of such
thought ‘is”. As such, he argues, metaphysics ‘bows out of the picture’
(Blackburn, 2015, p.850).
Huw Price argues for the same point. He starts with metaethical ex-
pressivism:
. . . what is at stake is the ability of pragmatism to escape cer-
tain sorts of metaphysical or ontological questions. One of the
great virtues of expressivism is the way it replaces metaphysical
questions with questions about human thought and language.
In place of metaphysical questions about the nature of value, or
modality, say, it offers us questions about the role and genea-
logy of evaluative and modal vocabularies—and these are ques-
tions about human behaviour, broadly construed, rather than
questions about some seemingly puzzling part of the metaphys-
ical realm. This shift is one of the things that makes Humean
expressivism attractive to naturalists. It simply sidesteps the
problem of finding a placing for value (or indeed causal neces-
sity!) in the kind of world that physics gives us reason to be-
lieve in. (There are concomitant epistemological virtues, too,
as was also clear to Hume.) So naturalists should embrace the
pragmatist-expressivist shift from philosophising about objects
to philosophising about vocabularies (Price, 2010, p.315)
Here we can see Price shifting from expressivism’s anti-metaphysical impact
to the impact of non-representationalism (the ‘pragmatist-expressivist shift’)
more generally.
In order to make clear sense of what it is that non-representationalism is
meant to undermine, I focus on the notion of truthmaking. This is simply
the idea that our statements and beliefs are made true by the world. This is
a core part of metaphysics. Moreover, we can understand common realist
positions in ethics in terms of truthmaker theory. Naturalists think that eth-
ical statements are made true by natural facts: non-naturalists think they are
made true by non-natural facts. Constructivists think they are made true by
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idealisations of our actual beliefs, for instance by what ideally consistent and
well-informed versions of ourselves would believe. Error theorists and fic-
tionalists think they are false, and so not made true at all. I take truthmaker
theory to be a simple and comprehensive way of understanding debates like
this.
We can divide the reasons why non-representationalism might under-
mine truthmaker investigations into two categories. The first is recent non-
representationalists’ commitment to minimalist or deflationary views of
truth, facts, and properties. Such views, which are in general independent
of specific non-representationalist views like metaethical expressivism, are
commonly thought to undermine the idea that our sentences and thoughts
are made true by the world. This is because these views say that truth is a
trivial notion which has no nature, and therefore cannot explain anything,
or even be explained in any more than a trivial way.
In Chapter 5 I focus on deflationism’s potential impact on truthmaking.
I argue that deflationism makes very little difference to truthmaking de-
bates. Some truthmaker theorists think deflationism is incompatible with
truthmaking: I show that their view rests on a misunderstanding of defla-
tionism and of the core idea behind truthmaker theory. I also show that
deflationists, including non-representationalists like Price and Blackburn,
have drawn false consequences concerning truthmaking from deflationist
ideas. As such, we should disregard the idea that deflationism undermines
truthmaking.
The other category is non-representationalists’ commitment to specific
views about representation and related concepts, for instance localists’ view
that we don’t need to explain a given area of language in terms of relations
with its subject matter, and globalists’ view that we never need general word-
world relations to explain language. In Chapter 6 I focus on these ideas. I
set out what I call the basic anti-metaphysical idea, an idea which drives the
view that non-representationalism undermines metaphysics. The basic idea
is simple: representation involves relations between words (and thoughts)
and the world, and this raises questions about the worldly relata of those
relations. Non-representationalism invokes no such relations, and so doesn’t
raise these questions. As Williams argues
Representationalist explanations of meaning tend to inherit the
apparent ontological commitments of the vocabulary under re-
view. A representationalist approach to moral predicates will
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tend to commit us ab initio to moral properties, and thus (if
we have naturalistic inclinations) to metaphysical worries about
their character. By contrast, the only antecedent ontological
commitments of use-theoretic approaches to meaning [i.e. non-
representationalism] are to speakers, their utterances, and so on:
that is, to things that everyone is bound to recognize anyway.
(Williams, 2013, p.130)
Here Williams is using ‘use-theoretic approaches’ to mean non-representa-
tionalism: the idea is that without invoking representation, we don’t end up
committed to entities as relata of representation relations.
Price takes this idea to be central to the anti-metaphysical impact of
non-representationalism. In perhaps his strongest statement of the basic
anti-metaphysical idea, he says:
Term by term, sentence by sentence, topic by topic, the rep-
resentationalist’s semantic ladder leads us from language to the
world, from words to their worldly objects. Somehow, the
resulting multiplicity of kinds of entities – values, modalities,
meanings, and the rest – needs to be accommodated within the
natural realm. To what else, after all, could natural speakers be
related by natural semantic relations?
Without a representationalist conception of the talk, however,
the puzzle takes a very different form. It remains in the lin-
guistic realm, a puzzle about a plurality of ways of talking, of
forms of human linguistic behaviour. The challenge is now
simply to explain in naturalistic terms how creatures like us
come to talk in these various ways. . . . Without representation-
alism, the joints between topics remain joints between kinds of
behaviour, and don’t need to be mirrored in ontology of any
other kind. (Price, 2013, p.20)
Representation, then, brings up questions about what is represented. Such
questions are metaphysical questions about certain properties, entities, and
of course truthmakers. By avoiding representation, truth, reference, and
similar concepts, the basic idea goes, non-representationalists avoid raising
those metaphysical questions, and so don’t need to answer them. Price calls
such metaphysical worries placement problems: they are problems of placing
certain truths and facts in the world.
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As with many other ideas in this thesis, I use explanatory scepticism to
make sense of the basic anti-metaphysical idea. The result is what I call the
anti-metaphysical thesis, which is really the heart of non-representationalists’
rejection of metaphysics. The thesis says this: wherever the non-represent-
ationalist can give her distinctive ‘what it does and why it’s there’ (‘WDT’)
theory for a discourse, they can thereby give a non-metaphysical resolution
of the placement problem for that discourse. This is the core way in which
non-representationalism purports to avoid metaphysics.
However, I argue that the anti-metaphysical thesis is false. First, if we
read the thesis as a global non-representationalist does, it has a whole class of
counterexamples. These are cases where we cannot explain a word without
using that very word, and hence invoking its subject matter. In such a case,
any placement problem we have about what that word refers to, or what
makes sentences involving it true, is not resolved by the distinctive non-
representationalist WDT theory of that word. The problem is simply raised
again, by that very theory.
Local non-representationalists may not worry about this: it doesn’t mat-
ter if global non-representationalism doesn’t always let us avoid metaphys-
ics. The more important thing is that specific local non-representationalist
theories, which as we’ve seen must avoid the subject matter of the language
they explain, will resolve placement problems in a non-metaphysical way,
and will not be vulnerable to the above argument.
However, I show that things are much worse. Not only is the anti-
metaphysical thesis false for global non-representationalism, it is false for
localism too. And not only are there counterexamples to the thesis, so
that non-representationalism cannot always avoid metaphysics. Instead, the
thesis’s contrary is true: such theories never avoid metaphysics.
This is because placement problems are not fundamentally about ex-
plaining a certain kind of language – about saying what it does and why we
have it. They are about explaining truths in the discourse in question: for
instance, the placement problem for ethics is fundamentally about explain-
ing ethical truths, explaining what makes things right and wrong. Non-rep-
resentationalism does not give us any such explanations. But nor does it
show us that we don’t need to give those explanations, nor that they are
trivial, or non-metaphysical, or cannot be given. Instead, if we take non-
representationalists’ focus on explanatory scepticism seriously, we find that
their WDT theories are simply independent of placement problems and the
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metaphysical issues raised.
At the end of Chapter 6 I apply these points to metaethical expressivism.
I argue against expressivists’ claims that their view vindicates ethics, and
thereby avoids the threat of error theory, the view that ethical statements are
uniformly false. I also undermine the common idea that expressivism avoids
the metaphysical issues of both naturalism and non-naturalism: I show that
in principle it is compatible with each view, and faces the same metaphys-
ical issues they face. Expressivism does not collapse the naturalism/non-
naturalism debate: it just leaves it unaffected.
In my concluding remarks, I sketch out some issues raised by my argu-
ments. I argue that non-representationalism is still an interesting view, and
that it does make a genuine difference if we accept it. However, it should not
be seen as a rival to realism or anti-realism nor as undermining either theory
either. Instead, we should recognise a new dimension along which theories
of an area of language can differ: whether they take the language in question
to be representational. This sits alongside distinctions concerning realism
and anti-realism, naturalism and non-naturalism, whereas previous writers
have understood it either to be inherently anti-realist, or else to collapse
these two distinctions by undermining their metaphysical foundations. My
conclusion is that non-representationalism is still a viable, interesting the-
ory, but it doesn’t undermine metaphysics.
Non-representationalism is a controversial view, particularly in ethics
where it has received the most attention. For instance, within ethics it faces
arguments that it makes ethical sentences not truth-apt, that it makes ethical
facts mind-dependent or subjective in some way, and that it cannot account
for logically complex sentences involving ethical language.8 In this thesis I
aim only to make sense of non-representationalism and its impact, and so I
will not discuss these objections, instead assuming that non-representation-
alism succeeds on its own terms.
1.8 Conclusion
To sum up: this thesis is about non-representationalism, a view most not-
ably applied to ethical language but also applied to many other kinds of
8 See for instance (Dworkin, 2011, pp.62–63), Jackson & Pettit (1998); Suikkanen
(2009), and Woods (2017) for discussions of these objections.
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language. It is a view which casts suspicion on the philosophical import-
ance of the idea that our language and thought represents the world around
us. In this thesis I will make sense of contemporary versions of this view,
arguing that what unites them is a core claim: explanatory scepticism. This
is the claim that the language in question can be explained in a certain way,
without saying it has representational features – without saying that it rep-
resents, describes, refers, has truth-conditions, and so on.
After making sense of the view, I use this interpretation to resolve two
recent debates in the literature: the problem of creeping minimalism, and
the debate between local and global non-representationalism. I then turn
to the question of how non-representationalism impacts metaphysics, and
argue that it has very little impact. As such we need to reconceive of non-
representationalism and its place in the debates it is involved in. However,
this is not all bad news for the non-representationalist.
chapter 2
MAKING SENSE OF
NON-REPRESENTATIONALIST
PRAGMATISM
2.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1, I introduced non-representationalist pragmatism – call it NRP,
or just pragmatism, for short. This is a group of theories united by their sus-
picion of the philosophical utility of notions like truth, reference, belief and
representation, at least as they apply to a limited range of language – ethical
language, causal language, and so on. However, the resemblance between
views as diverse as those of the writers I mentioned in the first chapter
– among them Allan Gibbard, Simon Blackburn, Amie Thomasson, Paul
Horwich, and Huw Price – is more of a family resemblance. There’s no
single feature which all these views share, but instead a few general threads
which run through them, which I’ve called a suspicion of truth, representa-
tion, and the other notions I’ve been discussing. In this chapter I will give a
thorough explanation of the ways in which this suspicion is manifested.
It’s difficult to give a general account of NRP for two reasons. First,
different non-representationalists may have different views about the same
notion. Consider for instance Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn’s views
about description as applied to ethical language. In his Thinking How to Live
(2003, p.112) Gibbard seems to deny that ethical language is descriptive. On
the other hand Blackburn has been happy to accept this:
In particular, notice that the word ‘description’ can go into the
deflationist pot along with ‘representation’. We describe how
things stand with norms and values, possible worlds, or num-
bers and sets. We believe the results of our descriptions (Black-
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burn, 2010b, p.4)
So different NRPs may disagree over specific notions like description.
NRPs are also suspicious of different notions. For instance, in one article
Blackburn accepts that ethical statements can be true and state facts:
Why does this not imply that there are no moral facts? Min-
imalism shows us why not. I have already given you a moral
opinion of mine: women should be educated. Here is another
way of putting it: it is true that women should be educated.
Here is another: it is a fact that women should be educated. If
we like we can go further up this progression, which I call Ram-
sey’s ladder: it is true that it is a fact . . . ; it is really true that it
is a fact . . . (Blackburn, 1999, p.217)
yet denies that they are representational: ‘moral opinion is not in the busi-
ness of representing the world’ (1999, p.214). Though Blackburn no longer
rejects ethical representation (see e.g. Blackburn 2015, p.81), this shows
how NRPs may adopt different attitudes towards different notions. A good
characterisation of NRP must be sensitive to this. As a result, we should
understand the distinctive stances NRPs take towards notions like repres-
entation and truth – stances I’ve so far lumped together as ‘suspicion’ – as
ones you can take towards some of these notions but not others.
Given these two issues, the rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. In
§2.2 I discuss the kinds of features under suspicion, and introduce the three
main claims NRPs make about them. I call these claims rejection, qualified
rejection, and explanatory scepticism. The final view, that representational
features have no role in explaining the target language, is the most import-
ant for contemporary NRP, so in §§2.3-2.5 I give a thorough account of
it and show how my account applies to extant NRP views. After doing
that in §2.6 I discuss rejection and qualified rejection, explaining the often
used but seldom explained terminology of ‘minimal’ and ‘robust’ represent-
ational features, and showing how these two claims fit in with explanatory
scepticism.
2.2 Representational features
So far I’ve talked about NRP’s suspicion of notions like truth, representa-
tion, belief, and so on. To get a full picture of the view we need to know
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exactly which notions are included. It’s convenient to give these a name, so
I’ll pick ‘representational features’. This is just for convenience. But what
are these features like, and are they linked in some way?
I won’t give necessary and sufficient conditions for being a represent-
ational feature. Partly this is because NRPs haven’t done so. Partly it is
because later in this thesis, debates will turn on which features count as
representational, and it’s more convenient to discuss this issue when it be-
comes relevant then. Instead I’ll give a brief survey of the kinds of features
included, and say what links them.
So far we’ve seen notions like truth, belief, representation and descrip-
tion. Here’s a list of these plus others that have been discussed:1
– x has truth-conditions/is truth-apt
– x expresses a proposition
– x makes a statement/an assertion
– x expresses a judgement/belief
– x is factual
– x refers to something/is referential
– x is true of/is satisfied by something
– x denotes/stands for something
– x represents something (as being some way)
– x represents a fact/the facts/the world/what exists/what’s ‘out there’
– x is representational
– x describes the world/is descriptive
These do seem to be linked at least loosely, and in a way that makes them
deserve to be called ‘representational’.
First, the majority of them concern some kind of relation between lin-
guistic things like words and sentences, and the things they are putatively
about, for instance between a referring term and its referent. Huw Price,
who along with other philosophers like Robert Brandom has made words
like ‘representationalism’ and ‘non-representationalism’ popular in describ-
ing theories like these, seems to have this idea in mind when he describes
‘representationalism’ as the view ‘that the linguistic items in question ‘stand
for’ or ‘represent’ something non-linguistic’ (2013, p.10).
1 Some of these are to be found in Robert Kraut’s list of properties (Kraut, 1990, p.159).
Others can be found in the literature cited in the rest of this chapter.
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Second, at least some of these properties are the kind found in a Tarskian
theory of truth for a language – reference, satisfaction, and truth. This
is interesting since many philosophers are interested in these theories, and
some think they can be used to give theories of meaning for languages.2
Third, many of these properties come as a package: something cannot
have one without having certain others. Consider the sentence ‘grass is
green’. This claim seems to have propositional content: roughly, it makes
sense to embed it in a ‘that’-clause. On one deflationist or minimalist view,
the sentence thereby trivially counts as having a host of representational
features. It expresses a proposition, namely 〈grass is green〉, it describes
and represents grass as being green, it can be used to assert or state that
grass is green, we can believe it, and if grass is green then it states a fact,
and correctly represents the world. All these trivially follow. We can also
say that its components have representational features: ‘grass’ and ‘green’
denote objects and properties, represent the world, and so on. NRPs are
typically deflationists about many, if not all, representational features, and
will therefore take these features as a package deal.
So, we have a rough list of the features of which NRPs are suspicious.
What do they say about these features, with regard to their chosen area of
language? Let’s call an area of language a discourse for simplicity. As far
as I can see there are three views which NRPs take regarding some given
representational feature F and a particular discourse:
Rejection The terms don’t have F.
Qualified Rejection The terms have F in one sense but not an-
other.
Explanatory Scepticism The best explanation of the terms doesn’t
require ascribing F to them.
Rejection is the favourite of old-style emotivists about ethical language, as
we saw in the previous chapter. Contemporary NRP mainly involves qual-
ified rejection and explanatory scepticism, and eschews outright rejection.
For instance, as we’ve seen, Blackburn and Gibbard no longer reject repres-
entational features in the case of ethical language.
We can use these three claims to define the core of non-representational-
ism. In my view, to count as a non-representational pragmatist at the very
2 See e.g. Davidson (1967).
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least you must take up explanatory scepticism. You must believe that the
terms in your chosen discourse are not explained by any representational
features. Explanatory scepticism is the core of contemporary NRP. Most of
the rest of this chapter is focused on making sense of this view. After doing
this, I’ll discuss the place of rejection and qualified rejection.
2.3 Explanatory scepticism
Explanatory scepticism is the view that certain features of the terms in ques-
tion are not explained by representational features. This explanatory view
is increasingly popular among NRPs:
Where pragmatism is distinctive is in holding that representa-
tion is nevertheless not the key concept to deploy when the de-
sire for philosophical explanation of our practice in some area
is upon us. It is not the way to understand the kind of thought
or the part of language in question, whereas a different focus on
the function of terms in the lives of thinkers and talkers, is the
better option. (Blackburn, 2015, p.851)
Whereas standard ‘representationalist’ views invoke substantial
notions of denotation and the like to explain the workings of
thinking and language, expressivists treat representation by de-
flation. [i.e. in a way which excludes it from having an explan-
atory role] (Gibbard, 2015, p.211)
I am not proposing merely that genuine representation turns
out to be a linguistic function that is not in play in our own
language, but that representation . . . is a theoretical category
we should dispense with altogether. The right thing to do, as
theorists . . . is to stop talking about representation altogether,
to abandon the project of theorising about word-world relations
in these terms (Price, 2011, p.10)
In all three of these passages we see the idea that representation and the
like play no role in some kind of explanation of our language. This idea is
prominent elsewhere too.3
3 See e.g. Gross et al. (2015, p.6), Price (2004, p.209), Price & O’Leary-Hawthorne
(1996, p.115), Blackburn (2010b, p.172), Williams (2013, p.128), Chrisman (2011), Dreier
(2004), Ridge (2014, pp.103ff), and Toppinen (2015).
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The idea in the above quotations is that representational features have no
role to play in explaining the terms of the discourse. Explaining these terms
doesn’t require treating them as representational – as ascribing representa-
tional features to them. To understand this view, we need to know what it
is to explain a term. The idea of an explanation of a term or discourse is par-
ticular to non-representationalism, so we shouldn’t expect it to match any
natural pretheoretical notion. In explaining it I will leave some concepts, in-
cluding meaning and explanation, open to limited interpretation in order to
allow NRPs to disagree with each other over details. To compensate for the
resulting general and abstract account of explanatory scepticism, I’ll then
show how this account can be applied to several extant NRP views.
Looking at the literature, an explanation of a discourse seems to have
two parts: saying what the terms in question ‘do’, and saying why we have
terms that ‘do’ this. Ethical expressivism gives us a simple example which
will be our template: What do ethical terms ‘do’? They express attitudes,
which aren’t fundamentally like beliefs. Why are they there? Because it is
useful to have terms which express attitudes.
The best statement of this two-part view comes from Blackburn’s defin-
ition of ‘pragmatism’:
You will be a pragmatist about an area of discourse if you pose a
. . . question: how does it come about that we go in for this kind
of discourse and thought? What is the explanation of this bit of
our language game? And then you offer an account of what
we are up to in going in for this discourse, and the account es-
chews any use of the referring expressions of the discourse; any
appeal to anything that a Quinean would identify as the values
of the bound variables if the discourse is regimented; or any se-
mantic or ontological attempt to ‘interpret’ the discourse in a
domain, to find referents for its terms, or truth makers for its
sentences . . . Instead the explanation proceeds by talking in dif-
ferent terms of what is done by so talking. It offers a revelatory
genealogy or anthropology or even a just-so story about how
this mode of talking and thinking and practising might come
about, given in terms of the functions it serves. (Blackburn,
2013, p.75)
Here, ‘an account of what we are up to’, of ‘what is done by so talking’ is the
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‘what it does’ component. The question ‘how does it come about that we go
in for this kind of discourse and thought?’ is the ‘why it’s there’ question.
The kinds of answer Blackburn wants to eschew involve representational
features (reference, truth, and so on). The focus on ‘what is done’ by using
these terms partly explains why people call NRP views ‘pragmatist’.
This two-part idea can be found elsewhere:
The challenge [for the NRP] is now simply to explain in nat-
uralistic terms how creatures like us come to talk in these vari-
ous ways. This is a matter of explaining what role the different
language games play in our lives – what differences there are
between the functions of talk of value and the functions of talk
of electrons, for example. (Price, 2013, p.20)
Here Price’s talk of ‘function’ and ‘role’ points at both ‘what it does’ and
‘why it’s there’ theories (we will return to the idea of a function in a mo-
ment). Gibbard describes part of his project like so:
. . . from a basis that excludes normative facts and treats human-
ity as part of the natural world, I explain why we would have
normative concepts that act much as normative realist proclaim.
(Gibbard, 2003, p.xii)
Michael Williams offers what he calls an ‘EMU’, an explanation of meaning
in terms of use. An EMU provides a ‘what it does’ explanation in terms
of use patterns of language, and a ‘why it’s there’ explanation as to why we
have terms with those use patterns (2013, pp.134ff).
The goal of offering a two-part theory like this is distinctive of NRPs.
Their focus on explaining a discourse differs from other theories which ask
questions about the subject matter of that discourse. While NRPs focus
on saying why we have ethical language, other kinds of theories may say
what ethical facts and properties are like. Theories like this are often simply
labelled ‘metaphysics’ by NRPs, who take their view to be in some way anti-
metaphysical. In the second part of this thesis I ask whether NRP is really
opposed to metaphysics, and there the role of the two-part NRP theory
becomes extremely important.
Given the two-part idea, we should read explanatory scepticism as the
view that the best explanation of what the terms of the discourse do, and
why we have terms which do this, does not involve treating those terms as
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representational, i.e. as having representational features. But what does this
mean?
First, it’s clear that not every feature of a word is relevant to what it
does. ‘Good’ has four letters, but having four letters isn’t what it does. It
has a particular etymology, but studying its etymology isn’t studying what
it does. Moreover it’s not clear how to narrow the field of relevant features.
It’s not what is distinctive of the word – ‘good’ is distinctive in its appearance
in great works of moral philosophy, but this isn’t what it does either.
One suggestion is to say what a term does by saying what state of mind
it is used to express. This is the expressivist route.4 Explanatory scepticism
is then the view that we can say what states of mind the target language ex-
presses without treating it as representational. However, this route ignores
inferentialists like Brandom (2008) and Matthew Chrisman (2011) who of-
ten describe themselves as pragmatists, or as opposed to representational-
ism, yet don’t focus on the expression of mental states. Instead they take
a language-focused inferentialist approach, and focus on the rules for using
language – when speakers are permitted or required to assert or deny sen-
tences. They may say these rules can be specified without representational
features. We need to include such views, and the expressivist route rules
them out.
To avoid these problems, I suggest we follow Jamie Dreier’s (2004) lead,
and build explanation into the notion of what the discourse does from the
start. On this reading, to say what a term t does is to specify the property
or properties of t which explain some of its important features. But which
features? On Dreier’s view, the feature to be explained is the meaning of
the term, or more precisely the fact that it means what it does. To say what a
term does, then, is to specify the features it has which explain why it means
what it does.
I want to expand this to include facts about use, since as we’ll see later
some NRPs may want to talk about use rather than meaning. As such, on
this reading, to say what a term does is to specify the properties it has which
explain the fact that it has the meaning it does, and/or the fact that it is used
as it is. Explanatory scepticism involves saying that the best explanation
of the meaning and/or use of the term doesn’t require treating it as repres-
4 Indeed Gibbard (2015) takes ‘expressivism’ just to apply to theories like this. In this
he differs from others who would call such a theory a Gricean or psychologistic theory of
meaning, and reserve ‘expressivism’ for the view that the relevant states of mind are unlike
beliefs.
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entational. Roughly, it’s the view that the term may have representational
features, but it’s not because it has these features that it means what it does,
or is used as it is.
This is an appealing interpretation. Most importantly, NRPs can con-
sistently accept this view yet maintain that the terms in question do have
representational features. It’s not that the terms lack these features, only
that we don’t need to mention that they have them in order to explain their
meaning or use. Moreover, so far there is room for NRPs to interpret the
three crucial notions – explanation, meaning and use – as they like. This
allows some disagreement, as we’ll see when we apply the account.
Given the discussion of the ‘what it does’ component, it’s straightfor-
ward to interpret the ‘why it’s there’ component. It says why humans have
terms which do what these terms do, i.e. to say why humans have words
with the features specified in the ‘what it does’ explanation. For example, ex-
pressivists will want to say why humans use terms which express attitudes,
and they may do this by saying that having words like this enables disagree-
ment and deliberation about how to act, and is therefore very practically
beneficial. The correct answer to the ‘why it’s there’ question depends on
the answer to the ‘what it does’ question.
This focus on ‘why it’s there’ allows us to make sense of non-represent-
ationalists’ use of the word ‘function’. If we follow the notion of function
defended byWright (1973), the function of a word is the feature it has which
explains why it’s there. So we can see the idea that giving a ‘what it does
and why it’s there’ theory of a word will specify its function, since it gives
an aetiological explanation of why we have a word with the role specified in
the ‘what it does’ component.
We can now summarise explanatory scepticism in its general form:
(ES) The best explanation of (i) the meaning and/or use of the
relevant terms (e.g. ethical terms) and (ii) why humans have terms
with the features that explain their meaning and/or use doesn’t
require treating those terms as representational
From now on, I’ll talk about an explanation of ‘what it does and why it’s
there’ as an explanation of the discourse or term. This is just a stipulation –
I’ll use different names for any other theories which might deserve this one.
Next I will explore several specific applications of ES, to show how it neatly
matches actual NRP theories. I will also make some general comments
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about what notions of meaning and explanation are suitable for NRPs to
use.
2.4 Applying explanatory scepticism
We can now put (ES) to work by applying it to NRP views. I’ll apply it to
ethical expressivism and then widen the application to include other NRP
views including Horwich’s deflationism about truth.
2.4.1 Ethical expressivism
Applying the ‘what it does’ component, we can read expressivists as saying
that the best explanation of the meaning and/or use of ethical terms doesn’t
require treating them as representational. In my view, the best interpreta-
tion of ‘explanation of the meaning’ here is given by Dreier (2004, p.35),
who takes it to mean a constitutive explanation of the meaning of ethical
terms. In other words, this is to say what it is in virtue of which ethical
terms mean what they do. Applying the idea, we get:
The best theory of what constitutes the fact that ethical terms
mean what they do does not require treating those terms as rep-
resentational
This is expressivism’s explanatory scepticism about what ethical language
‘does’.
On this reading, therefore, to explain the discourse involves first saying
what constitutes the fact that ethical terms mean what they do. Giving a
theory like this for ethical terms will involve filling in the blanks in claims
like
1. Sentence s means something ethical in virtue of —————
2. Word w means good in virtue of —————
3. Sentence s means torture is wrong in virtue of —————
To fill in the blanks will involve saying what constitutes a term’s having a
distinctive ethical meaning. There’s no need to go too deeply into the no-
tion of constitution here, since this is just an illustration. However we can
say that at the very least the notion is an explanatory one – a fact or prop-
erty should explain or illuminate the fact or property that it constitutes,
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in some sense. Later I’ll say more about which notions of explanation are
appropriate for NRP in general.
Given this framework, explanatory scepticism will involve saying that
whatever fills in the blanks in the statements above, it will not involve
ascribing any representational features to the terms in question. So even if
NRPs accept that ‘wrong’ refers towrongness (where reference is a represent-
ational feature), or that ‘wrong’ expresses beliefs which attribute wrongness
to things, they will also say that it’s not in virtue of having these properties
that ‘wrong’ means wrong. And crucially, accepting that something has a
property is compatible with denying that the property has a given explanat-
ory role, so explanatory scepticism does not entail rejection.
There is good evidence that this reading makes sense of expressivism. It
makes sense because NRP theories are clearly after an account of what it
is to make an ethical (or modal, or causal, or . . . ) assertion. For instance
here’s Gibbard:
The idea is to explain the meaning of the word via explaining the
states of mind that constitute believing things couched with the
term (Gibbard, 2015, p.212, emphasis added)
We can also see this in Blackburn when he talks about the question of ‘what
makes a practice a moral practice’ (2015, p.845), i.e. what makes our use of
ethical sentences count as expressing ethical meaning rather than something
else. There are other endorsements of this idea in the literature.5
In other words, expressivists are interested in what it is to say something
which has ethical content. Such an account is rightly read as an account of
what constitutes ethical content. In fact, expressivists go so far as to make
claims about what an ethical mental state is:
To hold a value, then, is typically to have a relatively stable dis-
position to conduct practical life and practical discussion in a
particular way: it is to be disposed or set in that way, and not-
ably to be set against change in this respect (Blackburn, 1998,
p.67).
Here Blackburn is saying what it is to hold a value, i.e. to have an ethical
belief. Expressivists then supplement this with a psychologistic view that
5 See: Blackburn (1993, p.19), Gibbard (2003, pp.6-7), Gibbard (2013, pp.219f) Chris-
man (2011), Ridge (2014, p.103ff), Williams (2013), Brandom (2013, p.86).
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the meaning of ethical sentences consists in their expressing these mental
states. Expressivism therefore clearly provides an answer to the ‘in virtue
of’ questions:
4. Sentence s means something ethical in virtue of being used to express
a practical attitude of a certain kind
5. Word w means good in virtue of the fact that w expresses a positive
practical attitude or plan
6. Sentence s means torture is wrong in virtue of expressing disapproval
of torture, or a plan involving avoiding torturing.
Since expressivism’s positive theory of what ethical language does neatly fits
this template, there’s good reason to read its negative claim about represent-
ational features in this way too.
We can also use this to make sense of other NRP theories about eth-
ical language. We can read an ethical inferentialist like Chrisman as saying
something like:
7. The English word ‘good’ means good in virtue of the fact that certain
inferences involving ‘good’ are required or permitted in English.
We can also read rival theories like naturalist and non-naturalist metaethical
realism in this way:
8. The English word ‘good’ means good in virtue of describing objects as
having the sui generis property goodness.
9. The English word ‘good’ means good in virtue of describing objects as
having the natural property goodness.
These two claims give an explanatory role to description and as such are
representationalist views.
Filling in (ES) in this way will also generalise to NRP theories of other
discourses. For instance we can fill in NRP claims about causation and
modality. Blackburn’s Humean expressivism about causation takes causal
language to express inferential dispositions, for instance the disposition to
expect the billiard ball to move when one sees another ball has strike it. We
can fill this in, albeit in quite general terms, like so:
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10. ‘cause’ means cause in virtue of the fact that it expresses inferential
dispositions, for instance to infer the existence of the effect from the
existence of the cause (Blackburn, 1990a)
Thomasson argues that modal claims make explicit rules of language use. In
this way they are like the statements of the rules of a board game written on
the box. For instance, ‘necessarily all bachelors are men’ makes explicit that
the rules of use for ‘bachelor’ and ‘man’ permit speakers to apply the former
only when the latter is permitted. It is somewhat like a rule that says: apply
‘bachelor’ only when you can also apply ‘man’. As such we can formulate
Thomasson’s view more generally:
11. ‘necessarily’ means necessarily in virtue of the fact that it makes lin-
guistic rules explicit. (Thomasson, 2007)
These are positive pragmatist claims saying what does constitute the relevant
terms’ meaning, rather than negative claims saying what doesn’t. But this
still illustrates the usefulness of reading the ‘what it does’ component in
terms of constitution of meaning.
We’ve seen how to understand what expressivists say about what eth-
ical language ‘does’. Next we can look at the ‘why it’s there’ component.
On this reading (ES) says that the best explanation of why humans have
terms with the meaning constituting properties of ethical terms doesn’t re-
quire treating those terms as representational. Expressivists think that eth-
ical terms express attitudes of some kind, and this claim says that we can
explain why humans have terms which express attitudes without treating
those terms as representational.
To support this, expressivists argue that humans can cooperate and col-
lectively decide what to do if they can share and dispute their practical
states. The ability to do this is crucial for successful collective action and
so survival. Expressivists argue that this is most effectively achieved by hav-
ing language which allows us to share, disagree and hypothesise about our
states. But this is just what ethical language allows us to do. So according
to expressivists, there is a clear explanation of why humans have a language
which does what the expressivist takes it to do. And at no point did it
require attributing representational features to ethical language.6 It’s im-
portant to note that isn’t intended to be a conclusive and comprehensive
6 See Blackburn (1988) for an account like this.
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account, but as a proof of concept – to make it plausible that there is such
an account which does not treat ethical terms as representational.
In sum, ethical expressivists’ explanatory scepticism is the claim that eth-
ical terms have their meaning in virtue of expressing attitudes which con-
trast with belief, rather than in virtue of having representational features,
and that the best explanation of why humans have terms which express at-
titudes needn’t involve ascribing such features to them.
2.4.2 Other applications
Filling in (ES) in terms of meaning and constitution isn’t the only option.
A pragmatist might be sceptical about meaning and meaning facts or prop-
erties.7 Perhaps meaning is too indeterminate, or simply doesn’t form an
interesting unified category for philosophical study. (Perhaps she thinks
that the notion of meaning is no clearer than the notion of what a word
‘does’.) In such a case, she might disregard meaning properties and replace
them with the overall usage facts about the terms, i.e. all the facts about
the circumstances in which they are uttered. This corresponds to the ap-
pearance of ‘use’ in my characterisation of ES. Her claim would then be
that the representational features of ‘good’ aren’t among those which ex-
plain the overall usage of the word. She may then want to read ‘explain’ in
causal-historical terms. On this reading, we can give an explanation of the
laws which explain why the term ‘good’ is used in the way it is, without
mentioning representational features at all.
Interestingly, one prominent non-representationalist – Paul Horwich –
has views on which this reading comes to more or less the same as the mean-
ing and constitution reading. Horwich believes that whatever underlying
property constitutes a term’s meaning what it does, that underlying prop-
erty must explain the overall use of the term (Horwich, 1998a, p.45). In
other words, because of his view about constitution and meaning, he thinks
that
x’s having F constitutes x’s meaning what it does
just is
x’s having F explains x’s overall use
7 Thanks to Huw Price for this point and for suggesting the positive view in this para-
graph.
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Therefore for Horwich, the first reading of the ‘what it does’ theory comes
to much the same thing as the second. Whether this interesting entailment
holds for other pragmatists who take the meaning and constitution read-
ing depends on how they understand constitution and meaning, since it’s
Horwich’s particular view about these notions that leads to this result.
Indeed Horwich’s own deflationary theory of truth follows the two-part
‘what it does and why it’s there’ pattern (Horwich, 1998b). Horwich first
claims that the meaning of the truth predicate ‘x is true’ is constituted by
our disposition to infer according to the T-schema:
(T) 〈p〉 is true iff p
where ‘〈p〉’ abbreviates ‘the proposition that p’. According to Horwich, this
means that our disposition to infer according to this schema is what gives the
most basic explanation of our use of the predicate ‘x is true’. This doesn’t
require ascribing any representational features to ‘x is true’, like referring
to or denoting the truths or truth, or representing x as true. So Horwich
is giving an NRP answer to the ‘what it does’ question about the truth-
predicate.
Horwich then goes on to answer the ‘why it’s there’ question (1998b,
pp.2ff). He argues that we use the truth predicate because it gives us ex-
pressive power we couldn’t easily get without it. The truth predicate allows
us to assert claims whose content we don’t know, or collections of claims
too numerous to list. For instance, if I want to agree with Ella’s funniest
remark I can say ‘Ella’s funniest remark is true’ even if I don’t know what
they said. The truth predicate also lets me make quantified claims like ‘For
any proposition x, x is true iff the double negation of x is true’. Horwich
takes this to explain why we have a truth-predicate whose meaning is con-
stituted in a non-representational way. Horwich’s view clearly exhibits the
two-part structure I’ve outlined.
2.5 Explanation
So far we’ve seen several different ways of interpreting explanatory scepti-
cism – of filling in the gaps in ES. However we might wonder in general
how to understand the notion of explanation used here. In fact there isn’t
a philosophical consensus on what explanation is, or whether it is a uni-
vocal notion. There are different kinds of explanation and different theories
of each, for instance scientific explanation, causal explanation, constitutive
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explanation, metaphysical explanation. And there is no agreed logic for ex-
planation, though most would agree on certain principles, for instance that
explanation is not truth-functional and not monotonic.
As such I don’t think we should aim to understand all non-representa-
tionalists as being concerned with the same kind of explanation. As we saw
above, Dreier is interested in a constitutive notion of explanation, while
Price is interested in a causal-historical kind, and Horwich is interested in
both, which more or less come to the same thing for him. Dreier men-
tions the notion of an ‘illuminating’ explanation, and this is reflected in
Blackburn’s use of Wittgenstein’s idea of a ‘übersichtliche Darstellung’ – a
‘perspicuous representation’ – of an area of our language and thought. Black-
burn doesn’t give a full theory of what this means, but we can understand
the rough idea. In particular, in the case of ethics, Blackburn thinks it is
more perspicuous to understand ethical commitments as practical attitudes
rather than saying that they represent things as having ethical features. I
think Dreier would say such an explanation is more illuminating. This is
rough, but it is enough to see what non-representationalists are after.
However, there’s another crucial point about explanation. Sometimes
it’s convenient to talk about explaining meaning: ‘expressivists try to ex-
plain the meaning of ethical language’, ‘representational features do not ex-
plain the meaning of causal language’, and so on. We saw an example of this
in the quote from Gibbard on p.33. This phrase is ambiguous. I can explain
the meaning of a word in one sense by giving a constitutive explanation of
the fact that it means what it does, or perhaps by giving a causal-historical
explanation of the fact that it has the properties which constitute this fact.
Or, crucially, I can explain its meaning by telling you that it means dog.
The first is explanation as constitutive (or causal) explanation, the second
is explanation as specifying or telling. These kinds of explanation are inde-
pendent. I can tell you that in John Le Carré’s slang, ‘babysitter’ means
bodyguard, without telling you what makes this so, or what caused it to be
so. You can tell me that ‘the Circus’ means whatever it does in virtue of be-
ing used in a certain way by Le Carré, or that he chose that word for various
reasons, without telling me what that word means.
As I’ve outlined it, explanatory scepticism does not concern explaining
as telling or specifying. This means that it is absolutely not the view that
you cannot use an ascription of a representational property to specify the
meaning of a term. For example, it may be perfectly reasonable to tell
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someone what ‘babysitter’ means by saying that it is true of all and only
bodyguards. The same goes for ethical language. Nor does NRP aim to fill
in the blanks in sentences like:
12. The sentence ‘torture is wrong’ means —————
with any kind of expressivist or NRP claim. The expressivist doesn’t say
that when I utter ‘torture is wrong’ what I mean is that I have a particular
attitude. Non-representationalists aren’t out to say what ethical sentences
mean, but to say what their meaning consists in (or what explains their use).
To use the jargon, NRP is not a semantic theory, telling us what sentences
mean, but ametasemantic theory, saying what makes them have the meaning
they do. Of course, the NRP can go for the semantic claim too if she wants
– but it’s wrong to read NRP as essentially making the semantic claim, since
it doesn’t match what NRPs actually say.
In particular, this means that NRPs can accept semantic theories which
ascribe representational features in order to yield a theory which specifies
the meanings of various sentences. Such a theory might have axioms like
13. Term t refers to torture
14. Predicate f denotes the set {x | x is wrong}
15. A sentence featuring just a predicate and a singular term is true if and
only if the object to which the singular term refers is a member of the
set which the predicate denotes.
which entail theorems which specify the meaning of sentences by giving
their truth-conditions
16. The sentence f(t) is true if and only if torture is in the set {x | x is
wrong}, i.e. if and only if torture is wrong.
The non-representationalist can accept that some sentences like this are true,
and may be used to explain the meaning of a sentence in the second sense
– to specify it. But this doesn’t entail that they explain the meaning in the
first sense. The claim ‘f denotes the set {x | x is wrong}’ may be true yet not
explain the claim ‘f means wrong’, as we saw above. So pragmatists do not
intend to conflict with semantic theories like this, though it’s controversial
whether they can actually avoid this conflict in the end.8
8 See Price (2004); Horwich (1998a, p.52) and the discussion in Horisk (2007); Gross
et al. (2015); Burgess (2011); Williams (1999).
40
2.6 Rejection and qualified rejection
This concludes my discussion of explanatory scepticism. However there are
two other views that NRPs take: rejection and qualified rejection. Rejec-
tion is straightforward: it’s that the language in question lacks the relevant
representational feature. Rejection was the primary view of emotivists like
Ayer and of expressivists like Blackburn and Gibbard in their earlier work.
As we saw in Chapter 1, Ayer simply denied that ethical sentences were
true or false, and Blackburn and Gibbard followed this in their earlier work.
However rejection is no longer common.
However it’s important to note that many critics have a tendency to
read NRP as primarily or even essentially adopting rejection toward all rep-
resentational features.9 Call this reading the rejection reading. This reading
in fact seems to be orthodox among critics, and there is a question about
whether it’s a good reading of the literature. But it doesn’t really matter
for my purposes. Instead I rule out the rejection reading by fiat: I am not
interested in positions for which the rejection reading would be correct. I
believe that Blackburn and Gibbard’s positions in particular are not cor-
rectly characterised by that reading, but if you disagree then instead simply
read me as discussing a possible position one could extract from the work of
Blackburn, Gibbard, and the other writers I have mentioned.
This point is extremely important, for some arguments concerning NRP
may simply be irrelevant when we adopt the understanding I’ve suggested.
For suppose such an argument involves the premise that NRPs believe that
the relevant sentences do not have truth-conditions. Given my reading of
the view, this premise would be false, and any argument based on it would
be unsound. When assessing NRP we must be aware of this, and also of
the persistence of the rejection reading. However, we must also be aware
that many arguments against it may not be vulnerable in this way, because
they are best read as arguing that NRP ends up entailing rejection itself.
Arguments like this do not involve the rejection reading; they argue that
NRPs end up with rejection whether or not they want it.
However, as I said in Chapter 1, in this thesis I am assuming that NRP
is successful insofar as it overcomes the three objections I outlined. This is
9 Some relatively recent examples: Parfit (2011, vol. 2, pp.378ff), Suikkanen (2009,
p.365), Jackson et al. (1994, p.287), Divers & Miller (1994, p.13), Smith (1994, p.3), Jack-
son (1999, p.422), Jackson & Pettit (1998, p.239), Brink (1989, p.18–19), Blome-Tillmann
(2009), Cuneo (2006, p.37).
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because I’m interested in NRP’s impact and overall interest if it succeeds
on its own terms. I shall therefore not discuss arguments which say that
NRP entails or involves rejection, because NRPs will count their view as
unsuccessful on their own terms if those arguments are right. This is not to
say that such arguments aren’t right, just that I’m not interested in them for
the purposes of this thesis. From here on, then, we should not read NRP as
essentially or even primarily rejecting the relevant notions.
Qualified rejection is a lot more common in the work of contempor-
ary non-representationalists. Qualified rejection is the view that the terms
in question have the relevant representational feature in one sense but lack
it in others. Consider for example ethical expressivists’ views about belief.
Early ethical expressivists denied that ethical states of minds are beliefs be-
cause of their views about the motivational power of ethical commitments.
According to expressivists, ethical states of mind are intrinsically motivat-
ing, but ordinary beliefs are not (see Blackburn 1984, pp.187-189). My belief
that the pub is open does not by itself motivate me to act. How I act on this
belief depends on my desires – whether I want a beer, to avoid the landlady,
or something else. This is sometimes called a Humean account of belief.
Expressivists think that ethical states of mind are not Humean beliefs,
because they are intrinsically motivating. If I have an ethical commitment,
say that the pub is an immoral place, this by itself will motivate me to act
in certain ways, like to avoid the pub and encourage others to do so too.
Early expressivists took ‘belief’ simply to mean ‘Humean belief’, and as such
denied that ethical states of mind are beliefs at all.
However, expressivists’ views have changed. Instead of thinking that
no beliefs are intrinsically motivating, they now think that not all beliefs
are intrinsically motivating. This allows ethical states of mind to count as
beliefs. In particular expressivists may accept the view that any assertoric
sentence expresses a belief:
. . . For there is nothing to prevent a theorist from allowing a
promiscuous, catholic, universal notion of ‘belief’ —one that
simply tags along with assertion, acceptance or commitment
(Blackburn, 2010b, p.4)
Expressivists now tend to think that ethical mental states are not Humean
beliefs, but nevertheless are beliefs. They therefore deny that ethical terms
express beliefs in one sense, but they accept it in another.
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This view is a qualified rejection of representational features. Qualified
rejection is possible because there are often different ways of understanding
representational notions, as we just saw with belief. It’s important to re-
cognise the possibility of qualified rejection, because sometimes it may be
unclear whether a pragmatist is rejecting a representational feature outright
(as Ayer does) or whether she is making a more subtle qualified rejection.
Misunderstanding on this point may lead to irrelevant criticisms of NRP.
Moreover an NRP may well sign up for qualified rejection but label it as
outright rejection. For instance, she may understand belief in a Humean
way, and as such say that ethical language does not expresses beliefs, and
not qualify that claim. However she may at the same time accept that eth-
ical mental states have truth-conditions, and are truth-apt, and so on. This
kind of view is essentially qualified rejection, just not explicitly recognised
as such. It’s inevitable that qualified rejection will present itself in this form,
because different pragmatists may simply have different views about what
representational features are like.
What are the different conceptions of representational features which
NRPs accept and reject? Often qualified rejection is stated using words like
‘thin’ and ‘minimal’ to describe the representational features the terms have,
and ‘robust’ and ‘substantial’ to describe those they lack. For instance here’s
James Lenman:
Thus the Expressivist might say that moral sentences are truth-
apt in that they have deflationary truth conditions but they lack
inflationary truth conditions; or that they are minimally but
not robustly truth-apt; or that moral assertions do not belong
to some full-blooded category of assertions proper but to a wider
class of quasi-assertions. (Lenman, 2003, p.33, original emphasis)
Neil Sinclair applies this idea to beliefs, saying that expressivism ‘can be
understood as claiming that moral sentences in their sincere assertoric uses
do not express robust beliefs’ which are to be distinguished from minimal
beliefs (Sinclair, 2006, p.253). Distinctions of this kind can also be found
elsewhere.10 One general way of describing qualified rejection is to say that
it is the view that the relevant representational feature applies in a thin or
minimal sense but not a robust sense.
10 See e.g. Williams (2013, pp.130-131) Price & O’Leary-Hawthorne (1996, passim),
Macarthur & Price (2007, p.240), (Blackburn, 1999, p.217), Price (2013, p.24), van Roojen
(2014).
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Critics have complained that NRPs’ use of terms like ‘robust’ and ‘min-
imal’ is obscure. Consider for instance John MacFarlane’s discussion of
Huw Price’s (2013). MacFarlane claims that ‘it is not entirely clear what
counts as a “substantial word-world semantic relation”’ (for Price,‘word-
world semantic relation’ just means ‘representational feature’):
. . . It does not help that Price tends to characterize represent-
ationalism using words like “stand for” or “represent” in scare
quotes, or phrases like “substantive semantic relation,” whose
meanings aren’t any clearer than “representationalism” itself.
(There is so little explicit attention to this issue in the lectures
and commentaries that I sometimes felt like an imposter: if you
have to ask, you shouldn’t be here! ) (MacFarlane, 2014, p.4)
I think MacFarlane’s point is reasonable; these terms are frequently used
with little explanation. It doesn’t help that different NRPs use them differ-
ently. However, it would be pessimistic and uncharitable to disregard NRP
over this issue. For there are several different distinctions in play among
NRPs, each of which can be explained clearly.
Let’s start with the ‘minimal’ sense in which NRPs think representa-
tional features do apply. NRPs accept whatever features of language and
thought trivially follow from the fact that the terms they’re interested in
have propositional content. Roughly, if we can say that an ethical sentence
like ‘torture is wrong’ has propositional content, i.e. says that p for some
p, then we can say that it is truth-apt, expresses beliefs, makes assertions
or statements, aims to state facts and describe the world, and so on. The
whole suite of representational features follows simply from its having pro-
positional content. A good example of this is in Blackburn’s view about
truth, expressed using the metaphor of Ramsey’s ladder
Because of minimalism we can have for free what look[s] like a
ladder of philosophical ascent: ‘p’, ‘it is true that p’, ‘it is really
and truly a fact that p’ . . . , for none of these terms, in Ramsey’s
view, marks an addition to the original judgement. You can as
easily make the last judgement as the first—Ramsey’s ladder is
lying on the ground, horizontal. (Blackburn, 1998, p.78)
Blackburn then goes on to apply this to other representational features:11
11 See also (Blackburn, 2010b, p.4) on representation, description and belief, cited above.
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Minimalism seems to let us end up saying, for instance, that
‘kindness is good’ represents the facts. For ‘represents the facts’
means no more than: ‘is true’. . . . The ethical proposition is
what it is and not another thing; its truth means that it repres-
ents the ethical facts or the ethical properties of things. We can
throw in mention of reality: ethical propositions are really true.
Since we already have a sketch of a minimalist theory of ethical
cognition . . .we might even find ourselves saying that we know
moral propositions to be true. Or, really true, or really factually
true, or really in accord with the eternal harmonies and verities
that govern the universe, if we like that kind of talk. . . . Just
because of minimalism about truth and representation, there is
no objection to tossing them in for free, at the end. (Blackburn,
1998, pp.79-80)
We can also see this in Gibbard:
Suppose instead that minimalists are right for truth, for facts,
and for belief: there is no more to claiming “It’s true that pain is
bad” than to claim that pain is bad; the fact that pain is bad just
consists in pain’s being bad; to believe that pain is bad is just to
accept that it is. Then it’s true that pain is bad and it’s a fact that
pain is bad—so long as, indeed, pain is bad. I genuinely believe
that pain is bad, and my expressivistic theory, filled out, explains
what believing this consists in. (Gibbard, 2003, pp.182-3)
Here Gibbard is talking about the idea that belief truth and facts trivially
follow in the case of ethical language – after the expressivist explanation of
ethical mental states is complete.
This doesn’t mean that it is trivial whether a given group of sentences
have propositional content. Expressivists justify their view that ethical sen-
tences have propositional content, for instance by appealing to notions like
disagreement (Gibbard, 2003, pp.65ff). However, they will think that all
the representational features follow trivially from this. If ‘torture is wrong’
means torture is wrong, then it expresses the proposition 〈torture is wrong〉,
represents torture as being wrong, ascribes the property wrongness to tor-
ture, and so on. There is nothing more to representing torture as being
wrong than meaning torture is wrong; more generally any sentence which
means b is F represents b as being F. This is what NRPs mean when they
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say that their chosen terms have representational features in aminimal sense.
We can then see ‘robust’ as marking out those features that terms and sen-
tences can only have if they satisfy more than these minimal requirements.
What requirements? What marks out representational features as ‘ro-
bust’, ‘substantial’, ‘thick’ ones? As far as I can see the most prominent use
of these terms is to mark out explanatory scepticism, which we’ve already
discussed at length. However, note that with explanatory scepticism there
is no distinction made between robust and non-robust kinds of representa-
tional features, but instead a distinction between the uses to which repres-
entational features are put. It’s not very accurate to say that NRPs deny
robust representational features; it’s more accurate to say that they refuse
to use them robustly, in explaining the target discourse. And indeed it’s far
simpler to say that they deny that such features help explain the discourse,
doing away with the term ‘robust’ altogether. It’s easy to see how explanat-
ory scepticism pairs with a view of representational features as minimal in
the above sense: if representational features are mere trivial entailments of
propositional content, they won’t play any role in explaining it.
Aside from the explanatory one I can see three other uses in the liter-
ature. The first is between environmental and non-environmental repres-
entation, with environmental representation usually being counted as the
‘robust’ kind. Environmental representation is, roughly, a causal tracking
relation between a term and features of the speaker’s environment. For
instance we may think of a word like ‘tree’ as environmentally represent-
ational because it is causally sensitive to the presence of trees in speakers’
environments. Here are Blackburn and Price on the environmental notion:
Environmental representation is essentially a matter of causal
covariation. It can be thought of by comparing ourselves with
the instruments we build to covary with environmental states:
petrol gauges, voltmeters, windsocks, and so forth. (Blackburn,
2010b, p.10)
In these cases, the crucial idea is that some feature of the rep-
resenting system either does, or is (in some sense) ‘intended to’,
vary in parallel with some feature of the represented system.
. . . In biological cases, for example, this notion gives priority to
the idea that the function of a representation is to co-vary with
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some (typically) external environmental condition: it puts the
system-world link on the front foot. (Price, 2013, p.36)
A term environmentally represents, or represents its environment, if it bears
some kind of relation of co-variation with the speaker’s external environ-
ment. Ethical expressivists deny that ethical terms represent their environ-
ment in this sense: they don’t track features of the environment. However,
they will still say that ethical terms represent in the more minimal sense
described above.
Discussion of environmental representation has been more popular in
recent years as issues concerning global expressivism have come to the fore
(see Chapter 4). Huw Price has used the notion to defend what he thinks is
the grain of truth in representationalist views; namely the idea that some of
our words and thoughts do seem to respond to the physical world around us.
He therefore accepts that some terms represent their environment. But he
thinks that many kinds of language represent in a non-environmental way.
Similarly, Simon Blackburn agrees that some terms represent their environ-
ment and some don’t. However, as we’ll see in Chapter 4 the two disagree
about whether this view counts as any concession to representationalism.
The second use concerns metaphysics, marking a distinction between
kinds of facts, truths and properties rather than a distinction between rela-
tions between words and thoughts and the world. Consider the predicate ‘x
is such that grass is green’, which is true of every object in the world. Does
this predicate correspond to a property? On a minimal reading, it does, for
all predicates express properties. There is a property being such that grass
is green. On more substantial readings, it does not. This is because a pre-
dicate only picks out a real property if that property has certain features.
For instance, we might think that a real or substantial property must be
causally relevant, and that things which have it must all genuinely resemble
each other in some way. Being such that grass is green doesn’t meet these
conditions.
This gives us a distinction between minimal and substantial properties.
NRPs sometimes say that their chosen discourse does express properties but
only in the minimal sense. For instance, deflationists about truth think that
being true is a property, but only in the minimal sense that some proposi-
tions are true and others aren’t (Horwich, 1998b, pp.37-40). Expressivists
think the same thing about ethical properties (Blackburn, 1993, p.8). In
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particular, since expressivists think that ethical properties don’t explain any-
thing, they won’t accept that they express substantial properties. NRPs may
also extend this distinction to facts and truths, where minimal (substantial)
truths and facts are those concerning minimal (substantial) properties. In
Chapter 5 I will discuss truths, facts and properties at greater length.
Finally, the NRP may simply refuse to specify what ‘robust’ means, and
stick to their minimal reading of the relevant notions. Here are Gibbard
and Blackburn on the notion of ‘genuine’ facts and belief:
Are [ethical facts] just pseudo-facts, incapable of real truth and
falsehood? Are beliefs in them pseudo-beliefs, states of mind dis-
tinct from beliefs, which we mistake for genuine beliefs? I took
no stand on this at the outset, but what do I now conclude? I
still weasel: I say that I need to understand the questions. Ex-
plain to me “real facts”, “substantial truth”, and “genuine be-
lief”, and I can think how to answer. (Gibbard, 2003, p.182)
For it is not as if we had a notion of what it would be to come
across ‘genuine’ causal, moral facts, but unfortunately have to
content ourselves with talking as if we had performed this feat,
when we have not done so. (Blackburn, 1986, p.206)
Here we see scepticism about any more robust way of understanding rep-
resentational features. On this view, NRPs will accept minimal representa-
tional features but deny that there’s anything else to contrast them with. As
such it’s not clear whether this counts as qualified rejection since there’s no
sense in which they reject representational features. However, NRPs will
still hold their core view – explanatory scepticism – and deny that these
minimal representational features play any explanatory role with regard to
the target discourse.
This discussion of qualified rejection gives us better insight into the cases
where NRPs may reject a representational feature outright. For instance
consider Blackburn’s earlier dismissal of representation in the case of eth-
ics: ‘moral opinion is not in the business of representing the world’ (1999,
p.214). How should we understand this claim? For a start Blackburn took
this to be compatible with thinking that ethical sentences can be true. So he
is not rejecting representation in the minimal sense outlined above, which
trivially follows from propositional content. He is best read as making a
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qualified rejection, and indeed later in that piece he says: ‘A representation
of something as F is typically explained by the fact that it is F. A represent-
ation answers to what is represented. I hold that ethical facts do not play
this explanatory role’ (1999, p.216). Blackburn isn’t rejecting representation
in the minimal sense, but in a more robust sense where representations are
explained by what they represent – in other words, an environmental sense
of robustness, where the environment plays a role in explaining representa-
tion. This environment may be a causally active one, or not. The important
thing here is that Blackburn is rejecting that ethical terms’ representational
features are explained by their relation external world, be it causal or not.
2.7 Conclusion
We now have a general picture of NRP. With regard to the target discourse,
NRP at least involves explanatory scepticism about all representational fea-
tures – the view that these features play no role in the best ‘what it does
and why it’s there’ explanation of the discourse. It may also involve further
rejections of representational features defined in more ‘robust’ ways as de-
scribed above. However NRPs will accept representational features in the
‘minimal’ sense, i.e. whatever representational features follow trivially from
the fact that the target discourse has propositional content.
This makes NRP clear and shows how we can do without words like ‘ro-
bust’ and ‘substantial’, since we’ve seen that they can actually be explained
straightforwardly. We’re now in a good position to assess NRP. In the next
chapter, I’ll apply the work from this chapter to the so-called problem of
creeping minimalism. This is the problem of distinguishing between a soph-
isticated version of metaethical expressivism – a form of NRP – and its main
rival, metaethical realism. I will use the account of this chapter to put to rest
worries about the solubility of this problem.
chapter 3
SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF CREEPING
MINIMALISM
3.1 Introduction
In the last chapter I introduced the common views held by non-represent-
ationalist pragmatists. In this chapter I apply this discussion to a debate
prominent in the recent literature about the view. The debate is about
a problem called the problem of creeping minimalism, a problem most of-
ten taken to apply to metaethical expressivism, which is as we’ve seen the
most developed and best known version of non-representationalism. The
problem is that it is difficult to tell metaethical expressivism apart from its
rivals, once expressivists accept so-called minimalist theories about repres-
entational features. Roughly, the idea is that all the denials expressivists used
to make – like the denial that ethical language is truth-apt, expresses beliefs,
has truth-conditions and so on – disappear once expressivists accept minim-
alist theories about these notions. This is because minimalism entails that
even by expressivists’ standards, ethical language has all these features after
all. As a result it’s hard to distinguish expressivism from its rivals, includ-
ing realist views which centre on the view that ethical language has all these
features.
In this chapter I will start by discussing what I think is the best solution
on offer, that proposed by Jamie Dreier (Dreier, 2004). Dreier argues that
the difference between expressivism and realism lies in expressivism’s com-
mitment to what I’m calling explanatory scepticism: the view that represent-
ational features play no role in explaining the meaning and use of ethical
terms. I use Dreier’s account and Chrisman’s criticism of it, both which I
think are ultimately unsuccessful, to draw out three important points about
the problem of creeping minimalism:
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i. The problem should be recast: we should distinguish expressivism
from representationalism not realism.
ii. We should not assume too much about the ontology involved in rep-
resentation.
iii. We should focus on explanation in order to solve the problem.
Given these, I then offer an alternative solution. The solution still lies in
explanatory scepticism. But instead of adopting Dreier’s specific version, we
need merely say that expressivists are distinctive in excluding representation
and belief from their explanation of ethical language and thought. This is
enough to protect expressivism from the problem.
After discussing some issues surrounding this solution I turn to recent ar-
guments in the literature on the problem. In particular I examine Christine
Tiefensee’s arguments against three possible solutions: Chrisman’s inferen-
tialism, Michael Williams’s ‘EMUs’ (Explanations of Meaning in terms of
Use), and Huw Price’s ‘e-representation’. Tiefensee argues that none of
these proposals can solve the problem, a worrying conclusion since they
represent three prominent non-representationalists’ primary philosophical
resources. I show that with my three key points in mind, we can answer all
of Tiefensee’s points, and get an interesting conclusion about Price’s notion
of e-representation. Finally, I look at a possible objection to my solution,
which will set up the discussion of global non-representationalism in the
following chapter.
3.2 The problem
The problem of creeping minimalism is that once expressivists accept min-
imalism about various representational features, it is hard to tell the differ-
ence between expressivism and realism, which it is meant to oppose. The
problem develops like this. The most distinctive expressivist view is that
ethical language and thought differs from non-ethical language and thought
in an interesting way. It is not that ethical language and thought has a dif-
ferent subject matter from non-ethical language, in the same sense in which
thought and talk about tomatoes and chairs has different subject matter. In-
stead it is that there is some interesting difference in what ethical language
does and what ethical mental states are like, which can’t be explained just
in terms of its subject matter. Ethical language is in some way a different
kind of thing to non-ethical language. Expressivists have characterised this
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difference in various ways: ethical language is not truth-apt, not descriptive,
it does not express propositions, it does not state facts or refer to properties.
Ethical thoughts are not beliefs or else they’re not representational beliefs.
The problem of creeping minimalism is that expressivists have begun to ac-
cept views which seem to collapse the contrasts drawn in these terms. The
views which make it difficult are known as minimalist or deflationist views.
As we saw in the previous chapter, minimalist views about representa-
tional features say that these features are had trivially by linguistic things
and those mental states that have propositional content. To see how this de-
velops, let’s begin with a question about the semantic properties of ethical
sentences: are ethical sentences truth-apt? Moral realists like Boyd (1988)
say that they are and Ayer famously said that they are not. But two factors
make recent expressivists like Blackburn and Gibbard agree with Boyd and
say that they are.1 First, they want to accommodate ordinary practice which
involves treating ethical sentences as truth-apt. Blackburn says: ‘if we are
true to the folk, rather than seeking to debunk their sincere and intended
sayings or convict them of wholesale error in even deploying their favoured
vocabularies’ then we will allow talk of truth as applied to ethical sentences
(Blackburn, 2010b, p.4). In other words, if we are to accommodate ordinary
ethical practice, we ought to accept that ethical sentences are truth-apt.
Second, expressivists accept a minimalist notion of truth-aptitude, ac-
cording to which a sentence like ‘torture is wrong’ counts as truth-apt just
so long as it is meaningful, and can be meaningfully embedded in ‘that’-
clauses. Since expressivists think that ethical sentences are meaningful and
can be meaningfully embedded in ‘that’-clauses, they must therefore accept
that ethical sentences are truth-apt. They therefore agree with realists about
the truth-aptitude of ethical sentences. This is not to say that expressivism
‘starts off with’ the view that ethical sentences aren’t truth-apt, but then re-
luctantly comes to accept that they are. While historically, expressivists like
Blackburn and Gibbard have changed their minds and moved from deny-
ing to accepting the truth-aptitude of ethical sentences, this needn’t be true
of other expressivists, who may accept from the beginning that ethical sen-
tences are truth-apt, for minimalist reasons.
The same thing happens (more or less) when expressivists accept other
minimalist theories about, for instance, propositions, truth-conditions, and
assertions. Where previously they may have denied that ethical sentences
1 In this section I will focus on Blackburn’s view just for simplicity.
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express propositions, have truth-conditions, and make assertions, minimal-
ism about those notions will lead them to drop these denials and admit that
ethical sentences do express propositions, and all the rest. This is because
minimalist theories about these notions say, roughly: a truth-apt claim like
‘grass is green’ expresses the proposition that grass is green, is true if and
only if grass is green, and can be used to assert that grass is green. The same
goes for all other claims. Expressivists agree that ethical claims are truth-
apt, and so now agree with realists about whether ethical sentences have
truth-conditions, are assertions, or express propositions.
This doesn’t stop with semantic concepts like truth and propositions.
Minimalist theories of facts entail that by expressivists’ own lights, there are
ethical facts. On such views, for there to be ethical facts just requires that
there are ethical truths, something expressivists are happy to accept:
After all, the minimalism about truth allows us [the expressiv-
ists] to end up saying ‘It is true that kindness is good’. For this
means no more than that kindness is good, an attitude we may
properly want to express. We can say that the proposition rep-
resents the fact that kindness is good. (Blackburn, 1998, p.79)
On the minimalist view a sentence S states a fact just in case S is true –
given this, expressivists have no reason to deny ethical facts. The same goes
for properties – torture has the property being wrong just in case torture is
wrong, so expressivists have no reason to deny that there are ethical proper-
ties either (Dreier, 2004, p.26). So now expressivists believe in ethical facts
and properties.
A further application of this is used to accept that ethical facts and prop-
erties are mind-independent. Expressivists take the statement that they are
to be no more than a first-order ethical claim: that what is right or wrong
would still be right or wrong if we didn’t think it was (Blackburn, 1998,
pp.311-312). Interpreting the thesis that ethical facts are mind-independent
in this minimal way lets expressivists accept it.
Finally, psychological notions like belief and representation can be en-
compassed by minimalism, which says that if ‘torture is wrong’ is truth-
apt (which expressivists think it is) then the associated mental state had by
someone who accepts that sentence can be called a belief, and we can say
that the sentence and the belief represent the world. On minimalist theor-
ies, a sentence ‘p’ represents the world as being such that p and expresses the
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belief that p. It represents the world correctly if and only if p; it expresses a
true belief if and only if p:
Minimalism seems to let us end up saying, for instance, that
‘kindness is good’ represents the facts. For ‘represents the facts’
means no more than: ‘is true’. (Blackburn, 1998, p.79)
The point about belief is important since expressivists usually say that eth-
ical states of mind are attitudes which are not beliefs. To think something is
good is not to believe it to be a certain way. But minimalism threatens this,
as we can see:
Other contrasts, such as that between belief and attitude, may
go the same way. For there is nothing to prevent a theorist from
allowing a promiscuous, catholic, universal notion of ‘belief’—
one that simply tags along with assertion, acceptance or com-
mitment (Blackburn, 2010b, p.4)
And at last, expressivists agree with realists about whether ethical states of
mind are beliefs, and whether they are representational.
To see the problem starkly, consider this claim from the prominent
moral realist Russ Shafer-Landau:
At the simplest level, all realists endorse the idea that there is a
moral reality that people are trying to represent when they is-
sue judgements about what is right and wrong. (Shafer-Landau,
2003, p.13)
Equipped with the right minimalist views (including a minimalist view of
reality as tagging along with truth), there’s no reason that Blackburn would
want or need to deny what Shafer-Landau takes to be crucial to realism. For
in Blackburn’s eyes (through minimalist lenses), what Shafer-Landau has
said is no more than, roughly: some things are right and wrong, and people
want to say that things are right only when they are right, and wrong only
when they are wrong.2
Matthew Chrisman argues that part of the challenge of creeping minim-
alism is that it threatens expressivism’s ability to make ‘a difference to the
epistemological and ontological status of ethical discourse’ – i.e. to have the
2 The minimalist construal of the idea of aiming at truth is due to Horwich (1998b,
p.62).
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advantages its defenders have traditionally claimed for it (Chrisman, 2008,
p.347). I want to separate two issues: (i) distinguishing expressivism from
realism, and (ii) doing so in a way which lets expressivists keep their dis-
tinctive advantages (at least by their own lights). I think (i) and (ii) are
separate, and in this chapter I will only address (i): I will show how to dis-
tinguish expressivism from realism (or as we’ll see in §3.4, because I think
the problem has been misconceived, how to distinguish expressivism from
representationalism). I will not address issue (ii) – whether characterised
as I have done, expressivism can keep what its defenders take to be its dis-
tinctive advantages. Instead, I will address issue (ii) as part of my broader
discussion of the relationship between non-representationalism and meta-
physics, in Chapters 5 and 6.
3.3 The ‘explanation’ explanation
In the same paper in which he sets out the problem of creeping minimalism,
Dreier suggests a solution to it. Dreier calls this the ‘explanation’ explana-
tion (2004, p.39). Its first stage is that the difference between expressivism
and realism lies in the stance of those views on the proper explanation of cer-
tain target statements. Dreier calls these ‘protected normative statements’
(2004, p.34), and they include:
(E) Edith said that abortion is wrong
( J) Judith believes that knowledge is intrinsically good
He argues that expressivism and realism differ over what constitutes the
truth of statements like these – what it is in virtue of which they are true.
He thinks that realists and expressivists will differ over how to fill in the
blank in statements like:
(E*) Its being the case that (E) consists in nothing more than
( J*) Its being the case that ( J) consists in nothing more than
This is the first stage of the ‘explanation’ explanation: expressivists and real-
ists differ over what will (constitutively) explain protected normative state-
ments.
Dreier does not merely say that expressivism will differ from realism in
how it fills in claims like ( J*) and (E*). He tells us what that difference
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is. According to Dreier, realists think that what fills in the blank in such
statements must involve ethical facts or properties, and expressivists will
say that it needn’t involve such things. Characterising expressivism, Dreier
says:
In particular, [says the expressivist,] to explain what it is to
make a moral judgment, we need not mention any normative
properties (Dreier, 2004, p.39).
This is to be contrasted with a realist who thinks that to explain what it is to
make a moral judgement, we need to cite ethical facts or properties to which
the believer is related in some way. This is the second stage of the ‘explan-
ation’ explanation: expressivists and realists differ as to whether normative
facts and properties need to be cited to explain normative content.
In the terms I introduced in Chapter 2, Dreier is saying that expressivism
is distinctive in accepting explanatory scepticism about ethical language:
(ES) The best explanation of (i) the meaning and/or use of the rel-
evant terms and (ii) why humans have terms with the features that
explain their meaning and/or use doesn’t require treating those
terms as representational.
Recall that ‘treating as representational’ is shorthand for ‘ascribing repres-
entational features’. We can read Dreier as taking the explanation here as
constitutive explanation of meaning and as filling in ‘treating as representa-
tional’ as ascribing relations between ethical terms and mental states on the
one hand, and ethical facts and properties on the other:
(ESD) The best explanation of (i) the meaning and/or use of the
relevant terms and (ii) why humans have terms with the features
that explain their meaning and/or use doesn’t require ascribing
relations between ethical terms and ethical facts or properties.
According to Dreier, expressivists think it is possible to explain ethical terms
without ascribing relations between them and ethical facts and properties;
realists disagree.
This looks like a good distinction. For expressivists clearly aim to ex-
plain ethical language by saying that it expresses distinctive mental states
which can be characterised entirely in terms of the effect they have on their
possessor’s behavioural and emotional profile, and which can be character-
ised without appealing to a moral reality to which these states are meant to
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be reactions. This is often claimed as a distinctive advantage for expressiv-
ists:
Its [expressivism’s] promise is that with attention to these activ-
ities we come to see how our evaluative descriptions of things
need no truck with the idea that we somehow respond to an
autonomous realm of values: a metaphysical extra that we inex-
plicably care about on top of voicing and discussing our more
humdrum concerns. (Blackburn, 2010b, p.5)
So initially it seems that the lack of appeal to ethical facts and properties is
distinctive of expressivism.
Dreier’s account is also supported by the literature. In the previous
chapter we saw how widely explanatory scepticism is accepted by non-
representationalists. To support his specific focus on facts and properties,
Dreier draws on Fine (2001), Gibbard (2003), and Price and Hawthorne
(1996) to support his view, but there are also other voices in the debate
which support it. Simon Blackburn argues that it is definitional of what he
calls ‘pragmatism’ (which includes expressivism) that its explanation of the
relevant language does not cite the ontology associated with it – the ‘refer-
ents [of] its terms, or truth-makers [of] its sentences’, as he puts it (2013,
p.75). Michael Williams concurs, arguing that an expressivist explanation
of ethical language will be ‘ontologically conservative’ (2013, p.143), which
just means that the explanation will not appeal to ethical facts and proper-
ties.
The most important feature of Dreier’s solution is that it neatly avoids
the issue of minimalism. It is compatible for expressivists to accept that
there are ethical facts and properties on minimalist grounds, and to deny
that such things are part of what constitutes ethical content. Accepting
some facts or properties doesn’t entail accepting that they do any particular
constitutive explanatory work. This shift to explanatory questions is what
stops minimalism undermining Dreier’s solution.
However, Matthew Chrisman (2008, pp.347-8) argues that when a be-
lief is false, realists cannot say that what constitutes that belief is a relation
between the believer and a fact. For if the belief is false, there is no fact for
the believer to be related to. Suppose Suzy believes that some given instance
of torture T is permissible. Suppose T is in fact not permissible – it meets
none of the criteria that permissible torture must meet. No one will accept
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that her belief consists in a relation with the fact that T is permissible since
no one believes such a fact exists. So realism cannot be identified as Dreier
suggests, or else we could only be realists about true beliefs. This would be
unacceptable, since a realist will think that the same story should be told for
what constitutes the content of all ethical beliefs.
Chrisman then argues that the only way Dreier can avoid the false be-
lief issue is by appealing to representation. The realist will say that what
constitutes Suzy’s false belief is that she represents T as permissible. This
is possible even though her belief is false, since thinkers can represent the
world falsely. This leaves expressivists open to deny that representation is
part of what constitutes Suzy’s belief, and we get our distinction.
However, Chrisman argues that this alternative route relies on a ‘distinc-
tion between representational and nonrepresentational mental states’ (2008,
p.348) which he says collapses given minimalism. The idea is that minimal-
ism, in the same way as I described in §3.2, simply entails that ethical beliefs
are representational, even by expressivists’ own standards. So it forces them
to accept this, and so collapses the distinction as drawn above.
3.4 Learning from the ‘explanation’ explanation
I think that Chrisman’s objections both fail. Dreier’s account does not col-
lapse for the reason Chrisman offers, and a representation-based alternative
does not collapse under minimalism. However, I think Chrisman’s discus-
sion points to some important and interesting issues concerning the prob-
lem of creeping minimalism.
I’m going to use my discussion of the above debate to argue for three
claims. First, we have been conceiving of the problem of creeping minimal-
ism in the wrong way. We should recast it, and then examine Dreier’s view
in light of this. Second, Dreier’s solution focuses too much on the ontology
of representation, and the best solution to the problem of creeping minim-
alism should not do so. Third, Dreier is right to focus on explanation, and
doing so lets us refute Chrisman’s second objection. After establishing these
three points, I will argue for a solution which improves on Dreier’s.
3.4.1 Three lessons
The first point is that we should recast the problem of creeping minimal-
ism. We should aim not to distinguish expressivism from realism, but from
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representationalism. Representationalism is the view that ethical thought
and language is representational, that ethical thoughts are beliefs, and so on.
Representationalism is not sufficient for realism.3 Realists typically accept
representationalism – but crucially, so do many non-realists. For example,
error theorists are not realists, in the sense that they think there are no eth-
ical truths or facts.4 But they typically are representationalists: they think
ethical thoughts are genuine, representational beliefs. As such, distinguish-
ing expressivism from realism is not the right route. For error theory differs
from expressivism in exactly the same relevant respect as realism does: over
whether ethical thought is belief-like and representational.
This leads neatly on to the second point. We should not focus too much
on the ontology invoked by representational accounts. Error theory gives
us a nice route in to this point. Consider again Chrisman’s first objection
to Dreier: the belief that p cannot be constituted by a relation to the fact
that p where it’s false that p. A very natural reply to this is to point out that
the realist will of course not think it is so constituted, but will instead say
that Suzy’s belief that T is permissible is composed of concepts, including
the concept of permissibility. This concept represents things as permissible,
and does so in virtue of a relation to the property of permissibility. This
route saves Dreier from Chrisman’s objection: it retains the explanatory
role of ethical properties rather than ethical facts.
However, it is at the very least controversial whether all accounts of rep-
resentation will take this form, of appealing to a relation with properties.
Start with error theory. The property view I just outlined would commit
error theorists to relations between thinkers and uninstantiated properties,
perhaps necessarily uninstantiated properties. If representation means a re-
lation with a property, since error theorists think such properties are not
instantiated, they can at best say we bear relations to properties which exist
but are uninstantiated. Not all error theorists would want to accept this.5
So this is a drawback for Dreier’s view. It is not necessarily decisive.
3 In Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 I will argue that it isn’t necessary for it either.
4 Here I take realism to mean the view that there are things, truths, properties, and
so on in the relevant domain, not the view that truth in the domain is objective or mind-
independent. I thereby take the same view of realism as Lewis when, describing his modal
realism, he says ‘For me, the question is of the existence of objects – not the objectivity
of a subject matter.’ (Lewis, 1986, p.viii). On this view, error theorists are not realists,
whatever they might think about the objectivity of ethics.
5 While the error theorist Jonas Olson has happily accepted the property view, Bart
Streumer rejects it (private correspondence).
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However, error theory is just one tricky case: there is a much more
general point here, namely that not all accounts of representation take the
property or fact view Dreier discusses. There are plenty of representational-
ist views that do not. Consider a propositionalist view, which takes a belief
that p to be a relation to the proposition 〈p〉. Some take propositions to be
composed of senses or concepts, which don’t require corresponding proper-
ties or entities. Such a view would not require my representing something
as F to require a relation between me and F-ness. Yet it would still be rep-
resentationalist.
Consider also views which say that we can believe things about non-
existent objects. Le Verrier’s beliefs about Vulcan are still representational
in a way which expressivists think his beliefs about right and wrong are not.
But it would be a stretch to think that we should account for his beliefs in
terms of a relation with an existing object, since Vulcan doesn’t exist. The
same idea goes for uninstantiated properties. We all want to account for
systematically false beliefs, for instance about magic or witches. Not every-
one will want to accept uninstantiated properties being magical and being a
witch to help us explain such beliefs. Finally, consider adverbialism about
perception. Such a view says that to see something red is to see red-ly, not to
bear a relation with redness. Yet this view is still clearly representationalist:
this view will not deny that seeing red is representing something as red.
So this is our second point: we should not commit the representation-
alist to a specific ontological view in order to account for representation.
This is uncharitable as a general account of representationalism simply be-
cause there are plenty of representationalist views which don’t accept this
ontology. And we should not rule out these views just to solve the prob-
lem of creeping minimalism, a problem, as Dreier says, in ‘metametaethics’
(Dreier, 2004, p.31)! This point has been obscured because of the focus
on distinguishing expressivism from realism specifically, rather than from
representationalism.
As such, it might seem that the best route is to say this: expressivists
deny that ethical language is representational, representationalists affirm
that it is. We then decline to say anything more specific about what repres-
entation is. I don’t think this is the right route either. But before developing
something better, recall Chrisman’s second objection: isn’t this proposal
hopeless, since expressivists won’t deny that ethical language is representa-
tional, and indeed can’t deny it if minimalism is true?
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No. The whole point of Dreier’s account is that what matters is not
what features expressivists think ethical language and thought has, but which
of those features explains it. And minimalism does not imply that ethical
language and thought is to be explained in terms of representation. It only
implies that it is representational, in the sense that ethical language and
thought can be said to represent the world. So Chrisman’s second objec-
tion completely misses Dreier’s crucial manoeuvre: the shift to explanation,
to explanatory scepticism as I’ve been calling it. This is the third point I want
to establish.
3.4.2 A better account
So, we should be distinguishing expressivism from representationalism rather
than realism, we should not assume toomuch about the ontological commit-
ments of a representationalist view, and we should remember that the whole
account rests on what explains ethical language and thought, not what fea-
tures it has. What, then, should we say about creeping minimalism?
The first step is to say that expressivists are minimalists about represent-
ation and belief, but since those things play no role in their explanations
of ethical thought and language, they are still distinct from representation-
alists. The expressivist may then want to refuse to say more about what
representation and belief come to: they know they can do without those
words in their explanations, and it’s up to the representationalist to give us
an account of such things. The important thing is that the expressivist has
fended off the trouble minimalism seemed to bring: for now we see that
though minimalism forces expressivists to admit that ethical thoughts are
representational beliefs, this is not an explanatory claim and so their core
theory is untouched.
There’s a minor issue with this: how do we classify accounts which don’t
use the words ‘representation’ and ‘belief’ in their theory? For instance, if
a reductionist view could be given, perhaps one which reduces an ethical
belief to a causal tracking state, this would not use representation and belief
to explain ethical thought, yet would still clearly count as representational.
More generally, the above view only seems to rule out those accounts which
use belief and representation as primitives – as unexplained explainers. 6
6 Thanks to Jamie Dreier for this objection.
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There are two responses to this objection. The first is that we need
simply understand the expressivist’s ban on representation and belief as in-
cluding anything which might serve as a reduction base for those things. So
the reductionist view above rests on the idea that causal tracking is repres-
entation; her explanatory chain goes:
w means good← w represents things as good← w tracks goodness
(where w is just a word.) The expressivist will not accept this. Repres-
entation is itself trivially entailed by w’s meaning good, which is directly
explained in terms of attitudes:
w represents things as good← w means good← basic sentences involving
w express intentions, plans, attitudes . . .
This captures the idea that representationalists are reducing representation,
while expressivists are not putting it in any explanatory capacity at all.
The second response is to give a more thorough account of what repres-
entation and belief are. While I think for argumentative purposes, the first
response will be enough to save the expressivist, I will explore this briefly
for now as it takes center stage in the next chapter.
In my view, the key idea in representation is a relation to what we can
call the subject matter of the concept in question. Representationalism is the
view that a belief involving that concept, or an assertion involving the cor-
responding term, can only be explained in terms of a relation with subject
matter. Of course, this cannot be an ontologically committing thing: other-
wise this view is no different from Dreier’s. But the notion of subject matter
can cover such ideas. For instance, we can think of representing as good as
involving subject matter, namely good, because this has to be characterised
in terms of good. Equally, though, we can think of tracking goodness or
good things as a relation with subject matter, since the characterisation of
this requires talking about goodness.
Moreover, even strict reductionist views, like those Moore aimed to un-
dermine, which say that to believe that x is good is to believe it has N, where
N is a natural property, rely on the idea that N is goodness. In such a case,
the view is that to believe that x is good is to believe it has a property which
constitutes goodness, and again this involves the subject matter of the term
‘good’.
Contrast expressivism: to believe x is good is to approve of x, to desire
x, to plan to do x, to be disposed to exhort others to do x, and so on. None
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of these things requires characterising in terms of goodness. So it does not
invoke a relation between ‘good’ and its subject matter. This is what makes
such views non-representationalist: they account for belief and assertion in-
volving the relevant concept and term, without invoking relations between
these things and their subject matter.
In the next chapter, I will defend this view more fully as an interpret-
ation of other kinds of non-representationalist views, not just metaethical
expressivism. However, it gives us a reply to the reductionist problem above.
It also puts expressivism in line with other non-representationalist views, as
we’ll see. And it does not collapse given minimalism: minimalism does not
block this explanatory claim.
So, to conclude: Dreier’s account is right in its basic approach, but it
faces two issues. First, it tries to distinguish expressivism from realism rather
than from representationalism; this is the wrong focus. Second, it attributes
too much of an ontological commitment to representationalist views, per-
haps because its focus is more on realism.
So instead we should step back, and argue that while expressivists must
accept that ethical thoughts are beliefs and that they represent the world,
as do ethical assertions, they need not say this in their explanation of what
gives ethical thought and language its content. This is completely compat-
ible with minimalism. When pushed for more of a view about what rep-
resentation and belief are, the expressivist should, for the purposes of the
problem of creeping minimalism, decline to say more. However, there is
something interesting to be said here, concerning subject matter, which I
will develop in the following chapter.
3.5 Other accounts
I therefore think that Dreier’s original solution, altered to avoid relying on
facts and properties, and to focus on representation and belief instead, dis-
tinguishes expressivism not merely from realists but representationalists in
general, and does not collapse given minimalism. However, before we look
at some potential issues with the new solution, it is worth applying some
points from the previous section to other work on the problem of creeping
minimalism. Specifically I want to examine three arguments by Christine
Tiefensee, which criticise three solutions to the problem. One of these solu-
tions is Chrisman’s. The other two use two concepts recently developed by
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two prominent non-representationalists: Michael Williams’s notion of an
‘EMU’ (an explanation of meaning in terms of use) and Huw Price’s notion
of ‘e-representation’. Tiefensee argues that none of these solutions works.
Tiefensee’s arguments are worth discussing for two reasons. First, her
pessimistic conclusion is cause for concern: if even the sophisticated non-
representationalist machinery recently set out by Chrisman, Williams and
Price cannot solve the problem of creeping minimalism, we might well
worry that no solution is likely to emerge soon. I will resolve this worry by
showing how her objections can be resolved. Second, it turns out that every
key point in Tiefensee’s critique can be answered by using two of the ideas I
defended above: (a) by not focusing on the ontology of representation and
belief, and (b) by recognising the importance of explanation.
3.5.1 Chrisman’s inferentialism
With this in mind let’s look at Chrisman’s idea. On the basis of his criticism
of Dreier, Chrisman rejects representation-based approaches to the problem
of creeping minimalism. Instead he thinks we should replace representation
with inference as the central tool for understanding expressivism (Chrisman,
2008, p.335). On an inferentialist view, the meaning of a sentence is consti-
tuted by its inferential role, which Chrisman takes to consist in two things:
(i) what circumstances license asserting the sentence and (ii) what further
assertions and actions are licensed by asserting the sentence (2008, p.350).
Circumstances licensing the assertion may include external conditions but
also when other assertions are licensed. So for instance, the sentence ‘this is
red’ means what it does in virtue of the fact that a speaker is licensed to as-
sert it in certain circumstances – for instance when a speaker is confronted
with an object of a particular colour, but also when she is licensed to say
‘this is scarlet’ – and the fact that when licensed to assert it, the speaker is
also licensed to assert ‘this is not green’, and so on.
Note that so far this is all compatible with Dreier’s ‘explanation’ ex-
planation. Dreier is interested in statements of what the meaning of ethical
utterances and beliefs consists in; Chrisman is interested in inferentialist
versions of such statements. Therefore he can be understood as discussing
claims like (E*). Whatever fills those in, he thinks, will be statements of
inferential role:
(1) Its being the case that (E) consists in nothing more than Edith’s mak-
ing an assertion which has a particular inferential role R.
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Chrisman’s adoption of inferentialism is therefore more or less equivalent
to Dreier’s first stage: the adoption of a general framework concerning how
best to explain ethical meaning, though Chrisman adds that acceptable an-
swers must be inferentialist. And as Dreier does, Chrisman then gives a spe-
cific mark of the distinction between realism and expressivism. (Chrisman
and Tiefensee both follow Dreier in talking about distinguishing between
expressivism and realism, rather than representationalism, but this makes
no difference here.)
This distinction is to be given in terms of a distinction between theoret-
ical and practical reasoning. Chrisman says that the premises of a piece of
theoretical reasoning give ‘evidential support’ to the conclusion, and if that
conclusion is true, it ‘will usually constitute theoretical knowledge about
the world’ (2008, p.350). On the other hand, ‘the premises of a practical
inference should provide practical support for the conclusion’, which if true
‘can constitute practical knowledge about how to interact with the world as
we know it to be’ (2008, pp.349–350, original emphasis). This distinction
yields a distinction between theoretical and practical commitments: when
one is committed to the conclusion of a piece of theoretical (practical) reas-
oning, one has a theoretical (practical) commitment.
With this distinction in hand, Chrisman says that both realists and ex-
pressivists can be understood as offering statements like (1). But realists
will fill it in by saying that ethical statements express theoretical commit-
ments, some of which are true, and expressivists will fill it in by saying that
ethical statements express practical commitments (2008, p.353). This is the
distinction between realism and expressivism. Realism understands ethical
language along the lines of other theoretical language; expressivism views
ethical language as distinctive in its link to action.
However, Chrisman’s proposed solution to the problem has been force-
fully criticised by Christine Tiefensee (2016) who argues that it is just as
vulnerable to creeping minimalism as other approaches. She focuses her ini-
tial objection on the distinction between practical and theoretical commit-
ments. Consider the claim that ethical statements express theoretical com-
mitments. According to Chrisman, this means that they express commit-
ments which if true will ‘constitute theoretical knowledge about the world’
(2008, p.350). But Tiefensee argues that given the right minimalist theor-
ies, the expressivist will accept that ethical commitments are theoretical:
given minimalism about ‘true’, and ‘world’, she says, there’s no reason for
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expressivism to reject that true ethical commitments can constitute ethical
knowledge about the world (Tiefensee, 2016, p.2443).
Moreover, Tiefensee argues that realism looks compatible with the view
that ethical commitments are practical, because for Chrisman practical com-
mitments needn’t tie to motivations for action but rather justifications and
reasons for action. But realists have no reason to deny that true moral state-
ments justify or provide reasons for actions (Tiefensee, 2016, p.2444). If it’s
true that torture is wrong, this justifies certain actions. So realists won’t
deny that ethical commitments are practical.
I think Tiefensee is absolutely right at least about the fact that expressiv-
ists can accept a minimalist version of the claim that ethical commitments
are theoretical commitments. However, as with Dreier, Chrisman can reply
by turning to explanation. He shouldn’t say that for expressivists, ethical
commitments are not theoretical. He should say that for expressivists, the
fact that they are theoretical has no role in explaining them. A sentence like
‘torture is wrong’ has its meaning because it is practical, not because it is the-
oretical. It means what it does because it gives practical support for conclu-
sions based on it as a premise. But it is still theoretical: it still gives evidential
support to the conclusion, and when true it constitutes knowledge about the
world. It’s just that this fact plays no explanatory role whatsoever. For the
representationalist, that sentence has its meaning because it is theoretical, be-
cause it gives evidential support to conclusions based on it, not because it
is practical. As with Chrisman’s objection to Dreier, Tiefensee’s objection
can be avoided with more of a focus on explanation. This isn’t to say his
solution is correct, just that it can avoid Tiefensee’s objection.
3.5.2 The EMU
Michael Williams (2013) claims that the notion of an EMU – an Explanation
of Meaning in terms of Use – is a good way of understanding expressivism
about ethical language as well as distinguishing between non-representation-
alist pragmatism and representationalismmore generally. According to him,
an EMU has three components. I will characterise them exactly as Tiefensee
does (Tiefensee, 2016, p.2448)
(I-T) Amaterial-inferential (intra-linguistic) component, comprising the in-
ferential patterns in which a concept stands, thus determining its con-
ceptual meaning.
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(E-T) An epistemological component, specifying the epistemological circum-
stances of competent language use.
(F-T) A functional component, detailing what the concept is used for.
(I-T) is meant to specify the inferential role of a term. For instance, part
of the (I-T) clause for a colour-word like ‘red’ will specify inferential con-
nections between that word and other colour terms: from ‘x is red’ you can
infer ‘x is coloured’, from ‘x is scarlet’ you can infer ‘x is red’, and so on. (E-
T) is meant to specify the circumstances under which a speaker is licensed
to make assertions using the term; for instance part of (E-T) for ‘red’ will
specify that a speaker can use ‘red’ only to apply to objects which are clearly
red. (F-T) is meant to tell us why we have a term of which (I-T) and (E-T)
are true (Williams, 2013, p.135). Williams says: ‘The F-clause appeals to
use as expressive function: what a word is used to do, what it is useful for’
(Williams, 2013, p.135).
Tiefensee then suggests that we could try to distinguish realism and ex-
pressivism by saying that a realist EMU will differ from an expressivist one.
She sets out two EMUs which follow the above pattern, and points out
where they match and where they differ. For our purposes, the crucial part
of this is that Tiefensee thinks the difference between expressivism and real-
ism will have to be located in two claims, one which is part of the realist
EMU and one which is part of the expressivist EMU. The realist claim is
this (Tiefensee, 2016, p.2449, my emphasis):
(2) In a reporting use, tokens of ‘x is good’ express reliable discriminative
reactions to an environmental circumstance. Their role is to keep track
of goodness, in this way functioning as language entry transitions.
What this roughly means is that ethical statements express beliefs which
track ethical properties, perhaps in the same way that we think our lan-
guage about our environment tracks the objects in it. Tiefensee considers
the idea that expressivists will deny this, and instead will say (Tiefensee,
2016, p.2449)
(3) ‘Good’ expresses endorsement of inferential patterns that allow for
language exit moves, connecting moral commitments with actions.
This allows us to coordinate our lives and to deliberate about our
actions.
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In essence, the disagreement here is over the ‘function’ of ethical language:
does it track ethical properties, or does it express some kind of attitude like
endorsement?
However, Tiefensee argues that even this account doesn’t work. She
argues that expressivists can accept a suitably minimalist reading of (2):
[I]nferentialist expressivists could happily agree that moral state-
ments track moral facts in this i-sense. For, there is no reason for
them to deny that someone who masters the term ‘good’ will,
given appropriate motivation and conditions, report goodness
when encountering it. This is, after all, what being a reliable
moral judge is all about. They could even concur that moral
commitments express these discriminative moral reactions of
ours and track moral truths (Tiefensee, 2016, p.2451)
Here Tiefensee mentions the ‘i-sense’ of tracking: what she means by this is
roughly just a minimalist reading, since she is following Price who uses the
‘i-’ prefix to denote minimalist notions.
I take Tiefensee’s point here to be roughly this. On a minimalist reading,
the idea that ethical statements ‘track the moral truth’ is nothing more than
the idea that some ethical statements are true, and some people are good
enough at using them so that they assert more or less only the moral truths,
and that their moral statements are counterfactually responsive to the moral
truth so that, for example, if x had been good, they would have said that
x was good, and if it had not been, they would not have said so. On this
minimalist reading of tracking, an ethical truth-tracker is the person who
gets the ethical truths right, and who wouldn’t easily have got them wrong.
Since we’re assuming that expressivists can make sense of ‘getting the ethical
truths right’, and can evaluate counterfactuals involving ethical statements,
they will not deny that ethical statements track the truth in this sense.
So, Tiefensee concludes, taking the route Williams outlines – i.e. focus-
ing on the notion of tracking – will not give us a distinction between ex-
pressivism and realism, because expressivists will end up asserting the same
things as the realist. And though Tiefensee does not explicitly say so in this
passage, this is because of a minimalist reading of ‘truth-tracking’, which
Tiefensee calls ‘i-tracking’ due to its link with Price’s ‘i-representation’, a
concept we’ll discuss shortly.
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3.5.3 E-representation
Tiefensee argues that as a result of this, the only way to get a distinction
between expressivism and realism is to understand the notion of tracking
in (2) as ‘e-tracking’, which we can make sense of in terms of Huw Price’s
distinction between what he calls ‘e-representation’ and ‘i-representation’.
Price distinguishes these like so:
e-Representation On the one hand we have the environment-
tracking paradigm of representation . . . – think of examples like
the position of the needle in the fuel gauge and the level of fuel
in the tank . . . In these cases, the crucial idea is that some fea-
ture of the representing system either does, or is (in some sense)
‘intended to’, vary in parallel with some feature of the represen-
ted system. (Usually, but perhaps not always, the covariation in
question has a causal basis.) In biological cases, for example, this
notion gives priority to the idea that the function of a represent-
ation is to co-vary with some (typically) external environmental
condition: it puts the system–world link on the front foot
i-RepresentationOn the other hand we have a notion that gives
priority to the internal functional role of the representation:
something counts as a representation in virtue of its position or
role in some cognitive or inferential architecture. Here it is an
internal role of some kind – perhaps causal–functional, perhaps
logico-inferential, perhaps computational – that takes the lead.
(Price, 2013, p.36)
Roughly, then, a term e-represents if it tracks things in world. A term i-
represents if it has the inferential role required to give it assertoric content.
We can then read the notion of ‘e-tracking’ in terms of e-representation,
taking the two to be more or less the same idea.
Crucially, a term can i-represent without e-representing: a term can be
used in assertions, without having the job of tracking the world. Expressiv-
ists think that ethical terms are i-representational but not e-representational.
We might distinguish them on this basis from realists, who think that ethical
terms are both i- and e-representational. This is just the same as saying that
expressivists deny, but realists accept, that ethical terms e-track the world.
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Tiefensee argues that we need to explain e-representation in more de-
tail, but that the only substantial way of doing so faces a dilemma: it yields
either a characterisation of realism which expressivists can accept (thus fail-
ing to yield a distinction) or else one which realists won’t themselves ac-
cept. Tiefensee argues that the best way of cashing out the notion of e-
representation (and thereby, e-tracking) has it that ethical language is e-
representational just in case it has two features: (i) that ‘reports of the
presence of goodness must be caused by goodness’ and (ii) that such re-
ports ‘must be default justified’, i.e. ‘do not require inferential support from
other premises’ (Tiefensee, 2016, p.2454). However, many realists will wish
to deny (ii). Moreover, there are two readings of (i), one of which realists
will reject, the other of which expressivists will accept. Either way, we don’t
get a distinction between expressivism and realism.
Nothing in my argument will depend on whether ethical sentences are
‘default justified’ so instead I shall focus on claim (i), that reports of the pres-
ence of goodness must be caused by goodness. Tiefensee begins by pointing
out that non-naturalist realists, who believe in the causal inefficacy of ethical
facts and properties, will reject (i). I think this is sufficient reason to reject
this reading, since it fails to account for one of the two major forms of real-
ism. However she goes on to make a further point. She argues that there
are two readings of (i), the strong reading and the weak reading. On the
strong reading, (i) says that ‘moral properties are themselves causally effic-
acious and that we perceive them through a special, sensory moral faculty’
(Tiefensee, 2016, p.2454). While expressivists will indeed deny that moral
properties are like this, and therefore will deny (i) on its strong reading,
Tiefensee points out that many realists will also reject (i) due to scepticism
about the notion of a special sensory moral faculty. The strong reading,
then, fails to be acceptable to realists, and so cannot be a necessary compon-
ent of realism.
The weak reading of (ii), on the other hand, seems more moderate:
This explains that we perceive moral properties, not through
some special moral faculty, but in exactly the same way as we
detect natural properties. The reason for this is that the former
are closely connected to the latter—be they identical to nat-
ural properties, constituted by them or supervening on them.
Consequently, whenever we detect a causally efficacious nat-
ural property that constitutes a moral property—say, we see that
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the ruffians inflict severe pain on the cat by setting it on fire—
we also perceive the corresponding moral property—here, the
wrongness of their action. (Tiefensee, 2016, p.2455)
This seems more acceptable to realists. However, Tiefensee argues, it will
also be acceptable to expressivists, for the following reason.
The weak reading of (i), says Tiefensee, depends on the idea that moral
properties are, ‘in some sense or other, nothing over and above natural prop-
erties such as causing pain’ (Tiefensee, 2016, p.2455). Expressivists, she says,
can make that claim too, though for them it will be understood as the ex-
pression of an ethical claim, about what wrongness consists in (e.g. causing
pain). But if this is so, she argues, then since wrongness just is some nat-
ural property, then if those natural properties cause our ethical utterances,
then it follows that ethical properties cause our ethical utterances. And so
expressivists will be happy to accept (i) on the weak reading.
Tiefensee concludes that e-representation, as cashed out via (i) and (ii),
cannot give us a reasonable distinction between realism and expressivism:
either it will not be a distinction at all or else will yield a characterisation
of realism which realists themselves will reject. It’s worth noting at this
point that Tiefensee also thinks of e-representation as being a mark of onto-
logical commitment: those bits of language which are e-representational are
the ones which carry some genuine ontological commitment, and as such
are the ones for which realism is appropriate. She therefore adopts a pess-
imistic stance about the notion of ontological commitment here: no such
notion has been cashed out which distinguishes expressivism from realism
and which realists will accept.
To sum up, Tiefensee argues that neither Williams’s EMUs nor Price’s
distinction between i-representation and e-representation can solve the prob-
lem of creeping minimalism. EMUs cannot help by themselves because the
best EMU-based strategy uses a notion of tracking, that is acceptable to ex-
pressivists when understood minimalistically. When cashed out in terms of
e-representation, either expressivists will still accept that ethical language is
e-representational, or else realists will deny that it is.
3.5.4 Replying to Tiefensee’s arguments
As I mentioned earlier, Tiefensee’s arguments are important because they
target resources – EMUs and e-representation – given a central role in re-
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cent work by prominent non-representationalists. These arguments should
worry us quite independently of the problem of creeping minimalism for
ethics: they threaten some of the core components of contemporary non-
representationalism. While I think Tiefensee’s argument fails as a whole,
discussing it does reveal some important lessons.
First, we must recognise that it’s because Williams’s EMUs are taken
to be explanations, that Tiefensee’s criticism of EMU-based strategies fails.
Tiefensee claims that expressivists might be able to accept the realist’s claim
(2) In a reporting use, tokens of ‘x is good’ express reliable discriminative
reactions to an environmental circumstance. Their role is to keep track
of goodness, in this way functioning as language entry transitions.
which is part of the realist’s EMU for ‘good’. But if Williams’s EMUs really
are explanations, then the fact that expressivists can accept that ‘good’ can
express reliable discriminative reactions is not enough to undermine this
particular EMU strategy. More is required: expressivists need to think that
(2) is part of what explains the fact that ‘good’ means good. They might
accept (2) as true, but say that it doesn’t belong in the EMU for ‘good’,
because it doesn’t have any explanatory role. In other words, even if you
are good at tracking the ethical truth, you don’t have the concept good in
virtue of this fact.
Tiefensee approaches this point herself in the final footnote in her paper.
She says:
It might be thought that a stronger focus on function might
do the trick, stressing that although inferentialist expressivists
might agree that moral concepts establish language entry trans-
itions, they would deny that this constitutes their function. I
am doubtful that such a wedge can plausibly be driven between
these two theses. (Tiefensee, 2016, n.26, p.2458)
Tiefensee is pessimistic about the notion of ‘function’ in play here. How-
ever, if we read ‘function’ just in the same explanatory terms as Dreier intro-
duces and I have endorsed, then the ‘stronger focus on function’ Tiefensee
mentions can be understood as putting more emphasis on what explains
ethical meaning. And this is precisely the route I want to follow. On this
view, the idea Tiefensee discusses becomes the claim that expressivists say
that ethical terms ‘establish language entry transitions’ (roughly that they
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track ethical facts), but that this fact does not explain their meaning. So the
EMU-based solution doesn’t collapse given minimalism after all.
While Tiefensee’s argument against EMUs fails, I think Tiefensee is more
or less right about e-representation. Price’s notion of e-representation can
be used as a mark of neither realism nor representationalism. There are
two reasons for this. First, whether or not a given kind of language is e-
representational depends on whether it has an appropriate causal connec-
tion with the kinds of objects, properties and facts that it is meant to repres-
ent. But this cannot be a mark of realism or representationalism in general
because there will be views which accept representationalism (and perhaps
realism too) yet deny that the relevant facts and properties are causally act-
ive, as Tiefensee rightly points out. For instance an ethical non-naturalist
might think that ethical language can only be explained in terms of rep-
resenting the world, but that the properties and facts it represents are not
causally linked to it.7
This is one reason we can’t rest the general distinction between expressiv-
ism (or non-representational pragmatism more generally) and representa-
tionalism on e-representation. The second reason is that e-representation
does not have explanation built in. In other words, a piece of language
may well be e-representational, but this does not entail that its meaning
or use is explained by its being e-representational. (This is why expressiv-
ists could accept that ethical language was e-representational in Tiefensee’s
weaker sense.) Since I have pinned the distinction between representation-
alism and expressivism on the issue of what explains the content of ethical
language, e-representation is not by itself going to play a crucial role – we
need to include explanatory considerations too.8 So we shouldn’t think that
e-representation is a mark of the difference between representationalism and
expressivism in ethics. More generally, therefore, we shouldn’t think that
it’s a mark of representationalism versus non-representationalism either.
So while Tiefensee’s pessimistic argument fails as a whole, it reveals some
7 Perhaps we should rethink the notion of e-representation. Price introduces it with ‘e’
standing for ‘external’ or ‘environmental’. Some might argue that the ‘external’ world and
the environment includes things which aren’t causally active. So there’s room here for a
kind of e-representation which involves co-variation between language and the world which
isn’t causal. Then a mark of representationalism could be about whether ethical language
is e-representational in either the causal or non-causal sense. Thanks to Huw Price for this
point.
8 This is not to say that the i-/e-representation distinction is not a good one, nor that it
plays no other useful role in discussions of pragmatism and representationalism, just that it
can’t do the work it needs to do in the solutions Tiefensee criticised.
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important general points about the debate about expressivism and repres-
entationalism. Moreover, we’ve seen that the main moves in this debate can
all be better understood and answered when we appreciate that explanatory
scepticism is the key to distinguishing expressivism. Dreier and Chrisman’s
points are best understood in these terms, and understanding Williams’s
EMUs in this way helps us see how we might use them to answer Tiefensee’s
objections.
3.6 Defending explanatory scepticism
There are several further issues with the solution to the problem of creep-
ing minimalism that I’ve defended. First, one might argue that my reading
of expressivism makes representationalism incompatible with minimalism.
Some argue that minimalism about representation entails that representa-
tion is never capable of (even partly) explaining anything.9 A fortiori, it is
not capable of explaining ethical content. Consequently, representational-
ism as construed here is incompatible with minimalism because it requires
representation to (partly) explain ethical content. Insofar as our account
should make representationalism and expressivism both compatible with
minimalism, the account offered here can’t be right.10
Initially this objection seems to hang on whether a solution to the prob-
lem of creeping minimalism has to make both expressivism and representa-
tionalism compatible with minimalism. This is controversial. While given
expressivists’ tendencies to endorse minimalism, it’s clear that a solution
must make these views compatible, it is certainly up for debate whether
we’re obliged to make representationalism compatible with minimalism too.
In fact I don’t think we’re obliged to make the two compatible. For it is ex-
pressivists’ acceptance of minimalism that causes the problem of creeping
minimalism to arise in the first place. It is they who accept minimalism and
it’s their view that then looks similar to representationalism. So all a solu-
tion to this problem needs to do is to make expressivism and minimalism
compatible, and the resulting view distinct from representationalism. The
problem itself only requires making expressivism and minimalism compat-
ible. Note that this doesn’t let us off giving a satisfactory characterisation
of representationalism – it only means that we can do this without making
representationalism and minimalism compatible.
9 See e.g. Macarthur & Price (2007).
10 Thanks to Christine Tiefensee for both of the objections in this section.
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This doesn’t mean that either representationalists or expressivists spe-
cifically are under pressure to solve the problem of creeping minimalism, in
the sense that either of their views particularly suffer if there’s no solution.
Perhaps expressivism is the one which suffers, since it can no longer tell
us something distinctive. Perhaps representationalism suffers for the same
reason. Perhaps expressivism loses its particular ontological and epistemolo-
gical impact if it goes minimalist. Or, as Dreier thinks, perhaps metaethics
in general suffers: ‘those of us who feel confident that there is some differ-
ence between the two meta-ethical camps should be concerned that we don’t
know how to say what that difference is’ (Dreier, 2004, p.31).
The question of who has to solve the problem of creeping minimalism –
who suffers if it isn’t solved – is independent of the question of which views
must be made compatible with realism. A realist who rejects minimalism
may simply not care whether her view is compatible with it, yet she may
think it worrying that expressivism looks so close to her view. Or she may
not care about this either. An expressivist may not care about representa-
tionalism’s compatibility with minimalism, yet still think she’d better make
her own view distinctive.
We may well then dismiss this issue, and not worry about whether
representationalism and minimalism are compatible. However, there is a
closely related worry here, which is that expressivists’ acceptance of min-
imalism doesn’t only make their view about ethics indistinguishable from
representationalism, but also prevents expressivists themselves from taking
representationalist views of other areas of language, for instance about nat-
ural kind terms. If representationalism is incompatible with minimalism,
then an expressivist who accepts minimalism cannot be a representational-
ist about any kind of language. She therefore cannot consider terms like
‘tree’ and ‘water’ to be representational, in contrast with ethical terms. The
difficulty here is not about how we distinguish metaethical expressivism
from metaethical representationalism, but how expressivists can distinguish
ethical language from other, apparently representational kinds of language.
Sometimes this particular problem is identified as the problem of creeping
minimalism, though this differs from how I’m using that phrase (Williams
2013, p.128, Price 2013, p.148).
This issue is central to the topic of the next chapter: global non-repres-
entationalist views. For global pragmatists like Huw Price have argued pre-
cisely as above – that minimalism rules out representationalism, and hence
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expressivists who accept minimalism should admit that the pragmatism they
espouse in the ethical case really applies to all language and thought. The
debate between globalists like Price and Michael Williams on the one hand,
and localists like Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard on the other, has oc-
cupied much of the recent literature on pragmatism. In the next chapter I
will address this debate, and thereby address the last two issues raised in this
chapter.
3.7 Conclusion
To conclude: in this chapter I introduced the problem of creeping minimal-
ism, the problem of distinguishing expressivism from its rivals once express-
ivists accept minimalist theories about notions like truth, representation
and belief. I looked at Dreier’s ‘explanation’ explanation, which locates a
difference between expressivism and realism in their explanations of ethical
language and thought, rather than what features they think that language
and thought actually has.
Prompted by Chrisman’s ultimately unsuccessful criticism of Dreier, I
argued for key three points. First, we should distinguish expressivism not
from realism, but from representationalism. Second, we should not under-
stand representation in terms of a relation with existing facts and properties,
or in general assume too much about the ontology involved in accounts
which explain in terms of representation. These two points are closely
connected, since Dreier’s account seems to attribute too much ontological
commitment to the realist, commitment not all representationalists would
accept. Third, we should focus on explanation, as Dreier does – Chrisman’s
second criticism of Dreier missed this fact.
As such, I argued that the expressivist can solve the problem of creeping
minimalism by arguing that her view is distinct from representationalism
because it does not put representation or belief into its explanation of eth-
ical thought and language. I argued that the expressivist need not say more
about what representation or belief are: this is enough to protect her from
the problem, since she can happily accept that ethical language represents
and that ethical thoughts are beliefs, without saying these things in her ex-
planation of that language and thought. I sketched some further issues here,
and suggested that we can understand representationalism in terms of the
notion of subject matter, which I will discuss in the next chapter.
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After doing this I showed how the key points I defended help us re-
solve several issues raised in the recent literature: Chrisman’s criticism of
Dreier, and Tiefensee’s criticisms of Chrisman’s inferentialism, as well as
Williams’s ‘EMUs’ and Price’s ‘e-representation’. I argued that Chrisman
himself should simply focus more on explanation, that we should recognise
thatWilliams’s EMUs are explanations, and that Price’s e-representation can-
not be a mark of either realism or representationalism.
Finally I raised an issue: is representationalism compatible with min-
imalism? This is a problem for two reasons. First, it might seem that the
expressivist is simply ruling out her rivals in advance, saying that their views
are not compatible with minimalism. I don’t think this is much of a prob-
lem. However, there is a more pressing issue here: if minimalism and rep-
resentationalism are incompatible, then doesn’t it follow that metaethical
expressivists have to reject representationalism in all cases? This is the sub-
ject of the next chapter.
chapter 4
LOCAL AND GLOBAL
NON-REPRESENTATIONALISM
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I discussed the problem of creeping minimalism,
the problem of distinguishing metaethical expressivism from its represent-
ationalist rivals, given that expressivists typically accept minimalism about
certain representational features including truth, reference, belief and rep-
resentation. I defended Jamie Dreier’s solution to the problem: we should
understand expressivism in terms of explanatory scepticism, the view that
representational notions play no role in explaining the meaning and use of
ethical terms. At the end of the chapter I raised a problem for this solution.
The problem is that it seems to make representationalism incompatible with
minimalism. This is a problem because expressivists may well want to be
representationalists about certain kinds of language, other than ethical lan-
guage. Minimalism would seem to prevent them from doing so.
This idea has much wider significance. It bears directly on the debate
between positions known as local and global non-representationalism. These
two positions differ over the proper extent of non-representationalist the-
ories. Localists believe only some language and thought is suitable for a
non-representationalist treatment; globalists think non-representationalism
should apply everywhere. Localist views include metaethical expressivism,
and are extremely controversial. Globalism may then seem even more con-
troversial: for those who are suspicious of the idea that, say, ethical, modal,
or probabilistic language does not represent the world, the idea that no lan-
guage does this may seem easily dismissed.
The debate between global and local non-representationalism has taken
center stage in the literature on this topic, largely due to Huw Price’s ar-
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guments in favour of globalism.1 Price’s central claim is that localism is
unstable: it collapses into globalism. And one of his arguments for this
uses minimalism in precisely the way I just described – it says that localists’
commitment to minimalism about certain representational features is what
makes their view collapse into globalism.
Price’s arguments that localism collapses into globalism are the best-
known arguments in the debate. In this chapter I will show that they fail.
However, they do not fail straightforwardly. They fail because close atten-
tion to the literature shows that the debate between localists and globalists
is a merely verbal one. Localists like Blackburn and Gibbard already accept
Price’s globalism, but Price already accepts Blackburn and Gibbard’s local-
ism. Both parties agree: they accept localism in one sense and globalism in
another. As such Price’s arguments fail to push localism anywhere new, just
as objections from localists like Blackburn fail to push Price anywhere new.
The reason for this is that localists and globalists have different views
about what non-representationalism involves. Both agree that it involves
explanatory scepticism, excluding representational features from explaining
the meaning and use of the terms in question. But they have different views
about what features are representational. Localists like Blackburn and Gib-
bard take them to be relations between words (and thoughts) and their sub-
ject matter, as I suggested in the previous chapter and will argue in this
one. Price takes them to be word-world relations which are suitably general,
holding between all terms of a given kind, and things in the world. Once
we recognise this difference, we see that localists already accept globalism,
and globalists already accept localism.
In §4.2 I set out Price’s globalist project and his two arguments that
localism collapses into globalism. In §4.3 I show that these arguments fail
if we read them as localists do, and that globalists should agree with the
localists on this; in §4.4 I show that when read as Price wants, localists will
already agree with the arguments. In §4.5 I examine other ways we could
read Price’s arguments, corresponding to the view I’ve been calling qualified
rejection about representational features, and I argue that these arguments
straightforwardly fail on these readings. Finally, in §4.6 I draw out some
consequences of my argument.
1 See Price (2011, 2013, 2015a); Macarthur & Price (2007).
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4.2 Price’s globalist project
Price targets his globalising arguments primarily at Simon Blackburn’s non-
representationalist work. Blackburn defends two views of interest to Price.
First, he defends several local applications of non-representationalist theor-
ies, most notably expressivism about ethics, but also including a kind of
expressivism about modal and causal judgements too. Second, he defends
the idea that non-representationalism must remain local: that we cannot
give a non-representationalist theory for all kinds of language. There will
be some kinds of language whose best theory is not a non-representational-
ist one. Let’s call this view local non-representationalism or localism. Con-
trast it with local applications of non-representationalist theories to specific
kinds of terms, for instance about modal, causal, or ethical terms. Black-
burn makes local applications, but he’s a localist too. Price, on the other
hand, is a global non-representationalist or globalist. Globalism and localism
are views about the proper application of non-representationalist theories,
rather than specific applications of those theories. You can be a globalist or
a localist without being interested in any specific applications.2
Price argues that local non-representationalism is inherently unstable –
it collapses into global non-representationalism. He offers two arguments
for this claim. The first is an external argument: localists should accept
minimalism about representational notions, but minimalism entails global
non-representationalism. The second is an internal argument: if local non-
representationalists think that any local applications of non-representation-
alism succeed, they should also accept that this success will spread, so that
non-representationalist theories can be given for all language. To under-
stand these arguments we need to understand Price’s conception of local
and global non-representationalism.
Price begins by discussing what Robert Kraut (1990, p.158) calls the
bifurcation thesis. Roughly, this is the view that there is a division within
kinds of language, between those that are in some way representational,
and those that are not. For instance, expressivists may want to make a
division between ethical language which expresses attitudes, and language
about ordinary objects, which expresses beliefs. The bifurcation thesis is a
generalisation of this idea.
2 Compare someone who thinks that in principle all religions can be debunked, but
isn’t very interested in any specific debunking.
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However, just as there are several different readings of non-representa-
tionalist claims, so the bifurcation thesis has different readings. A first pass
is that there is a distinction between language which has representational
features and language which doesn’t. More precisely, there is a distinction
between declarative claims, and terms used in them, which have represent-
ational features and those which don’t. We add the clause about declarat-
ive claims since everyone agrees that (at least some) non-declarative claims
like ‘hello’ or ‘ouch!’ don’t have representational features. The bifurcation
thesis goes further than this: there are some declarative claims which still
lack representational features. For instance, an emotivist like Ayer would
have accepted this thesis, since he thought that ethical claims are declarative
yet are not truth-apt, in contrast with verifiable scientific claims which are.
This reading isn’t what Price means. Nor should it be. For as we’ve seen,
contemporary non-representationalists no longer deny that their favourite
area of language has representational features, because they accept minim-
alism about them, which entails that all claims with propositional content
have the full range of representational features. So they won’t accept the
bifurcation thesis in this way. How else can we conceive of the bifurcation
thesis?
Following the discussion in Chapter 2 we could read the bifurcation
thesis in terms of qualified rejection: on this reading it says that some declar-
ative claims have representational features in some ‘robust’ sense that others
do not. In Chapter 2 I outlined different ways to make sense of this. How-
ever, as we’ve seen the primary claim non-representationalists make is about
the explanatory role of representational features – it’s what I’ve been calling
explanatory scepticism. And indeed it is an explanatory reading of the bifurc-
ation thesis that Price attacks (2015a, p.139). So from now on we’ll follow
this, though in §4.5 I’ll briefly discuss readings of the bifurcation thesis in
terms of qualified rejection.
On an explanatory reading, the bifurcation thesis says that some lan-
guage is to be explained in terms of its representational features, and some
language is not. Given the reading of non-representationalism I have de-
fended so far – as centrally involving explanatory scepticism – this is just a
statement of local non-representationalism. To be a non-representationalist
about a given area of language is, at core, to deny that it is to be explained
using representational notions. To accept the bifurcation thesis is to accept
that not all language is like this.
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Local non-representationalism therefore involves accepting the bifurca-
tion thesis. Price then draws attention to Blackburn’s quasi-realism (Price,
2015b, p.136). Sometimes ‘quasi-realism’ is used to mean metaethical ex-
pressivism, but there’s more to it than this. First, if metaethical expressiv-
ism says that ethical language expresses attitudes to be contrasted in some
way with beliefs, then metaethical quasi-realism aims to explain why we end
up expressing these attitudes using language which shares many important
features with language which express ordinary beliefs. These features in-
clude coming in propositional form, being apt for truth and falsehood, and
so on. Quasi-realism, then, is a further project on top of expressivism, of
explaining why ethical language looks the way it does if the core expressivist
claim is right. Together, expressivism and quasi-realism combine to give us
the distinctive ‘what it does and why it’s there’ theory which I introduced
in Chapter 2, the theory which tells us what explains the meaning and/or
use of the relevant terms, and why we have terms with the features which
explain this.
Second, quasi-realism is often taken to be limited to ethical language.
This isn’t right: in principle, quasi-realism can cover other kinds of lan-
guage. For Price, quasi-realism is the project of explaining why we use
propositional claims in the given domain, whether it be ethical, causal, or
something else (Price, 2015a, pp.136-137). For instance, suppose you accept
the view that modal claims express inferential dispositions. Quasi-realism,
in such a case, means the project of explaining why we express inferential
dispositions using assertions like ‘it is necessary that p’ rather than in some
other way.
Given this set up, we can now see what Price’s global non-represent-
ationalism looks like. For a start, it is a globalisation of the quasi-realist
project. It is ‘a view that takes the same explanatory stance towards what
Blackburn calls the ‘realist-sounding discourse within which we promote
and debate [our] views’ for all kinds of views, rather than for special cases
(such as moral views)’ (Price, 2015a, p.138). Global non-representational-
ism involves explaining why we have any propositional language at all –
why we use any sentences which come as assertions, can be called ‘true’ and
‘false’, and so on.
However, there’s more to global non-representationalism than this. It
also involves the view that we can complete this quasi-realist explanatory
project without invoking representational features. According to Price, ‘the
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entire story’ about why we have assertoric language ‘is told in nonrepresent-
ational terms’ (2015a, p.143). This nicely matches the interpretation of non-
representationalism I’ve been defending: explain what the language does and
why we have it, without invoking representational features. I called this
claim explanatory scepticism – in Price’s case, this comes to the claim:
(GES) All terms can be explained without treating them as rep-
resentational
to be contrasted with localism
(LES) Some but not all terms can be explained without treating
them as representational
Price thinks that (LES) collapses into (GES) Let’s now examine his two
arguments for this. I will call them the external argument and the internal
argument.
4.2.1 Price’s two arguments
Price’s external argument draws consequences from minimalism about rep-
resentational features. He argues that minimalism collapses the bifurcation
thesis. According to Price, the core of minimalism is ‘the claim that these
semantic [and representational] notions play no significant theoretical role
in a mature theory of language and thought’ (2015a, p.138). On its explanat-
ory reading, the bifurcation thesis says that some language is best explained
in terms of representational notions. So minimalism clearly conflicts with
it. However, Price argues that anyone supporting local applications of non-
representationalism (this includes localists, and of course Blackburn) should
accept minimalism, and indeed many non-representationalists do accept it.
(The reasons he gives play a central role in the internal argument.) So,
he concludes, local non-representationalists are committed to minimalism
which entails global non-representationalism, because it entails that the bi-
furcation thesis is false.
We can set out Price’s argument like so:
(E1) Minimalism entails that all terms can be explained without represent-
ational notions.
(E2) Local non-representationalists are committed to minimalism.
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(E3) So local non-representationalists are committed to accepting that all
terms can be explained without representational notions. (from E1,
E2)
(E4) So local non-representationalists are committed to global non-repres-
entationalism. (from E3)
We’ll return to this argument after examining the internal argument.
Price’s internal argument concerns the notion of a successful quasi-real-
ist project. Price points out that a successful local application of non-rep-
resentationalism, for instance a successful quasi-realist theory of ethical lan-
guage, will explain its target language without treating it as representational.
In particular it will explain why that target language has the features of lan-
guage that localists take to be representational; it will explain why the target
language is assertoric, gets treated in terms of truth and falsity, and so on
(Price, 2015a, p.140). Let’s say it will explain the representational appearance
of ethical language. Explaining this appearance without treating the relev-
ant terms as representational just is what it is for a non-representationalist
project to succeed. Price argues that if a local application like Blackburn’s
expressivism succeeds, this is good reason to think that similarly non-rep-
resentational theories can be given of all language, even of language which
localists say is representational. It will turn out that it can be explained
without representational notions after all (Price, 2015a, pp.140-1).
His argument goes like this. The ethical quasi-realist’s explanation of the
representational appearance of ethical language ‘will offer some function, or
‘point,’ for the practice of expressing moral judgements (say) in declarative
form, and ascribing truth and falsity to the resulting claims’ (2015a, p.140).
The quasi-realist will say why humans will have language which expresses
the attitudes which constitute moral judgements – this is the ‘why it’s there’
component. For instance, as Price says, the quasi-realist might show how
expressing moral attitudes is extremely beneficial for humans, as it allows
us to disagree and argue, and thereby align our attitudes and so coordinate
our actions. Price argues that if this works for the case of ethical attitudes,
which are to be contrasted with beliefs, then it should work ‘in what seems
a much easier case: that of the expression of the behavioural dispositions we
call beliefs’ (2015a, p.140). This is because it is plausible that it would be
useful to be able to coordinate and align our beliefs.
As such, Price takes the local success of non-representationalism to be
a kind of proof of concept for a global version of the view. For if the
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local application really does succeed, this is evidence that representational
features really aren’t needed in other cases. Moreover, Price argues, if a loc-
alist says that representational features are needed to explain certain kinds
of language, this merely shows she hasn’t succeeded in explaining the repres-
entational appearance of the language for which she wants to give a non-rep-
resentationalist account. For in such a case the representational features we
needed must be ‘associated with some characteristic of use that the merely
quasi kind of truth [i.e. notions used in a non-representational explanation]
cannot emulate’ (2015a, p.141).
So we can set Price’s internal argument out like so:
(I1) If ethical quasi-realism is true, we can explain ethical language without
treating it as representational.
(I2) If we can explain ethical language without treating it as representa-
tional, we can explain all language without treating it as representa-
tional
(I3) So if ethical quasi-realism is true, we can explain all language without
treating it as representational. (from I1,I2)
(I4) Therefore if ethical quasi-realism is true, so is global non-representa-
tionalism. (from I3)
Note the focus on ethical quasi-realism here. This plays an important role
for Price, because he discusses some of the specifics of ethical quasi-realism’s
attempts at explaining ethical language. Moreover, since Blackburn is his
target, it makes sense to focus on Blackburn’s most developed specific ap-
plication of non-representationalism.
4.3 Localism and subject matter
In order to assess Price’s arguments, we need to know what counts as treat-
ing as representational. In Chapter 2 I left this fairly open, for the reason
that several important debates hang on this question. Like the case of creep-
ing minimalism in the previous chapter, this is one of those debates. In the
end, we find that what Price thinks this means differs from what localists
like Blackburn and Allan Gibbard think it means. Consequently, there is
actually no disagreement between Price and the localists. When Price as-
serts his version of globalism, he is not asserting anything Blackburn and
Gibbard deny. And when Blackburn and Gibbard deny what they think is
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globalism, they do not deny anything Price asserts. As such when we ap-
ply these different conceptions to Price’s arguments, they only succeed on
Price’s conception of globalism, and they fail when we plug in Blackburn
and Gibbard’s view.
In the previous chapter I argued for interpreting metaethical expressiv-
ism as the view that the best explanation of ethical language and thought
doesn’t require saying it’s belief-like or representational. I suggested that we
can understand these ideas in terms of the notion of a relation with subject
matter. I now want to say a bit more about this and how it relates to local
non-representationalism more widely.
Metaethics gives us the most famous example of non-representational-
ism. But there are many others. For instance, consider these non-represent-
ationalist views about causation, modality, conditionals, and probability:
1. To believe that Xs cause Ys is to expect a Y given an X
2. To believe that necessarily, P is to be disposed to use 〈P〉 in reasoning
from any premise.
3. To believe that if P then Q, is to be disposed to believe that Q on
coming to believe that P.
4. To believe that pr(A) = n is to be disposed to bet on A at certain
odds.3
There is nothing obviously in common between these in terms of the pos-
itive view offered about what these beliefs consist in. Moreover, they have
little in common with what the expressivist says about ethics: they don’t
appeal to attitudes or plans at all.
Contrast these views with some rivals:
1. To believe that Xs cause Ys is to believe that an X raises the chance of
a Y
2. To believe that necessarily, P is to believe 〈P〉 is true in all possible
worlds
3. To believe that if P then Q, is to believe 〈not-P or Q〉
3 The first of these is a crude version of a Humean view. The second is defended by
McFetridge (1990) and Divers & Elstein (2012). The third is defended by Stalnaker (1984)
and Mellor (1993). The fourth is defended by Blackburn (1980), but has roots in Ramsey
(1926).
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4. To believe that pr(A) = n is to believe that in an infinite series of
relevant tests, the frequency of As will tend to n.4
Again, there is nothing obviously in common between these views.
Despite there being nothing obviously linking the views within each
list, the first are all clearly non-representationalist, and the second are all
clearly representationalist. I think the best way of explaining this is in terms
of subject matter. The second set involves relations between beliefs and
their subject matter. The first does not. In the second set we find relations
between thinks that philosophers have taken to constitute the subject matter
at hand: probability relations which constitute causation, truth at possible
worlds which constitutes necessity, material implication which constitutes
conditional truth, and frequency which constitutes probability. These are
very specific, reductive views. But other representationalist views include:
1. To believe that Xs cause Ys is to believe that a causal relation C holds
between all or most Xs and Ys.
2. To believe that necessarily, P is to attribute necessity to 〈P〉
3. To believe that if P then Q, is to hold the belief relation to 〈If P then
Q〉
4. To believe that pr(A) = n is to ascribe the chance relation between
〈A〉 and n.
Still we find subject matter on the right hand side: necessity, causal rela-
tion, conditional propositions, the chance relation. And note that someone
may offer a view like the necessity view without actually believing necessity
exists: they may be an error theorist.
All these representationalist views contrast with the non-representation-
alist views above. My view is that the contrast between these views consists
in the fact that the non-representationalist theories do not invoke the subject
matter of the terms in question. By subject matter, I mean the specific sub-
ject matter of the specific term in question. So while a belief that Xs cause
Ys does have Xs and Ys as its subject matter, and therefore the account
above does mention its subject matter in some sense, it does not mention
causation, and therefore as an account of the term ‘cause’ and the concept of
causation it does not mention subject matter.
4 The first is a crude version of Mellor (1995b). The second is based on Lewis (1986).
The third is the material conditional view of conditional beliefs, see Jackson (1979). The
fourth is a frequency interpretation of probability, see Mellor (2005, ch.3). I’m not saying
anyone has explicitly defended these views, but they are views one might take.
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Similarly, being disposed to bet on A, or being disposed to reason with
〈A〉, or being disposed to believe that Q on coming to believe that P, are
likewise not relations with probability, necessity, or conditionals. And, as
we’ve seen, so approving of x, desiring x, or intending or planning to pro-
mote and pursue x, are not relations to goodness, whatever they are.
This gives us one general picture of what it is to be a non-representation-
alist: it is to deny that the relevant term or concept needs to be explained
in terms of relations between it and its subject matter. I therefore think
the best way of reading localism is as the local denial of the explanatory
relevance of relations between thoughts and words and their subject matter,
though I want to alter this slightly as we’ll see in a moment. So, we can
formulate the localist and globalist claims like so:
(LSM) For some but not all terms t, the best explanation of the
meaning and/or use of t doesn’t require ascribing any relations
between t and its subject matter.
(GSM) There is no term t such that the best explanation of the
meaning and/or use of ethical terms requires ascribing relations
between t and its subject matter.
In this section I will argue for three claims: (i) this is the best reading of the
conception of representational features adopted by Blackburn and Gibbard
in their discussions of globalism and localism. Given this conception, (ii)
both of Price’s arguments fail against Blackburn and Gibbard’s localism and
(iii) even globalists will not accept all the premises of Price’s arguments.
This shows that globalists like Price do not read globalism in the same way
as Blackburn and Gibbard. In the next section I will develop my argument
further to show that the localists and the globalists agree with each other,
and that their disagreement is merely verbal.
4.3.1 Blackburn and Gibbard
Let’s start with Blackburn. In his most notable recent contributions to
this debate (Blackburn, 2013, 2010b) Blackburn gives his definition of prag-
matism (which in my terms is another term for non-representationalism).
Blackburn requires of a pragmatist theory of a class of terms that it
. . . eschews any use of the referring expressions of the discourse;
any appeal to anything that a Quinean would identify as the
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values of the bound variables if the discourse is regimented; or
any semantic or ontological attempt to ‘interpret’ the discourse
in a domain, to find referents for its terms, or truth makers for
its sentences. (Blackburn, 2013, p.66)
Blackburn is defining pragmatist theories as those which don’t use the terms
they try to explain. For instance, an expressivist theory doesn’t need to
use ‘good’ to explain the meaning of ‘good’ or why we have a term which
expresses the kinds of attitudes it expresses.
I think the best way of reading this is to invoke the notion of a relation
between a term and its subject matter. For when you use a term in its own
explanation, for instance by invoking a causal tracking relation between
‘current’ and currents, to use Blackburn’s example, you are thereby typ-
ically introducing a relation between the term and its subject matter. For
we can state a term’s subject matter by using it – the subject matter of ‘tree’
is trees. So the non-pragmatist cases Blackburn is envisaging, which include
‘current’, ‘energies’, and other terms he takes to be involved in scientific lan-
guage, are those where we invoke relations to subject matter to explain the
terms. As such, when Blackburn goes on to reject global non-representa-
tionalism, he is rejecting (GSM) and asserting (LSM).
The same goes for Gibbard, though the route to see this is slightly trick-
ier. Gibbard admits that he uses ‘expressivism’ differently to globalists like
Price. He takes an expressivist theory of a word to be one which ‘explain[s]
the meaning of the word via explaining the states of mind that constitute be-
lieving things couched with the term’ (Gibbard, 2015, p.212). Metaethical
expressivism clearly counts as such a theory since it says that practical at-
titudes constitute ethical beliefs, and explains ethical terms’ meaning as ex-
pressing those practical attitudes. Gibbard claims to be a global expressivist
in this sense. And here we can treat ‘expressivism’ as shorthand for ‘non-
representationalism’, since neither Gibbard nor the discussion by Price that
he cites distinguishes these.
However, Gibbard’s use is idiosyncratic, as he admits (2015, p.213). For
what Gibbard calls ‘expressivism’ is really like a psychologistic or ideational
approach to meaning, according to which language gets its meaning in virtue
of expressing mental states whose content it inherits (see e.g. Davis, 2002).
Yet one can be a psychologist without being a non-representationalist. Con-
sider the view that ethical language gets its meaning from expressing ethical
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beliefs, which are not attitudes at all but as belief-like as can be, consist-
ing in relations to their subject matter. Such a view is psychologistic but
representationalist.
Gibbard does recognise that this use of ‘expressivism’ does not match
that of a globalist like Price, and claims that his own view is in fact at odds
with globalism.
Perhaps he [Price] uses the term ‘expressivism’ to exclude giv-
ing any notion of representation a genuine explanatory role, a
genuine role in explaining meaning. I’m not building this ex-
clusion into the meaning of ‘expressivism’, and trivially if Price
does then the position I am suggesting doesn’t qualify as ‘global
expressivism’ in his sense. (Gibbard, 2015, p.213)
This makes it seem likely that Gibbard’s view really will conflict with global
expressivism as the globalist understands it. And indeed later on Gibbard
endorses ‘representationalism’ at least in some cases, and claims that his
viewwill involve ‘explaining also in terms of representation’ (Gibbard, 2015,
p.215). So here we see Gibbard rejecting the idea that representational no-
tions never do any explanatory work.
But now let’s see what Gibbard counts as representation. He claims that
representational terms are ones which track the environment, where track-
ing is a causal relation with the world. He takes representational thoughts
to involve ‘a relation to the states of affairs we are thinking about’, a relation
which is causal (2015, p.215). As such, he thinks that the representational
terms are those whose explanation requires (causal) relations with subject
matter. For causal tracking relations are relations between terms and their
subject matter: ‘tree’ causally tracks trees, and so on. So in the end, Gibbard
too denies (GSM) and asserts (LSM).
Before we move on to Price’s arguments, it’s worth noting something
important. Both Blackburn and Gibbard are interested not just in relations
with subject matter, but cases where these are cashed out in terms of causal
tracking relations with the environment, with things to which the predicate
in question applies. For instance, they are both interested in cases like ‘tree’
which causally tracks trees. This means that Blackburn and Gibbard are
both focused on a limited subset of the wider class of relations with subject
matter. For instance, a relation between a believer and a proposition will
count as a relation with subject matter even if that proposition is about a
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property which doesn’t exist. Yet Blackburn and Gibbard are not particu-
larly interested in relations like this.
I think this is because like Dreier in the previous chapter Blackburn and
Gibbard are more interested in cases where we have to invoke a specific
ontology – a group of objects of a given kind – in order to explain our
language and thought. For them it is not specifically the idea that to explain
assertions involving ‘tree’ we have to invoke the notion of representing as
a tree or believing to be a tree, but the idea that we have to invoke trees
themselves to do this work. So Blackburn and Gibbard are focusing only on
a subset of representational features, namely those which are relations with
things in the world which satisfy the concept or term we’re explaining.
They shouldn’t think these exhaust the representational features, since
they will want to believe that ‘witch’ and ‘magic’ are representational, yet
cannot think that utterances of ‘magic’ are caused by magic things. In such
a case they should say that ‘magic’ can only be explained in terms of subject
matter: representing as magical, believing to be magical, believing a propos-
ition of the form 〈x is magical〉, or something which constitutively explains
these things. But in what follows we can read them as restricting their view
to relations to subject matter which include things like causal tracking –
those relations which involve the ontology . My argument is unaffected by
this restriction.
4.3.2 The arguments
Now we’ve seen that the localists Blackburn and Gibbard take representa-
tional features to be relations to subject matter, though in a stricter sense
than I have been understanding them, we can formulate Price’s arguments
in these terms. Let’s start with the external argument, and return later to
the internal one:
(ER1) Minimalism entails that all terms can be explained without relations
to subject matter.
(ER2) Local non-representationalists are committed to minimalism.
(ER3) So local non-representationalists are committed to accepting that all
terms can be explained without relations to subject matter. (from
ER1, ER2)
(ER4) So local non-representationalists are committed to global non-repres-
entationalism. (from ER3)
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This arguments applies to Blackburn and Gibbard’s localism because they
take global non-representationalism to be the claim that no term’s meaning
is explained in terms of relations with its subject matter. However, the
argument fails, because either premise (ER1) or else (ER2) is false; in either
case (ER3) is therefore false too.
(ER1) says that minimalism entails that relations to subject matter are
never needed to explain terms’ meaning and/or use. (ER2) says that local
non-representationalists are committed to such a view. At least one of these
claims is false, and globalists like Price will admit this too. To start with,
notice that a theory like Paul Horwich’s minimalism about reference denies
that there is any constitution theory to be given for reference, a theory of
the form:
The relation of x referring to y consists (roughly speaking) in x
bearing relation r to y (Horwich, 1998a, p.123)
The same goes for truth (1998a, p.104). Horwich thinks that there’s no
property which constitutes being true – for Horwich, this means there’s no
property which is possessed by all and only the truths and which explains
the characteristic features of truths.
However, Horwich himself claims that the best explanation of the use
of a term – which for him is the best theory of what constitutes that term’s
meaning – may sometimes involve a relation between that term and its sub-
ject matter (1998a, pp.65-66). He gives ‘red’ as an example (1998a, p.45).
Yet Horwich is one of the best-known minimalists about truth and refer-
ence. So if even a minimalist like Horwich will deny (ER1), it doesn’t seem
plausible.
The above points help us answer the worry from the previous chapter:
that minimalism is incompatible with representationalism. We can now
see that there is no problem here. Minimalism about notions like truth,
representation, belief, will not entail that all possible uses of those concepts
cannot explain. Instead, it just denies that there’s a constitution thesis for
these things, some underlying property each has which explains it.
This allows us to explain in terms of representation and belief. For a
minimalist can allow that these things are disjunctive: that many different
things can count as representation. This is because a minimalist about rep-
resentation thinks representation follows trivially from meaning, and so if
we think that meaning is not itself constituted by anything across the board,
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we will not think so about representation either. Non-representationalists
do not think meaning is constituted by one thing: many different things
can explain meaning. So they will be able to say that representation, too, is
explained by many different things.
Now, this lets us explain in terms of some relation or feature which does
count as representation, so long as we don’t say that that feature constitutes
representation. So, for instance, an expressivist can perfectly well say that
some terms are explained in terms of causal tracking, without saying some-
thing incompatible with minimalism, for she will also say that causal track-
ing does not constitute or explain representation itself. Minimalism has no
problem with these piecemeal explanations, so long as there is no claim that
there is a general category of representation which can itself do explanatory
work. Instead, we can just give explanations in terms of the various things
which count as representation, rather than one unified category.
Suppose instead we shift our conception of minimalism to exclude Hor-
wich from the minimalist camp, at least for the purposes of the argument.
In such a case, we’d make (ER1) true by fiat. But in doing so we would make
(ER2) false: local non-representationalists aren’t committed to minimalism,
if this is what minimalism means. A localist like Blackburn is explicit about
relations to subject matter being necessary to explain some terms. Discuss-
ing Horwich’s claim that some terms can be explained without recourse to
these relations, Blackburn says:
Here it seems to me Horwich may be right, and certainly for
the purpose of this essay I have no quarrel with his claim. But
notice how weak the claim is. It is only that the fundamental
acceptance properties governing the use of a term [for Horwich,
these are what explain meaning] need not relate the understand-
ing user to the extension. But it clearly can do so, for certain
terms, or certain families of terms. (Blackburn, 2012, p.206,
original emphasis)
He then goes on to wonder whether this casts doubt on minimalism. So
clearly for Blackburn, if minimalism is right it doesn’t entail that no terms
are explained by their relations to their extensions, i.e. their subject matter.
So (ER2) is false.
One might argue that Blackburn’s view entails minimalism whether he
likes it or not. However, this can’t help globalists like Price. For they too
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admit that some terms are explained using relations to their subject matter,
and hence they cannot coherently accept (ER1). So, just as with Blackburn
and Horwich, they too won’t think that minimalism entails that no terms
are to be explained in terms of relations to subject matter. To see this let’s
look at Price and Michael Williams.
Michael Williams says there are terms whose explanation involves speak-
ers’ reliable discriminative reporting dispositions or RDRDs. Like Horwich,
he gives ‘red’ as an example:
To master ‘red’ in its reporting use, the speaker must have a
reliable discriminative reporting disposition (RDRD): a dispos-
ition, given appropriate motivation and conditions, to report ‘x
is red’ only in the presence of a red thing in his field of vision.
(Williams, 2013, p.140)
For Williams, then, the explanation of why ‘red’ means red necessarily in-
volves a link between ‘red’ and red things – a link mediated by speakers’ per-
ceptions. Note that Williams is not merely saying that people have RDRDs
regarding red things, but that ‘red’ gets its meaning in virtue of these. He
makes the above claim in the context of sketching an ‘EMU’ – an explana-
tion of meaning in terms of use – for ‘red’ (2013, p.133). The claim about
RDRDs is therefore meant to be an explanatory one.
Price too thinks that some terms will be explained using relations with
their subject matter. He admits that some terms ‘e-represent’, as he puts it
(Price 2015a, p.147, Price 2013, pp.36ff, pp.175ff). Price takes e-representa-
tion to be a kind of causal tracking relation between a term and its subject
matter. Price approvingly cites Williams’s case of ‘red’ as a case of e-rep-
resentation, and as a case where the best explanation of the term invokes
e-representation (Price, 2013, p.175).
Moreover, Price has good philosophical reason to accept that some terms
should be explained in terms of e-representation. For Price is primarily
interested in explaining patterns of linguistic use:
The challenge [for the non-representationalist] is now simply to
explain in naturalistic terms how creatures like us come to talk
in these various ways. (Price, 2013, p.20)
Environmental representation often involves a notion of tracking, cashed
out in a causal way: utterances of a given term are caused by the (per-
ceived) presence of a given object. In the case of ‘red’, speakers with the
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right RDRD are disposed to report ‘x is red’ only when there is a red thing
visible. But this is clearly part of an explanation of why the claim gets
uttered: the speaker’s RDRD, plus the presence of a red thing, plus the link
between RDRDs and her understanding of the word ‘red’ explain why she
said ‘x is red’. So here the link between ‘red’ and the red thing – a link
which counts as environmental representation – is not only present but also
explainswhy the term gets uttered. There’s no good reason for Price to deny
this.
So, reading the external argument in terms of relations to subject mat-
ter, we find that it fails. At least one of the premises is false. Whether
or not they’re committed to minimalism, local non-representationalists are
not committed to accepting the globalist view that all terms can be explained
without relations to subject matter. Next let’s look at the internal argument.
Applying the subject matter reading, the internal argument comes out
like this:
(IR1) If ethical quasi-realism is true, we can explain ethical language without
invoking relations between ethical terms and their subject matter.
(IR2) If we can explain ethical language without invoking relations between
ethical terms and their subject matter, we can explain all language
without invoking relations between terms and their subject matter.
(IR3) So if ethical quasi-realism is true, we can explain all language without
invoking relations between terms and their subject matter. (from
IR1,IR2)
(IR4) Therefore if ethical quasi-realism is true, so is global non-representa-
tionalism. (from IR3)
However, this argument fails because premise (IR2) is false and consequently
so is (IR3). Moreover, globalists like Price and Michael Williams will and
should agree with this diagnosis.
(IR2) says that if we can explain ethical language without invoking rela-
tions between ethical terms and their subject matter, we can generalise this
kind of explanation to all cases. This premise is false, and neither localists
or globalists will accept it. The reasons for this are the same reasons that the
external argument failed. For since we saw that both localists and globalists
think that some terms must be explained by relations to their subject mat-
ter, they will reject (IR2)! They will take ethical language as distinctive, in
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being explicable without its subject matter. But they won’t think this can
extend to all kinds of language.
As such I’ve established the three claims mentioned at the beginning of
this section: (i) the relations to subject matter reading is the best reading
of Blackburn and Gibbard’s view, (ii) given this conception, both of Price’s
arguments fail, and (iii) given this conception, globalists won’t accept all
the premises of these arguments anyway. However, so far I haven’t shown
that the local/global debate is verbal. I’ve only shown that localists’ views
don’t collapse into globalism, when we read globalism in the way localists
favour, and that globalists should and do accept localism when read in this
way. This doesn’t show that the debate is verbal: it’s simply bad news for
globalists! The debate only becomes verbal when we see that localists do
accept globalism when we read it as globalists want to read it. Showing this
is the task of the next section, where I’ll examine how Price’s arguments
fare when we read them in Price’s way.
4.4 Globalism and generality
Price doesn’t share the localists’ conception of representational features as
relations to subject matter. In his defences of global non-representational-
ism, Price frequently discusses whether reference, representation and the
like are in some sense general. He talks about their being uniform or uni-
vocal (Price, 2011, pp.32-33), whether all meaningful descriptive sentences
have something in common which explains them (Price, 2004, p.201), and
whether we should think of all sentences in language as being “about’ some
aspect of the external world, in much the same way’ (Price, 2013, p.40, em-
phasis added). Summing up his view in a recent paper, Price says:
In particular, it is open to us to take the view that at least by
the time we get to language, there is no useful external notion,
of a semantic kind—in other words, no useful, general, notion of
relations that words and sentences bear to the external world,
that we might usefully identify with truth and reference. (Price,
2015a, pp.146-157)
Taking Price’s term ‘useful’ to mean something explanatory, in the sense
we’ve been discussing, this amounts to a denial that there are any proper-
ties of language which satisfy these three conditions: (i) they are relations
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between language and the world, (ii) they explain terms’ meaning and/or
use, and (iii) they are general.5 In other words, Price thinks that no term’s
meaning is explained by its possession of a relational property which is gen-
eral.
Following the template earlier, this gives us readings of local and global
non-representationalism as follows:
(LEG) For some but not all terms t, the best explanation of the
meaning and/or use of t doesn’t require ascribing to t a general
relation between language and the world.
(GEG) There is no term t such that the best explanation of the
meaning and/or use of ethical terms requires ascribing to t a gen-
eral relation between language and the world.
However, now we need to understand what ‘general’ means, and whether
this gives global non-representationalism any more hope. Note also that
Price talks in terms of relations between language and the world, rather
than terms and their subject matter. This will be important shortly.
First, we might think that a relation is general just in case it holds
between all terms and something in the world: there is a relation R such
that for each term t, there is something to which t bears R. But if we read
‘general’ this way, (GEG) becomes too easily true. Nobody thinks that
every single linguistic thing is to be explained in terms of the very same
relation with the world. Even if relations to the world are what explain
meaning, no single relation is going to be part of the explanation of all of
the many different kinds of words and phrases in our language. So if (GEG)
is merely the denial of an extremely general but explanatory relation which
links all terms to the world and thereby explains their meaning and/or use,
it hardly seems like a radical departure from mainstream philosophy of lan-
guage. Moreover, it seems perfectly acceptable to localists. So this can’t be
the right reading of generality.
An alternative way of understanding generality is to take (GEG) as say-
ing that there are no relations which explain all terms of a given kind. So
what (GEG) denies is not (just) the existence of a general relation linking all
words to the world, which explains some of those terms’ meaning and/or
5 The clause about generality encompasses Price’s claim that they can’t be identified
with truth and reference, which would count as general properties and relations in this
way.
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use. Instead it says that even for a given kind of term, there is no relation
which all terms of that kind bear to the world, and which explains their
meaning and/or use. So for instance, supposing we take all adjectives to be
of the same kind, (GEG) says that there is no relation which all adjectives
bear to the world and which explains their meaning and/or use.
There are questions about what constitutes a ‘kind’: the less we know
about what a kind is, the less we know about global non-representational-
ism. Putting this issue to one side, when read in this way (GEG) does indeed
conflict with some mainstream theories of meaning. For instance, at least
one kind of causal theory of predicate reference seems to violate (GEG),
since it takes all predicates to be explained in terms of their causal link with
the members of their extension. This is a relation between all terms of
a given kind and their subject matter. Moreover, (GEG) is not obviously
false; it seems at least (epistemically) possible that there are no general – i.e.
kind-relative – explanatory relations of the kind (GEG) denies. Indeed this
is part of what local forms of expressivism require, a fact we’ll discuss more
later.
However, on this reading (GEG) is still too weak. For a start, it’s com-
patible with the view that there are no general relations to the world which
explain terms’ meanings, not even ones within kinds, but that all such rela-
tions which do explain meanings are relations to subject matter. Someone
might agree that two different relations are needed to explain the meaning
and/or use of, say, ‘tree’ and ‘number’, but they may also say that whatever
those relations are, they will be relations between ‘tree’ and trees, and ‘num-
ber’ and numbers.6 In light of this issue, we need to add to (GEG) the claim
that not all terms’ meaning is explained by relations to their subject matter,
and to add the same to the localist claim:
(GEGX) There is no term t such that the best explanation of t’s
meaning and/or use requires ascriptions to t of a general relation
between language and the world, and there are some terms such
that the best explanation of their meaning and/or use doesn’t re-
quire ascribing relations between them and their subject matter.
(LEGX) For some but not all terms t, the best explanation of t’s
meaning and/or use requires ascriptions to t of a general relation
6 This kind of view is discussed and rejected by Horwich (1998a, pp.22-23), because he
thinks that it relies on a non-deflationary theory of truth, which he thinks is indefensible.
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between language and the world; and there are some terms such
that the best explanation of their meaning and/or use doesn’t re-
quire ascribing relations between them and their subject matter.
This rules out these non-expressivist but non-general views. It also recog-
nises the fact that Price primarily focuses on (i) the generality or univocity
of representation, and (ii) the possibility of explanations of terms which
don’t put them in relations with their subject matter.7
So, let’s interpret Price’s arguments using this notion of generality. The
external argument becomes:
(EG1) Minimalism entails that all terms can be explained without general
relations between language and the world.
(EG2) Local non-representationalists are committed to minimalism.
(EG3) So local non-representationalists are committed to accepting that all
terms can be explained without general relations between language
and the world. (from EG1, EG2)
(EG4) So local non-representationalists are committed to global non-repres-
entationalism. (from EG3)
and the internal argument becomes:
(IG1) If ethical quasi-realism is true, we can explain ethical language without
invoking general relations between language and the world.
(IG2) If we can explain ethical language without invoking general relations
between language and the world, we can explain all language without
invoking such relations.
(IG3) So if ethical quasi-realism is true, we can explain all language without
invoking general relations between language and the world. (from
IG1,IG2)
(IG4) Therefore if ethical quasi-realism is true, so is global non-representa-
tionalism. (from IG3)
The key premises in these arguments now become true. For if we un-
derstand generality in terms of kinds, minimalism does entail that there are
7 Price talks about word-world relations, but even, say, desiring x is a word-world rela-
tion, between the desirer and x. So we should focus on relations with subject matter rather
than word-world relations as such: these are the things local non-representationalists deny
and which Price will have in mind in the case of (LEGX).
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no kind-level relations which explain meaning. For instance, it seems likely
that a minimalist would accept that there is no one relation that predic-
ates all bear to the world which explains their meaning, since such a rela-
tion would be correctly said to constitute meaning, something minimalists
deny. Indeed minimalists like Horwich (and, of course, Price) believe this,
as we’ve seen. Moreover, localists do seem to accept minimalism in this
sense, because they think different terms of the same kind may need explan-
ation in different ways – ‘good’ and ‘wrong’ are not going to be explained
in terms of the same relation with the world as ‘tree’ and ‘cat’, for instance.
(EG1) and (EG2) are therefore true.
Localists like Blackburn should also agree that explaining ethical terms
without citing general relations with the world is enough to show that no
terms need explaining in this way. This is simply because by showing that
ethical terms get explained differently to other terms which are similar in
kind, they already discounted kind-level relations from having any explan-
atory role. ‘Good’ is not to be explained in the same way as ‘tree’, but any
kind-level relation of the kind mentioned in the above arguments would
have to explain both these terms since they are of the same kind. So no such
kind-level relation does explanatory work here. Therefore (IG2) is true,
alongside (IG1).
One might think that globalism therefore comes out victorious. But this
is not so. Localists will simply reject the inference between the final premises
and the conclusions of these arguments. This is because they won’t count
the global denial of general, explanatory word-world relations as global non-
representationalism. For them, global non-representationalism is the global
denial of explanatory relations to subject matter. So while they will accept
that no general relations explain any terms, they will not count this as in-
compatible with their localism. We saw above that it is the relations to
subject matter view that localists like Gibbard and Blackburn hold – Black-
burn goes so far as to make it part of his definition of pragmatism. So these
arguments won’t move Blackburn and Gibbard.
The argument of the last two sections shows that globalists and localists
are merely talking past each other. They’re interested in different things,
and count different kinds of theories as non-representationalist theories. So
while Price’s globalising arguments may be interesting, they don’t show
that localism is unstable. Localists never denied what Price takes to be glob-
alism, so it isn’t unstable, as Price says. Nor does Price accept what the
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localists think globalism is. They already agree with each other, and Price’s
arguments don’t force anyone to change their view.
So far, then, we have sufficient reason to believe that actual localists and
globalists don’t disagree, but merely have different views about what counts
as a non-representationalist theory. As such, even if localism is true, the
‘bifurcation thesis’ still stands if we read it as localists do: some claims are
to be explained in terms of relations between them and their subject matter,
and some are not. It does not stand if we read it as globalists do: no claims
are to be explained in terms of general word-world relations.
4.5 Qualified rejection
What about reading the bifurcation thesis in terms of qualified rejection?
Then it would say that some declarative claims have genuine or robust rep-
resentational features and others don’t. Do Price’s arguments impact this
thesis? Recall the two ways qualified rejection is often read: in terms of
environmental representation, and in terms of metaphysical substantivity.
Neither minimalism nor the success of local forms of non-representa-
tionalism threatens to collapse the distinction between claims that represent
their environment and those that don’t. We already saw this in action in
§4.3. Nobody denies that some claims represent their environment, and
the fact that we can explain some kinds of language without environmental
representation doesn’t entail that no language represents its environment.
Moreover, as we’ve seen minimalism has no impact on this issue, so if we
draw the bifurcation thesis in these terms it still stands.
What about metaphysical substantivity? On this reading the bifurcation
thesis says that some declarative claims correspond to metaphysically real
facts and properties and others don’t. Minimalism might seem to have an
impact here. We might argue as follows: minimalism deprives us of any
more metaphysically weighty notion of a fact or a property. It only allows a
notion which tags along with propositional content, so that any true claim
has a corresponding fact and property – the claim that grass is green corres-
ponds to the fact that grass is green, and ascribes the property being green to
grass, and so on for all other true claims. So this leaves us no room to dis-
tinguish between claims which correspond to real properties and facts and
those which don’t.
However this is too pessimistic. It relies on the idea that if we are min-
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imalist about a certain notion, we cannot make sense of any less minimal
version of it. This is false. For instance, consider a minimalist about truth,
who thinks that for 〈grass is green〉 to be true takes nothing more than
grass’s being green. Such a minimalist can easily stipulate other senses of
truth which build upon this. For instance, suppose someone said that some
truths are interesting and some are not. The minimalist can easily make
sense of this. For 〈grass is green〉 to be an interesting truth is for grass to be
green and for it to be interesting that grass is green. (Or perhaps, for it to be
interesting whether grass is green.) And so for propositions in general. The
minimalist has no problem with this. She only has a problem with thinking
that there is any non-trivial thing to say about the core notion of truth on
which the notion of interesting truth is built.
Let’s apply this to facts and properties. Minimalism gives us one notion
of facts and properties which we can then build on to get the relevant sub-
stantial notion. It tells us that the fact that p exists if and only if p, and
that an object o has the property being F if and only if o is F. It says that
these two claims exhaust our ordinary notion of fact and property, and are
basic: there is no further truth which explains them. But it doesn’t rule out
using such notions to build more complex ones. For instance, a minimalist
can accept the notion of a mental property, perhaps by saying being F is a
mental property if and only if all the things which are F are mental. This is
compatible with minimalism, because it doesn’t require adding anything to
our basic understanding of properties.
Consider now a distinction used to motivate the notion of a metaphys-
ically substantial property: there is something different between a gerry-
mandered property like being such that grass is green and, say, being green.
The former doesn’t have any explanatory power and doesn’t ground any
genuine resemblance between the things which have it, but the latter does,
at least to some greater extent than the former. We rarely if ever explain
things in terms of their having the former property, but we more frequently
explain things in terms of their having the latter, for instance when we ask
why the traffic light caused drivers to accelerate. And the things which share
the former property do not resemble each other – they include all objects,
which differ from each other in all possible ways! On the other hand, things
with the property being green do seem to resemble each other, at least to a
greater extent.
A minimalist can accept this, by simply reading the claims about these
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two properties in terms of ordinary truths about things which are such that
grass is green. There are very few true explanatory claims of the form p
because x is such that grass is green. Perhaps there are more true claims of
the form p because grass is green but that is quite different. Nor are things
which are such that grass is green similar to each other: since every object
is such that grass is green, the collection of these things is as diverse as can
be. Importantly, we can state all this without using words like ‘property’. If
there is a metaphysical distinction to be had here, a minimalist can accept it
by building on the ordinary notions of facts and properties that we have, and
understanding the further elements we add without resorting to property-
and fact-talk.
This isn’t to say that we should accept a metaphysical distinction of this
kind or that it’s defensible, just that minimalism doesn’t affect this issue.
Minimalism doesn’t undermine the bifurcation thesis read in terms of meta-
physical substantivity. It doesn’t deprive us of more substantive notions of
truth, representation, property and so on. It just argues that our ordinary
notion should be understood in the minimal way it suggests, in terms of
schemas like the T-schema. The success of local forms of non-representa-
tionalism does not undermine the bifurcation thesis either – it has nothing
to do with it at all. So we’ve found no reason that either minimalism about
representational features or the success of local applications of non-repres-
entationalism collapses the bifurcation thesis, read in terms of qualified re-
jection.
4.6 Consequences for non-representationalism
So far, we’ve seen that Price’s arguments for global non-representationalism
do not fail so much as fail to lead localism anywhere new. For localists
already accept Price’s globalism, and Price already accepts the localists’ loc-
alism. This is because the two camps have different views on what counts
as a representational feature, and hence different interpretations of explan-
atory scepticism, the key non-representationalist claim. We’ve also seen that
these same arguments have no impact when we consider the view I’m calling
qualified rejection: they don’t force non-representationalists to accept quali-
fied rejection with regard to all language.
This doesn’t just affect Price’s arguments. It also affects Blackburn’s
(2013) argument against globalism, which following Kraut (2001) he calls
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the no exit objection. The argument says that a non-representationalist the-
ory of a particular discourse – a ‘what it does and why it’s there’ theory
– cannot use the terms which are being explained. Since this is not always
possible, there are some discourses which need a representationalist theory,
and so globalism is false.
As we’ve seen, this localist argument completely misses its target, for
Price doesn’t see non-representationalism as a matter of avoiding using the
terms in question, but of avoiding general word-world relations. The fact
that we have to use some terms in their own explanation doesn’t entail that
we have to use general word-world relations to explain them. Indeed, as
we’ve seen, localists like Blackburn already accept Price’s view. So the no
exit objection succeeds against globalism as Blackburn reads it, but trivially
fails against globalism as Price reads it.
What should we take away from this result? At first sight it makes Price’s
globalism less radical: Price’s view is already in play, localists already accept
it and they don’t have to change any of their view to agree with it. However,
this is too quick. Price could argue that localists tacitly rely on the idea
that alongside the areas of language for which they give non-representational
theories, there are areas of language which can be satisfactorily explained
using general categories like truth, belief and representation. Their views
may entail globalism, but they haven’t yet appreciated the consequences of
this.
Indeed Price does seem to think this:
Blackburn’s local quasi-realist will presumably come to the table
with some ready-made (Fregean?) theory of how the relev-
ant phenomena are to be explained in the genuinely descript-
ive domains, where there isn’t a need to accommodate under-
lying functional diversity (at least of the relevant kind). The
task is then to show how bits of language with different basic
functions can then properly emulate the surface characteristics
of the genuinely descriptive domains. Global [non-representa-
tionalism] requires a different approach. Since it rejects repres-
entationalism altogether, it cannot begin by assuming that there
is a class of cases for which the explanation of the surface phe-
nomena is already available, at least in principle. (Macarthur &
Price, 2007, p.247)
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In other words, localists may tacitly assume that there is some class of words
– perhaps those like ‘tree’ and ‘cat’ – which all fundamentally have the same
function, and so don’t exhibit the ‘functional diversity’ exhibited by, say,
ethical and modal terms, and whose meaning and use can be characterised in
representational terms. Price argues that this collapses if globalism is right,
for we can never use representational features to explain any terms. So we
cannot assume that there’s some neatly outlined class of words for which
representationalism will work, and Price thinks localism rests on such an
assumption.
According to Price, this has two consequences. First it means explaining
not only each kind of language we see, but assertoric language as such. It
means saying why we have assertions – utterances which say that something
is the case – at all. Extending this to the psychological, it means saying why
we have beliefs – mental states with truth-evaluable content, which in some
way represent something as the case – at all.
Second, it means more of a focus on our use of representational words,
words like ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘belief’, ‘represents’. Price wants to turn our gaze
back onto these words, the very words non-representationalists want to es-
chew in their explanations of language. If globalism is right, we will need
a fresh explanation of our use of these words. This is because we cannot
explain any applications of these in terms of representational features: we
cannot say that we use the term ‘refers’ because some terms refer to things.
This would be invoking a general word-world relation (reference) to explain
the term ‘refers’, and globalism rules this out.
Instead, once we accept globalism we need to start again, giving the dis-
tinctive ‘what it does and why it’s there’ theory for representational words
themselves, not just ethical and modal ones for instance. However, whatever
explanation we give here must be compatible with our local non-represent-
ationalist theories: whatever theory we give of, say, the use of ‘true’, ‘false’,
and ‘belief’ had better be compatible with the fact that ethical language ex-
presses attitudes, that probability language expresses credences, and so on
for whatever local theories we think are plausible.
Price thinks localists like Blackburn will give a complex non-represent-
ationalist story to explain why we use the term ‘represents’ as applied to
ethical language, but think that in genuine cases no complex explanation
is required: we say that ‘Socrates’ refers to Socrates because ‘Socrates’ does
genuinely refer to Socrates. Accepting globalism means recognising that the
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latter is no explanation at all.
So for Price, accepting globalism means appreciating that we cannot
simply explain some words in terms of their referents, or in terms of what
they represent, because we already know this won’t do. Price offers several
different alternatives, including his own (1988) account of truth, and Robert
Brandom’s (1994; 2008) inferentialist account of assertion and propositional
content. It might seem, then, that localists must follow, and give up the
idea that other kinds of language can easily be explained in representational
terms.
This might seem like a radical overhaul for localism, but it isn’t. It is
true that Blackburn sounds as though he thinks that in cases which need
representationalist treatment, the explanations will be simple:
If we insisted instead on posing the . . . question: how come that
we go in for descriptions of the world in terms of surrounding
middle-sized dry goods? – then the answer is only going to be
the flat-footed stutter or self-pat on the back: it is because we are
indeed surrounded by middle sized dry goods. . . . It is because
it is no better than a stutter that I call it flat-footed representa-
tionalism. (Blackburn, 2013, pp.78-79)
Here Blackburn is claiming that in representationalist cases, we can only
‘stutter’. Price argues that things will not be as simple as saying: we use
‘tree’ because there are trees. We will still need a general theory of assertion
and propositional content, and in any case even exploring the way middle-
sized dry goods-talk works will not obviously be trivial and simple (Price,
2015a, pp.150-151).
However, this doesn’t imply that the right theory of assertion has to be
significantly different from any orthodox ones of the kind a localist may
believe. It doesn’t block a psychologistic theory of meaning on which as-
sertions get their content from the mental states they express, so long as we
can give a suitably non-representationalist account of those mental states.
Indeed this idea seems to be implicit in Price and Macarthur’s defence of
Price’s (1988; 2003) theory:
The proposal starts with the thought that many of our protolin-
guistic psychological states might be such that it is would be ad-
vantageous, with respect to those states, that we tend to towards
conformity across our communities. Assertoric language seems
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to facilitate and encourage such alignment—within the Asser-
tion Game, we give voice to our psychological dispositions in
ways which invite challenges by speakers with contrary dispos-
itions. (‘That’s false’ and ‘That’s true’ are markers of challenge
and concession, respectively—cf. Price (1988, 2003)). (Macar-
thur & Price, 2007, p.248)
In other words, we explain assertion as expressing (‘giving voice’) to psy-
chological states, and say why we’d do this – because it is advantageous to
do so. However, it’s not obvious how this is a departure from a psycho-
logistic theory along the lines of, say, Wayne Davis’s view (Davis, 2002),
or the kind Gibbard discusses (see §4.3), so long as we make sure that our
account of the relevant psychological states isn’t itself a representationalist
one. For instance we shouldn’t appeal to the expression of beliefs and leave
that category unexplained, or explain it in representational terms. If this is
so, localists can accept Price’s globalism without overhauling their general
approach to explaining meaning.
4.7 Conclusion
I’ll now sum up my argument in this chapter. I’ve discussed the debate
between local and global non-representationalism. I’ve read these views
in terms of explanatory scepticism: localists think that some language and
thought is not to be explained in terms of representational features, and
globalists think that no language and thought is to be explained in this way.
Price offers two arguments that localism collapses into globalism: these are
based on the success of local views, and the implications of minimalism.
However, things aren’t this simple: we need to make sense of what rep-
resentational features are. Once we do this, we get an interesting result. Loc-
alists think they are relations between thought and language and its subject
matter, though as we saw they read this more strictly than I do. Global-
ists think they are general relations between thought and language and the
world. Only this reading of representational features, I argued, allows glob-
alism to be plausible. However, this reading also entails an interesting result:
that localists already accept the globalists’ globalism, and globalists already
accept the localists’ localism! As such the debate between the two views is
empty, a mere verbal debate about what features count as representational.
Moreover, Price’s two arguments fail to push localism anywhere new: the
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arguments either have false premises about the impact of non-representa-
tionalism, or else localists will consider them invalid and irrelevant because
they understand representational features differently. All this is due to the
difference between globalists’ and localists’ views of what representational
features are.
Having established this, I then looked at some consequences for local-
ism and globalism. I argued that while Price claims localists need to over-
haul their general approach to explaining meaning, this doesn’t follow: even
if localists do appreciate that they’re already committed to globalism, this
doesn’t have much impact on their view.
This result allows us to answer the worry from the end of the previ-
ous chapter: that if ethical expressivists accept minimalism, they stop them-
selves being representationalists about other areas of language. This is es-
sentially Price’s point. But we’ve seen that it doesn’t go through: minim-
alism only rules out using general representational features, ones that hold
between things in the world and each term of a given kind. For expressivists
like Blackburn and Gibbard, this doesn’t rule out being representationalists
about some kinds of language, since for them representationalism involves
ascribing not general relations but relations between terms and their subject
matter. Minimalism doesn’t affect this.
The discussion in the last two chapters shows that by paying careful at-
tention to the core views of non-representationalism, and to what minimal-
ist theories of representational features actually involve, we can resolve two
recent and prominent debates about non-representationalism. In the next
two chapters, I’m going to apply the same strategy to investigate one major
theme in the discussion of non-representationalism, namely the impact of
non-representationalism on metaphysics. Writers have made various claims
about whether non-representationalism impacts metaphysical inquiry; in
the next two chapters I will explore these in detail, and argue that non-rep-
resentationalism’s impact is largely overstated.
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chapter 5
DEFLATIONISM AND TRUTHMAKING
5.1 Introduction
In the last three chapters I have focused on making sense of non-representa-
tionalism, and applying my understanding of it to two important debates in
the literature. In this chapter and the next I will turn to a different question:
what impact does non-representationalism have on metaphysics?
The idea that non-representationalism affects metaphysical enquiry is
common in the literature. Many writers argue that non-representationalism
in some way undermines metaphysical investigations into the nature of vari-
ous facts and properties. One strand of metaphysics thought to be affected is
truthmaker theory, the project of specifying things in the world which make
certain truths true. This project includes investigating the nature of certain
kinds of facts and properties. For instance, some metaphysicians of modal-
ity ask whether purely actual entities can make true statements about non-
actual possibilities. Answering this question involves asking whether actual
entities can do this job, and if not then what kinds of entities can. Other
philosophers ask whether natural facts and properties can be truthmakers
for normative statements; the result of this inquiry determines whether or
not we are naturalists about the normative.
Both supporters and critics of non-representationalism have argued that
it undermines truthmaker theory in some way. For instance, Simon Black-
burn takes his non-representationalist view of ethical language to obviate
the project of finding truthmakers for ethical statements, and of asking ques-
tions about ethical properties and facts. Blackburn identifies his metaphys-
ical opponent like so:
. . . the truth-theoretic approach identifies its problems in terms
of questions of the form ‘what is the ‘truth-maker’ or the fact
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involved in something or other?’ . . . This is the paradigm that
has dominated recent philosophy to the point at which other ap-
proaches are invisible to many writers. (Blackburn, 2015, p.850)
He argues that his non-representationalist approach is an alternative, and
once we accept it, ‘metaphysics bows out of the picture’.
The following two chapters are about whether non-representationalism
does undermine metaphysics. There are several different ways this might
happen, which I divide into two categories. First is the impact of what non-
representationalists say about representational features: their explanatory
scepticism, as I’m calling it. Second is non-representationalists’ commitment
to deflationary views about truth, reference, facts and properties. Both local
and global non-representationalists accept such views.
In this chapter I will focus on the second of these, leaving the first for the
next chapter. My focus here is on how deflationary views affect truthmaker
theory: what should a deflationist say about truthmaking? Some have ar-
gued that deflationism opposes truthmaking, by making truthmaking ques-
tions incoherent and so unanswerable, or avoidable, or trivial. I am going
to argue that this is mostly false. Deflationists can and should accept that
many truthmaking questions are coherent, not trivial, and not avoidable.
However, I will argue that deflationists do have reason to reject some ele-
ments of mainstream truthmaker theory, so it does make some difference.
The important point is that deflationism’s limited impact on truthmaker
theory is not strong enough to allow non-representationalists, who accept
deflationism, to reject truthmaker theory wholesale.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In §5.2 I introduce defla-
tionism about truth. In §5.3 then introduce the basic idea of truthmak-
ing, show how deflationists can make sense of truthmakers, and say why
they should believe in them. In §5.4 I explain how deflationists should
think about the role of facts and properties in truthmaker debates, and
argue that these things pose no problem to deflationists. In §§5.5-5.6 I
then answer three arguments from non-representationalists that deflation-
ism blocks truthmaking in some way: Price argues that deflationism stops
truthmaker questions arising in the first place; Blackburn argues that de-
flationism gives truthmaker questions trivial answers; and both Price and
Blackburn argue that deflationism makes truthmaker questions first-order
and so non-metaphysical. I show that these arguments all fail. I conclude
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that deflationism makes little difference to truthmaking debates, and so non-
representationalism does not avoid such debates in virtue of its commitment
to deflationism.
5.2 Deflationism about truth
The key idea behind deflationism about truth is that truth is not a philo-
sophically useful concept. It does no explanatory work. There are many
different kinds of deflationism, but the most popular among non-represent-
ationalists is Paul Horwich’s view (Horwich, 1998b), which I will therefore
take to be representative. The core deflationist claim is that our grasp of the
concept of truth is exhausted by our disposition to infer according to the
‘T-schema’ (where ‘〈p〉’ denotes the proposition that p):
(T) 〈p〉 is true if and only if p
and that the collected instances of this schema form the most basic or fun-
damental facts about truth.1 The instances themselves are basic – they are
not derived from or explained by anything else. Deflationists think that all
the facts involving truth can be explained on the basis of this schema plus
other facts not about truth (Horwich, 1998b, Ch.1).
Alongside this central negative claim, deflationists argue that we have the
concept of truth, and the truth predicate ‘. . . is true’, in order to formulate
claims we couldn’t easily formulate otherwise. For instance, suppose I want
to agree with what Ella said this morning, but can’t remember what she
said, other than that I agree. The truth predicate lets me agree with her by
saying: ‘What Ella said this morning is true’. The same goes for other cases
where we want to assert a claim without knowing its content, like when I
say ‘Fermat’s Last Theorem is true’. The truth predicate also lets us make
generalisations, like ‘Everything Ella said is true’. The truth predicate lets us
express these claims by giving us the means to assert a claim by predicating
truth of it.
For our purposes, however, the most important feature of deflationism is
that it takes the instances of (T) as the basic facts about truth, and indeed the
1 There are various issues here to do with the Liar paradox, since we don’t take my grasp
of truth to require me to believe that a proposition P, defined as the proposition 〈P is false〉,
is true if and only if P is false. However as I’m not asking whether deflationism is true, and
as these issues do not affect any of my discussion of truthmaking, I will disregard them,
and understand the disposition to infer according to (T) to be restricted to non-paradoxical
instances.
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disposition to infer according to it as constitutive of grasp of the concept of
truth. This means that the instances of (T) are not derived from any other
principle about truth. More specifically, deflationists reject any theory of
truth which takes the form
x is true iff x is F
For instance: x is true iff x corresponds to a fact, or x is true iff x is a member
of some ideally coherent set, or iff x is useful to believe, and so on. Defla-
tionists think that all it takes for a proposition like 〈grass is green〉 to be true
is for grass to be green, and the same goes for all propositions. Moreover,
this fact is basic and not explained by anything else, like the proposition’s
correspondence or utility or membership in a coherent set.
5.3 Truthmaking
The basic idea of a truthmaker is simple: it’s something which makes a
truth true. Here ‘makes’ is not to be read causally: a truthmaker is not
something which causes a truth to be true. Rather, most read it in terms
of the phrase ‘in virtue of’: a truthmaker is something in virtue of which
a truth is true. Most truthmaker theorists take this to involve explanation:
a truthmaker explains any truth it makes true. Most truthmaker theorists
also think a truthmaker must necessitate the relevant truth: necessarily, if
the truthmaker exists, then the truth is true.
The notion of explaining a truth is ambiguous. Consider the question
of what explains the truth of 〈grass is green〉. This can be read in two ways.
First it could be read as asking what explains the fact that grass is green,
or in other words asking why grass is green. Second, it could be read as
asking what it is for 〈grass is green〉 to be true, asking what it takes for that
proposition to have the property of being true. This question is focused on
the proposition itself: it asks what that proposition needs to be like to be
true. For instance, a coherentist may say that for 〈grass is green〉 to be true is
for it to be a member of some special maximal coherent set of propositions.
A nice way to understand this is to distinguish between two ways of
using words like ‘truth’ and ‘truths’. In the first sense, a truth is a true
truthbearer, a thing which has the property being true. If you think that
inscriptions of sentences are truthbearers, then in this sense you can write
down a truth, hold it in your hand, and then tear it in half. In the second
sense, there is no bearer in sight: a truth is just a way the world is. In this
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sense a truth is not a thing, a truthbearer, which is true. It is just a way
things are. You cannot hold or tear up a truth in this sense. In a world
without truthbearers, there would be no truths in the first sense, but plenty
of truths in the second sense. The second sense is what we mean when we
talk about the truth: we’re talking about what is the case, not a single true
truthbearer!
The two ways of explaining a truth correspond to this distinction. We
can explain a truth by explaining why something is so. For instance, we can
explain the truth that grass is green by explaining why grass is green. This
treats truth in the bearerless sense. In the second sense, we explain a truth
by explaining why a truthbearer has the property being true. Our focus is
on the truthbearer itself.
Peter Schulte (2011) draws on Benjamin Schnieder’s (2006) notion of
close explanations to make sense of the ambiguity in explaining truths.
Schnieder defines closeness in terms of chains of explanation. Suppose p
because q, and q because r. Then, ignoring the grammar a little, we can say
that q is a closer explanation of p than r is, since q is in some sense between
p and r in the explanatory chain.2 For instance, a functionalist may say that
someone has a mental state M because they have a functional state F, which
they have because they have a brain state B. For the functionalist, F is a
closer explanation of M than B is. Moreover, for the functionalist F is the
closest explanation of M: there is nothing between M and F which mediates
the explanation.
Note here that typically a very close explanation will not specify what
we might call the ultimate or most illuminating explanation of a truth. For
instance, the functionalist thinks that mental state M is explained by func-
tional state F, and she will think that this is the closest possible explanation:
someone has M because they have F, but this explanation isn’t mediated by
anything else. This is because at the most basic level, to have M is to have
F. However, this close explanation is not the ultimate explanation of M, be-
cause F itself might need explanation, perhaps in terms of the brain state
B or something else, and these may in turn need explanations in terms of
other states.
Closeness, therefore, concerns what following Schulte we might call
2 Instead you may want to say that the fact that q is a closer explanation of the fact that p
than the fact that r is. This wouldn’t commit you to facts as such; it’s just grammatical con-
venience. Alternatively we could talk in terms of propositions: 〈q〉 is a closer explanation
of 〈p〉, again for grammatical convenience.
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very simple explanations. These explanations are not simple in the sense
that they specify simple or basic truths which explain others. Instead they
are simple in the sense that the explanations themselves are not explained by
others. Saying that someone has M because they have F is a very simple
explanation because nothing explains it. But the fact that someone has F is
not a simple or basic fact – it can be explained in terms of other things. A
close explanation is simple, but its explanans need not be simple.
Schulte points out that we can understand the less common reading of
explaining a truth, the one which focuses on truthbearers and their posses-
sion of the property being true, in terms of closeness (2011, pp.418ff). The
closest explanation of 〈grass is green〉’s truth will tell us what it is for that
proposition to be true. It gives us the most basic thing we can say about the
proposition’s truth, the explanation which itself is not explicable.
This contrasts with less close explanations. For instance, suppose we
think that the closest explanation of 〈grass is green〉’s truth is that grass is
green. (This is what deflationists think, as we’ll see shortly.) Then we can
give less close explanations of 〈grass is green〉’s truth by explaining why grass
is green. Suppose we want to do this in terms of a collection of truths about
pieces of grass, chlorophyll, and so on. Then our explanation will form a
more distant explanation of 〈grass is green〉’s truth.
On this basis, Schulte distinguishes two kinds of truthmaker explana-
tions. He points out that the following two explanations are different in an
important way:
(1) 〈Aristotle exists〉 is true because Aristotle exists
(2) 〈Bertie believes Jeeves is clever〉 is true because Bertie has a state F
with a given functional role
While both of these explanations may be true, Schulte points out that the
first explanation is essentially about the proposition concerned, while the
second isn’t.
We can see this by replacing each proposition with the relevant (bearer-
less) truth:
(3) Aristotle exists because Aristotle exists
(4) Bertie believes Jeeves is clever because Bertie has a state F with a given
functional role
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The former becomes false but the latter remains true. Schulte argues that
this shows us that (1) is essentially about the proposition 〈Aristotle exists〉
and so concerns what it is for that proposition to be true. (2) on the other
hand is not essentially about the proposition, since it remains true once the
proposition is removed.
In our terms, Schulte’s distinction between simple and substantial truth-
maker explanations corresponds with the distinction between a truth as a
true truthbearer and a truth as a way the world is. Simple truthmaker ex-
planations essentially concern true truthbearers; substantial ones primarily
concern bearerless truths. We can understand this distinction in terms of
closeness: simple explanations are the closest explanations of truthbearer
truth, while substantial ones are more distant, since their main focus is on
explaining bearerless truths which in turn explain the truth of truthbearers.
Schnieder and Schulte therefore argue that truthmaker explanations like
〈grass is green〉 is true in virtue of its truthmaker g
Are best read as series of explanations, involving two components:
(i) 〈grass is green〉 is true in virtue of grass’s being green and
(ii) grass is green in virtue of g’s existence
As Schulte points out, these combine two elements: the explanation of a
truthbearer’s being true in terms of a bearerless truth, and the explanation
of that truth in terms of another, namely that g exists.3
What will a deflationist have to say about all this? Well, for her, the
closest possible explanation of the truth of 〈grass is green〉 is that grass is
green, and the same goes for all propositions, since the instances of the T-
schema are the most fundamental facts about truth. There is some con-
troversy about whether deflationists can agree that 〈grass is green〉 is true
because grass is green. I follow Schnieder (2006) and Künne (2003, pp.148ff)
in taking this to be a conceptual explanation, similar to when we say that
Bertie is Angela’s cousin because one of Bertie’s parents is a sibling of one of
Angela’s parents. 〈grass is green〉 is true because grass is green, and this is so
because it is an elucidation of the concept of truth. No deeper explanation
3 Schulte talks in terms of facts instead of bearerless truths. I’ve changed this because
‘fact’ usually means either (i) an existing complex entity, which Armstrong calls a state of
affairs, and some people call a Tractarian fact, or (ii) a true proposition. Neither of these
lines up with truths in the bearerless sense, ways the world is, which is what I’m talking
about here.
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of this is available. Converseley, just as it’s false that one of Bertie’s parents
is a sibling of one of Angela’s parents because Bertie is Angela’s cousin, it’s
false that grass is green because 〈grass is green〉 is true, since we do not need
the concept of truth to elucidate the concepts of grass and greenness.4
As such, for the deflationist the only way a truthmaker, say g, can explain
a proposition’s truth is in a more distant way, by explaining a bearerless
truth, namely that grass is green. Any true claim of the form
〈grass is green〉 is true in virtue of g’s existence
is true only because
Grass is green in virtue of g’s existence
is also true. Truthmaking explanations can never be closer than those given
to us by the T-schema: there is nothing ‘in between’ grass’s being green and
〈grass is green〉’s truth in the explanatory chain.
For the deflationist, then, truthmaking primarily concerns explanations
of (bearerless) truths by other (bearerless) truths, where the latter concern
truthmakers. In other words, truthmaking is concerned with explaining
why things are so. As Horwich puts it:
. . . we should appreciate that the basic content of a truthmaker
theory is formulated by propositions of the form “p because of
x” or “p because x exists” (Horwich, 2008, p.273)
For instance, a truthmaker theory for philosophy of mind specifies objects
in virtue of which (bearerless) truths about the mind hold. Or in other
words, it explains truths about various mental phenomena.5
Note that this doesn’t mean a truthmaker theory has to be specific, mak-
ing claims about individual truths one at a time. A functionalist may well
make specific truthmaker claims about the mind, saying that some specific
person has a specific mental state in virtue of their having a specific func-
tional state. But she may also go more general, for instance saying that any
thinker with anymental state of a given kind has it in virtue of their having
some functional state of a given kind.
4 This answer is controversial – see Liggins (2016). However I won’t discuss this further,
since I’m only interested in the impact of a correct form of deflationism. Therefore I’ll grant
for the sake of argument that deflationism can accept that 〈grass is green〉 is true because
grass is green.
5 See also McFetridge (1990).
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So, to conclude, a deflationist can believe in truthmakers. They are ob-
jects in virtue of which bearerless truths hold. By explaining these bearerless
truths, they explain the truth of various truthbearers. This explanation is
always more distant, because it is always mediated by the basic truth found
in the T-schema: 〈grass is green〉 is true because grass is green. The more
central claims of truthmaker theory are non-causal explanations of various
bearerless truths, and deflationists will accept that there are such explana-
tions.
But should a deflationist believe in truthmakers, and get involved in
truthmaker theory? At first sight we might think they shouldn’t. For
truthmaker theory is often motivated by considerations about truthbearers,
and in particular by ideas close to the correspondence of truth. Armstrong
claims that truthmaker theory is just a development of the correspondence
theory of truth:
Anybody who is attracted to the Correspondence theory of
truth should be drawn to the truthmaker. Correspondence de-
mands a correspondent, and a correspondent for a truth is a
truthmaker. (Armstrong, 1997, p.14)
The major difference between the truthmaker principle and previous ver-
sions of the correspondence theory of truth is that the relation between
truths and truthmakers isn’t one-one. One truth can be made true by
many different things – each human makes true 〈humans exist〉 – and many
truths can be made true by one thing – Ramsey makes true 〈Ramsey exists〉,
〈Humans exist〉, 〈Ramsey exists or humans exist〉, and so on.
Alex Oliver and Fraser MacBride agree with Armstrong’s idea. Oliver
claims that the truthmaker principle is
a sanitised version of a correspondence theory of truth, shorn
of the unworkable idea of truth as a kind of pictorial resemb-
lance, but retaining the doctrine that the world is independent
of linguistic description and must be a certain way in order for
a given sentence to be true of it (Oliver, 1996, p.69)
MacBride claims that the principle
is what remains once the specific determinations of the corres-
pondence theory have been given up. (MacBride, 2013, p.687)
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Here we see the idea that the truthmaker principle, that all truths have
truthmakers, is a version of the correspondence theory of truth, which de-
flationists of course reject. If this is right, deflationists will want to reject
this principle.
An important idea here is that the truthmaker principle that every truth
has a truthmaker specifies a truthmaking relation between true truthbearers
and things in the world, and this is unacceptable to deflationists. Gonzalo
Rodriguez-Pereyra argues that truthmaking is an asymmetric relation hold-
ing between ‘a true proposition and a thing in the world’, and on this basis
that ‘truth is a relational property of propositions’ (2005, p.26). He points
out that this links truthmaker theory closely to correspondence theories of
truth (2005, n.12 p.26). MacBride concurs, arguing that ‘The truthmaker
principle is an expression of the general idea that truth is a relation to some-
thing worldly’ (2013, p.687). Indeed, MacBride opens his Stanford Encyc-
lopedia of Philosophy survey article (MacBride, 2016) by saying that it is
‘agreed’ that ‘x makes it true that p’ denotes ‘a relation borne to a truth-
bearer by something else, a truth-maker’.
This relational idea seems incompatible with deflationism. Armstrong
claims that deflationism commits us to
the conclusion that there really is no truth relation that holds
between the true proposition and the world. This, though, chal-
lenges the realistic insight that there is a world that exists inde-
pendently of our thoughts and statements, making the latter
true or false. One is driven back to the Correspondence theory.
(Armstrong, 1997, p.128)
He says this is because deflationism says that ‘attaching the truth predicate
to a proposition does not add anything to the mere assertion of that propos-
ition’.
The key idea here is that to believe in truthmakers is to believe in a
relation between true truthbearers and the world, and this is not acceptable
to a deflationist, because she cannot accept that truth is such a relation, since
this goes above and beyond the instances of the T-schema which tell us only
that any proposition 〈p〉 is true iff p.
However this should not put deflationists off truthmaking. For the de-
flationist can believe in a truthmaking relation without believing that it
gives us a theory of truth. In other words, she can believe in truthmakers,
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without thinking that what it is for a proposition to be true is to have a
truthmaker. She can do this by distinguishing two ways of denying that
there’s a truth relation between true propositions and the world. First, it
is clear that the deflationist does deny that the property being true is consti-
tuted by a relation between a true truthbearer and the world. That is to say,
there is no relation R such that:
x is true iff x bears R to (something in) the world
is an explanation of what it is to be true. No relation of this kind will ex-
plain truth: a fortiori no relation between a proposition and its truthmaker
will explain the proposition’s truth. Partly this is because no such relation
will explain the truth of the instances of the T-schema, which deflationists
take to be inexplicable, and therefore to give the closest explanation of a
proposition’s truth.
However, this doesn’t mean that there are no relations between truth-
bearers and truthmakers. The deflationist can admit these relations but take
them as superficial. To make sense of this let’s consider an analogy. Consider
the relation R which holds between two objects x and y just in case y is a
person taller than Socrates. It is true that, say, Plato bears this relation to
Frank Ramsey.6 But Plato doesn’t bear this relation to Ramsey because of
anything about Plato. Indeed everything bears this relation to Ramsey. It
seems right to say that relation R is a relation, but it’s only superficially a
relation between the things it relates. This is because ultimately, wherever a
bears R to b, this is not because of what a is like, or any relation between a
and b, but because of a relation between b and Socrates.
The deflationist can treat truthmaking in this way. Consider 〈Ramsey is
tall〉 and let r be a truthmaker for it. Can the deflationist believe in a truth-
making relation between r and the proposition? She can argue as follows.
For r to make true 〈Ramsey is tall〉 is for 〈Ramsey is tall〉 to be true in virtue
of r’s existence. But being true in virtue of is not a genuine relation between
〈Ramsey is tall〉 and r. This is because all it takes for 〈Ramsey is tall〉 to be
true is for Ramsey to be tall. Moreover, this is the most basic thing we can
say about what it is for 〈Ramsey is tall〉 to be true. As such, for 〈Ramsey is
tall〉 to be true in virtue of r’s existence is just for Ramsey to be tall in virtue
of r’s existence.
6 Frank Ramsey was six foot three, according to his wife Lettice (see Mellor, 1995a,
p.253). Interestingly, there is a retired professional basketball player who has the name and
height, and to whom Plato therefore also bears this relation.
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So the deflationist can believe in the truthmaking relation between an
object and a proposition, she just believes that this holds because of the rela-
tion between the object and the subject matter of the proposition, and not
in virtue of a relation involving the proposition itself. She can accept the
truthmaking relation without thinking it explains truth, and hence without
taking truth to be a relational property in any sense that conflicts with de-
flationism.
Moreover, note that the correspondence argument only applies to an
unrestricted truthmaker principle: that all true propositions have truth-
makers. But so-called truthmaker non-maximalists like Simons (2005) and
Mellor (2009) do not believe this unrestricted version: they believe that
some but not all true propositions have truthmakers. For instance they
normally deny that negative propositions like 〈Vulcan doesn’t exist〉 have
truthmakers, since this proposition is true not because some entity exists
but because some entity, namely Vulcan, doesn’t exist. Non-maximalists
cannot think truth consists in the truthmaker relation, since they think that
some propositions are true yet do not bear this relation to anything.
So we have no reason to think that believing in (i) truthmakers in general
or (ii) the unrestricted truthmaker principle entails believing a correspond-
ence theory of truth. As such deflationists can believe in both (i) and (ii)
without undermining their deflationary view.
The notion of truth as a relation is very important when we consider
the link with non-representationalism. For as we’ve seen, at the heart of the
view is a suspicion of the explanatory role of relations between language and
the world. Huw Price nicely sums up the picture non-representationalists
reject with his metaphor of the ‘matching model’, with statements on the
left and the world on the right (Price, 2013, ch.2). In the matching game,
our aim is to find for each statement on the left a truthmaker on the right.
This game, Price claims, is a simplified version of contemporary linguist-
ically grounded metaphysics. It may at first seem unacceptable to non-rep-
resentationalists, who are suspicious of the use of relations between words
and the world. Moreover, as we’ve seen some influential truthmaker theor-
ists support this relational picture, where the aim of metaphysics is to find
truthmakers to be the worldly relata of the truthmaking relation. Indeed,
in his survey article on truthmaking, MacBride claims that ‘[t]ruth-makers
are posited to provide the point of semantic contact whereby true repres-
entations touch upon an independent reality, upon something non-repres-
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entational’ – this sounds very representationalist! So it makes sense that
non-representationalists will be suspicious of this idea.
However, as we’ve seen, the relational picture of truthmaking is at best
optional. Contrary to what some truthmaker theorists say, we can do
truthmaking without believing that the truth of a proposition consists in
a truthmaking relation between propositions and the world. So non-repres-
entationalists should not consider their deflationary views, nor their gen-
eral suspicion of word-world relations, to rule out believing in truthmak-
ing. Thinking otherwise involves accepting overly strong views about what
truthmaking involves, views which encourage the relational picture Price
targets.
The previous argument blocks a bad reason to think deflationists cannot
believe in truthmakers. But are there any good reasons to think that de-
flationists should believe in truthmakers? Earlier we saw that a deflationist
will only believe a truthmaker claim about a truthbearer on the basis of a
truthmaker claim about a bearerless truth. As such, she will only believe
the unrestricted truthmaker principle:
(TM) For every proposition 〈p〉, if 〈p〉 is true then there is some
x such that 〈p〉 is true in virtue of x’s existence
on the basis of believing the corresponding bearerless principle, which we
can express using sentential quantification:
(TM*) For every p, if p then there is some x such that p in virtue
of x’s existence
Therefore, the question of whether deflationists should believe in truth-
makers comes down to whether they should believe that in general, bear-
erless truths hold in virtue of existing objects.
To start with, deflationists must reject a common motivation for believ-
ing in truthmakers, which relates to the issues raised above about the corres-
pondence theory. The common motivation is that truth is not primitive or
brute, but is grounded in or dependent on reality. Rodriguez-Pereyra puts
this nicely:
Thus the insight behind the idea of truthmakers is that truth is
grounded. In other words, truth is not primitive. If a certain
proposition is true, then it owes its truth to something else: its
truth is not a primitive, brute, ultimate fact. The truth of a
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proposition thus depends on what reality, and in particular its
subject matter, is like. What reality is like is anterior to the truth
of the proposition, it gives rise to the truth of the proposition
and thereby accounts for it. (Rodriguez-Pereyra, 2005, p.21)
Notice that this motivation is all about truthbearers: the truth of a propos-
ition is not brute but depends on the world. Earlier we saw similar ideas
in Armstrong, MacBride and Oliver, though often cashed out in terms of
correspondence theories of truth.
Deflationists will deny that this gives us any further reason to believe in
truthmakers. They will accept that the truth of a truthbearer depends on
what the world is like. 〈grass is green〉 is not just true: it depends on what
the world is like, namely on whether grass is green. Indeed nobody will
want to deny this. As I argued earlier, deflationists should follow Schnieder
and Künne in taking this to be a conceptual fact, holding in virtue of the
concept of truth. This is all there is to say about the dependence of truth-
bearer truth on reality: 〈grass is green〉’s truth depends on whether grass is
green.
Deflationists will argue that we only need truthmakers to account for
this if we need truthmakers to account for bearerless truths, ways the world
are. In other words, whether we should believe in truthmakers depends
entirely on whether we think that all bearerless truths need hold in virtue
of existing objects. And regarding that question, Rodriguez-Pereyra’s argu-
ment has less force. For while in general, we can agree that any proposition’s
truth is to be explained by a bearerless truth, i.e. for any 〈p〉, 〈p〉 is true
because p, we needn’t also agree that any bearerless truth is to be explained
by something.
To see why this is so, consider the idea that there are brute (bearerless)
truths, truths which have no explanation. Let us use the sentence letter ‘b’
to state such a truth, so b but there is no entity x such that b because x
exists. Saying this is completely consistent with also agreeing that the cor-
responding proposition 〈b〉 is true because b. So agreeing that truthbearer
truth is always explained by the world does not commit us to agreeing that
bearerless truth is always explained by the world. And so the deflationist
can agree with the truthbearer-focused argument of Rodriguez-Pereyra and
others, without thinking this commits her to believing in truthmakers for
all true truthbearers, since she will only believe this on the grounds of be-
lieving in truthmakers for all bearerless truths, and she may reject this.
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So, considerations about truthbearers don’t give deflationists reason to
believe in truthmakers. However, deflationists will of course agree that
many truths do have explanations, and in particular that many truths philo-
sophers are interested in have or are likely to have non-causal explanations,
for instance truths about modality, morality, the mind, social groups, re-
lations between parts and wholes, time and tense, mathematics, logic, and
many other categories. So deflationists have no reason to reject truthmaking
as applied to bearerless truths.
It’s worth noting that truthmaker theorists often point to cases where
truthmakers are said to be needed, but for reasons which have nothing to
do with truthbearers. Consider, for instance, Armstrong’s argument that
the idea that truths need truthmakers shows us what’s wrong with phenom-
enalism and behaviourism (2004, pp.1-3). Armstrong argues that both of
these views posit counterfactuals to explain certain phenomena but do not
provide truthmakers for those counterfactuals. For instance behaviourists,
who think that mental states are just dispositions to behave in certain ways,
appeal to unmanifested dispositions to explain unmanifested beliefs, beliefs
that never show up in our behaviour. These beliefs are simply unmanifested
dispositions, and unmanifested dispositions can be understood in terms of
counterfactuals: if stimulus S had occurred, manifestation M would have
occurred. This can be so even if S never occurs.
Armstrong claims that Ryle saw ‘no need to consider the question of
the truthmaker for dispositional truths about minds’. However, once we do
ask this question, we find that we need more than behaviour to make true
truths about minds. As Armstrong says, ‘our view of the nature of mind
will very likely be transformed and we will move in a quite un-Rylean dir-
ection’. Whatever answer we give, Armstrong says, ‘the truthmaker insight
. . . prevents the metaphysician from letting dispositions ‘hang on air’ as
they do in Ryle’s philosophy of mind’, which he thinks is the ‘ultimate sin’
in a realist metaphysics (2004, p.3).
We can make sense of Armstrong’s objection without thinking about
truthbearers at all. The problem with behaviourism is not that it does not
explain what it is for 〈If S had occurred, M would have occurred〉 to be
true. Behaviourists will agree with the rest of us: this is true just in case
if S had occurred, M would have occurred. (They may add to this if they
accept non-deflationary theories of truth.) The problem is that they cannot
explain this counterfactual: they cannot say why it holds. They must treat
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it as brute, since no amount of actual behaviour can make it true. But what
needs to be made true here is primarily a bearerless truth. Behaviourists end
up treating a bearerless truth as brute, when that truth seems like it should
be explicable.
Horwich claims that Armstrong’s truthmaker-based criticism of phe-
nomenalism and behaviourism don’t give us any reason to buy into truth-
maker theory. He argues that the problem with behaviourism is simply that
we should not, as it must, treat truths about dispositions as brute, or as he
puts it ‘explanatorily fundamental’. But he claims that ‘it is perfectly pos-
sible to formulate these criticisms without any truthmaking rhetoric’, that
truthmaking ‘merely offers a dressed up way of putting the point’, and ulti-
mately that the notion of truth needn’t play any role in truthmaking theses
at all (Horwich, 2008, pp.272-3).
I think Horwich is right to think that the notion of truthbearer truth
doesn’t play any role here, since Armstrong’s concerns can be stated without
mentioning truthbearers. However I don’t think it follows that Armstrong’s
points can be formulated without ‘truthmaking rhetoric’. Rather, even if
we formulate Armstrong’s points without talking about truthbearers, we
can still count this as truthmaking. For it is still ultimately concerned with
what it is in virtue of which certain truths hold. This counts as truthmaking
even though it’s not about truthbearers.
So in general deflationists have good reason to believe that truths have
truthmakers. In particular, they also have good reason to believe that we
need to specify these, in order to explain those truths. Where truths re-
quire explanation, we should explain them. However, deflationists should
not believe we need to do this in order to account for truthbearer truth as
such, i.e. in order to say what it is for a truthbearer to be true. Rather,
we need to do this simply because many (bearerless) truths need explana-
tion. Moreover, there’s no reason for deflationists to believe the unrestric-
ted truthmaker principle (TM) since this rules out any brute truths, which
deflationists may want to accept. This means deflationists differ from main-
stream truthmaker theorists, since those who think what it is to be true is
to have a truthmaker will have grounds for believing (TM) that deflationists
do not.
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5.4 Facts and properties
So far I have not discussed what truthmakers themselves are. However, this
question is important both for debates within truthmaker theory and for
debates about non-representationalism and deflationism, and deflationism
does have an interesting impact on it.
So far I have talked about truthmakers as objects simply for convenience
of exposition since many truthmaker theorists accept this. However, there
are three important points here: (i) not everyone accepts this, (ii) deflation-
ists do not need to, and (iii) there are reasons to think they shouldn’t think
so.
Accepting that truthmakers have to be objects immediately leads us to
debates about universals and facts. Armstrong argues for facts or ‘states of
affairs’ as he calls them on this basis (Armstrong, 1997, pp.115-6). Consider
a contingent truth like 〈Ramsey is tall〉. If we think truthmakers are objects,
and we accept the common view that a truthmaker must necessitate a truth
it makes true, then the truthmaker for this proposition must be such that
necessarily, if it exists, then 〈Ramsey is tall〉 is true. So we need to find an
object whose existence entails that Ramsey is tall. Ramsey himself won’t
do: he could have existed while being short. Adding a universal, being tall,
is a step in the right direction. But it still won’t do, since both Ramsey and
being tall can exist, yet he can fail to instantiate it. So, Armstrong concludes,
we need a state of affairs, Ramsey’s being tall as the truthmaker.
Josh Parsons (1999) and Joseph Melia (2005) have responded to this ar-
gument. Parsons denies the assumption that a truthmaker must necessitate
any truth it makes true, and hence claims that Ramsey himself can make
true 〈Ramsey is tall〉 without any help from either a universal or a state of
affairs. More relevant for this discussion, Melia denies that truthmakers need
to be objects. Or, more precisely, he argues that we don’t need truthmakers
to make sense of truthmaking – his article is called ‘Truthmaking without
Truthmakers’. Melia argues that truthmaking needn’t be a relation between
an object and a truthbearer. Instead he wants to treat ‘makes true’ as a con-
nective like ‘and’ or ‘because’, which allows us to specify truthmakers using
sentences, for instance by saying
Bertie has F makes it true that Bertie has M
Melia claims that this blocks Armstrong’s argument at the first step, and
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allows us to adhere to what he calls a ‘sensible nominalism’, the view that
only concrete particular objects exist.
These issues are relevant for deflationism and non-representationalism’s
acceptance of it. For non-representationalists, and at least some deflationists
about truth like Horwich, take a deflationary attitude towards facts and
properties, which excludes them from any explanatory role, and a fortoiri
a truthmaking role. For instance, Horwich (2008, p.273) takes facts and
properties to be exhausted by the following schemas:
(5) The fact that p exists because p
(6) x has the property F-ness or being F because x is F
Horwich therefore thinks that properties and facts cannot explain the truths
that truthmakers want them to. For instance, he will deny that Ramsey is
tall because the fact Ramsey’s being tall exists. Rather, that fact exists be-
cause Ramsey is tall. Similarly, Ramsey has the property being tall because
Ramsey is tall, not vice versa.
If truthmakers must be objects, then, it looks like deflationists must re-
ject many common truthmaker explanations, and perhaps accept Parsons’s
defence of a nominalistic truthmaker approach. However, this is not so.
Deflationists can and will accept Melia’s idea that truthmaking is best un-
derstood in terms of a connective. For as we saw, deflationists will deny
that the truthmaking relation is really a relation, in any more than a su-
perficial sense. As such, they are under no pressure whatsoever to think
that truthmakers must be objects, on the grounds that only if they’re ob-
jects can they stand in the truthmaking relation. Instead, deflationists can
argue, as Melia does, that truthmaker theses are simply explanations of one
(bearerless) truth in terms of another. In general, they take the form:
p because q
where ‘because’ is not causal, but the ‘in virtue of’ kind of explanation. This
doesn’t stop deflationists accepting that particular objects can do truthmak-
ing work, since there will be some cases where ‘q’ is replaced by a claim
about something’s existence. But deflationists need not think this will al-
ways be so.
So deflationists needn’t accept that truthmakers must be objects. Instead
they can take truthmaking theses to be explanations of one (bearerless) truth
in terms of another. In fact, this is closer to what many metaphysicians call
127
grounding (see e.g. Correia & Schnieder, 2012). Horwich supports roughly
this idea, arguing in favour of
a sanitized version of truthmaker theory—a version that is not
focused on [truthbearer] truth per se, and that does not attempt
to explain everything in terms of what exists, but which is con-
cerned simply with the ways in which various kinds of phenom-
ena are to be explained . . . and with which of them must (or
may, or may not) be regarded as explanatorily basic. Indeed,
many of truthmaker theory’s characteristic concerns and claims
seem quite reasonable if they are understood as part of such an
inquiry. (Horwich, 2008, p.271)
Horwich argues for this on the basis of (i) a rejection of facts and properties
as explanatorily prior to (bearerless) truths, and (ii) a rejection of truth-
maker theory as a theory of truth – the two themes I’ve been discussing in
this chapter.
However, it’s also important to note that deflationists about facts and
properties can still talk about facts and properties in truthmaking claims.
For many truthmaking debates are concerned with whether a certain range
of truths can be explained in terms of another, without worrying how to
explain the latter. We may say that mental truths are made true by physical
facts or properties, without being serious about facts and properties. For
what we really mean is that mental truths are made true by physical truths.
Perhaps in explaining physical truths we will eventually need facts and prop-
erties, or at least we will need to debate with Armstrong and other realists
about them. But it is harmless to talk about them at these higher levels,
since we’re not concerned with explaining those physical truths, only with
explaining mental truths in terms of them.
Moreover, we shouldn’t think that deflationism blocks debates about
nominalism and universals in general. There are plenty of other things to
say in that debate which don’t rely on the specific notion of truthmakers as
entities as motivated by thinking of truthmaking as a relation.
To sum up, deflationists can accept truthmaking claims as explanations
of (bearerless) truths, whether or not those explanations ultimately specify
objects. Moreover they should therefore think that we need to specify truth-
makers for truths which need explanations. This is not because of issues
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about the nature of truth, but a more mundane fact: truths need explana-
tions. We’ve seen that deflationism does have some limited impact on truth-
maker theory, for instance not requiring that truthmakers be objects, and
blocking certain reasons for believing in truthmaking. However, in general
deflationism is compatible with the intelligibility of truthmaking questions,
their answerability, and the need to answer them.
5.5 Avoiding truthmaker questions
So far we’ve seen how deflationists can make sense of truthmaking and why
they should believe in it. Huw Price (2013, ch.1) argues, however, that de-
flationism undermines metaphysicians’ motivations for asking truthmaking
questions in the first place. His argument is simple. Truthmaking ques-
tions about sentences are appropriate only if they are genuinely about those
sentences. If deflationism is true, truthmaking questions are not genuinely
about the sentences in question. So if deflationism is true, truthmaking
questions are inappropriate.7
Price starts with the assumption that truthmaking questions are initially
motivated by facts about human language (2013, p.8). For instance, we note
that humans say: ‘torture is wrong’, and this motivates us to ask about the
truthmaker for this sentence. (This is the matching game I mentioned in
my discussion of relationality in §5.3.) Price’s assumption is that this is
the basic motivation for our truthmaking questions. I won’t challenge this
assumption in this chapter at all, though we will return to it in the next
chapter.
Price argues that questions about truthmakers for sentences are only ap-
propriate if they are genuinely about those sentences (2013, p.9). That is,
if we think of the sentences humans use as the data in our metaphysical
investigation, then asking questions about their truthmakers is only an ap-
propriate reaction to that data if those questions really are about the data,
the sentences themselves.
By analogy consider the strange property being such that grass is green.
All actual objects have this property. In particular, the English name ‘Ram-
sey’ has this property. But saying so isn’t really saying anything about the
name ‘Ramsey’, like saying that it has six letters. Instead, it’s just another
7 Price includes not only questions about truthmakers but questions about referents for
terms, for instance what object ‘3’ refers to, and what property ‘is good’ picks out. I’ll
ignore this extra element here, since my conclusions about truthmaking apply to it too.
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way of saying that grass is green. Now suppose our linguistic data comes in:
humans use the term ‘Ramsey’. If we then ask whether this has the prop-
erty of being such that grass is green, this isn’t an appropriate reaction to
that data. It’s not about the term at all. On the other hand, there are ques-
tions we can ask about ‘Ramsey’ which are genuinely about it, for instance
about its etymology, pronunciation, syntax, and so on.
Price claims that if deflationism is right, then questions about truth-
makers are like questions about being such that grass is green. He claims this
is because deflationism entails that ascriptions of truth to sentences aren’t
really about the sentences concerned, but are covert uses of those sentences
(2013, p.9). For instance, deflationism entails that saying that ‘Ramsey is
tall’ is true is saying nothing more than that Ramsey is tall. Saying Ram-
sey is tall isn’t saying anything about language at all, it’s saying something
about Ramsey and his height. This idea is common in the deflationist liter-
ature and non-representationalists’ discussion of it. According to Price, this
means that questions about truthmakers for sentences aren’t actually about
those sentences, since asking what makes true ‘Ramsey is tall’ is no more
than asking what makes Ramsey tall. Asking about the truthmaker for a
sentence is like asking whether it has the property being such that grass is
green.
Therefore, if deflationism is right, truthmaking questions aren’t really
about language at all. And as such, they are not appropriate reactions in our
metaphysical enquiry, since we’re assuming that this enquiry starts with
data about language use. So while as we’ve seen deflationism allows truth-
making claims, Price concludes that it entails that they’re not in fact well
motivated. Instead, he thinks deflationism leads us to ask the distinctive
non-representationalist questions about the relevant language: what does it
do, and why is it there?
Price’s argument rests on the assumption that metaphysical enquiry be-
gins with facts about language. I will not discuss this here. This is because
in the next chapter I will discuss several other arguments which begin with
this premise, so it is more fruitful to discuss it there. Moreover, I think even
with this assumption, Price’s argument fails. This is because deflationism
does not entail that truthmaker claims are not really about the sentences
concerned. And nor should it.
First consider ascriptions like
In English, the sentence ‘Ramsey is tall’ is true
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where we know the content of the sentence concerned. What is it for this
claim to be genuinely about the sentence ‘Ramsey is tall’? A good answer is
that it is for its truth to depend on what that sentence, that linguistic object,
is like. For consider again the property being such that grass is green. An
ascription of this property to an object is not about that object, because its
truth is entirely independent of what that object is like. It is either true of
all objects or false of all objects. The fact that the ascription’s truth doesn’t
depend on what the object is like is good reason to think it is not really
about that object.
However, the truth ascription above is not like this: its truth does de-
pend on what the sentence ‘Ramsey is tall’ is like. For a start, its truth
depends on what ‘Ramsey is tall’ means. If ‘Ramsey is tall’ meant Ramsey
is short, it would be false and so would the truth ascription. Moreover, we
could replace it with another sentence and get a falsehood, since in English,
the sentence ‘Socrates is tall’ is not true. So the truth of the ascription clearly
does depend on what ‘Ramsey is tall’ is like. So there’s good reason to think
that this ascription is genuinely about that sentence, and more generally that
truth ascriptions really are about the sentences concerned.
What about the idea that to ascribe truth to a sentence is to use it? This
idea is entirely compatible with the view that truth ascriptions are also genu-
inely about the sentence. Truth ascriptions both use and mention the rel-
evant term. Saying that in English, ‘Ramsey is tall’ is true, is to use the
sentence ‘Ramsey is tall’ and say something about it: it is about Ramsey,
his height, and an English sentence. Price thinks that deflationism says that
such ascriptions only look like mentions, but are really just uses. The right
answer is that they are both. If deflationism conflicts with this fact, we have
good reason to doubt deflationism. However as we’ll now see, deflationists
don’t deny this.
Start by considering Horwich, who thinks that propositions are the
primary bearers of truth. As such, he thinks that truth ascriptions like
the one above involve ascriptions of meaning to the relevant sentence, and
are best read like so:
For some p: in English, ‘Ramsey is tall’ expresses the proposition that p,
and p
or in other words: in English, ‘Ramsey is tall’ expresses a true proposition.
So truth ascriptions to sentences are genuinely about those sentences.
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Similarly, Quine, who is Price’s exemplar deflationist, thinks that truth
ascriptions are genuinely about the sentences concerned. Quine differs from
Horwich in taking sentences to be the primary truthbearers, and thinking
that the claim that ‘Ramsey is tall’ is true is itself an assertion of the quoted
sentence and is therefore equivalent to it – nomeaning ascription is required.
However, as we already saw, that a truth ascription counts as a use of the
sentence doesn’t entail that it isn’t about that sentence. And as Stephen
Gross (2015) has argued in a closely related exchange with Claire Horisk
(2007), on Quine’s own terms, truth ascriptions are genuinely about the
sentences concerned.
This is because Quine thinks that if replacing a singular term by a core-
ferring term preserves truth-value, then that singular term is performing its
usual referring function. For instance, replacing ‘Ramsey’ with ‘the prover
of Ramsey’s theorem’ preserves truth-value in the above ascription, since
‘the prover of Ramsey’s theorem is tall’ is true. Gross points out that this
holds for the phrase “Ramsey is tall”, the name of the sentence. Suppose we
take ‘my favourite sentence’ to be coreferential with this. Then
In English, my favourite sentence is true
remains true. And so in the original ascription, “Ramsey is tall” is perform-
ing its usual referring function, of referring to the sentence ‘Ramsey is tall’.
So it really is about that sentence, and is not just a use of it.
The same holds of other truth ascriptions where we don’t know the
content of the sentence. For instance, I may want to say that Ella’s funniest
remark was true (perhaps it was funny because it was true), though I can’t
remember what she said. This will get the same verdict from Horwich and
Quine: it really is about what Ella said, because its truth depends on what
Ella said. Even if this also counts as a use of the sentence – for instance, we
might think that my remark commits me to agreeing with whatever Ella
turned out to have said – it certainly is about that sentence.
So deflationism doesn’t entail that truth ascriptions aren’t really about
the sentences involved, and hence that truthmaker questions and claims
aren’t really about the sentences involved either. This means that they are
well motivated by linguistic data: they really are about the data we’re given.
Or more precisely, this shows that we shouldn’t accept Price’s reason for
thinking deflationism makes them not well motivated. Deflationism doesn’t
have the impact Price argues for it.
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5.6 Triviality and first-order claims
So far, we’ve seen that deflationism doesn’t make truthmaking questions
unintelligible or avoidable. However, some have argued that deflationism
makes truthmaking claims trivial. If this is right, then we could argue that
deflationists have no particular need to answer truthmaking questions, be-
cause their answers are trivial and not of philosophical interest.
The idea is that deflationism restricts us to saying that what makes a pro-
position like 〈Ramsey is tall〉 true is that Ramsey is tall, and there’s nothing
more to be said here. The same goes for what components of propositions
refer to: 〈Ramsey〉 picks out Ramsey and 〈is tall〉 picks out tallness. Simon
Blackburn argues for this idea:
There is a story to be written, in this view, about the ethical
proposition, and how it holds its place as a focus for discussion
and thought. But there is no last chapter to be written about
‘what makes such a proposition true’. There is nothing occult
or Platonic or mysterious waiting to puzzle us, but also no need
to struggle with implausible reductions in order to find ‘natural-
istic’ truth-conditions. If a David Armstrong or a David Lewis
comes along demanding a ‘truth-maker’ we can profit from de-
flationism, and simply say that what makes it true that honesty
is good is that honesty is good. Nothing else needs to be said,
wearing allegedly metaphysical hats, or allegedly scientific hats.
(Blackburn, 2012, p.195)
Blackburn’s idea is that deflationism makes these questions trivial and so
irrelevant: what makes it true that honesty is good is that honesty is good,
and this we already knew. Huw Price also suggests something similar (2009,
p.266).
However, this argument doesn’t work, because while deflationism only
supplies trivial answers to these questions, it doesn’t block non-trivial ones.
For instance, it tells us that 〈honesty is good〉 is true iff honesty is good, and
that this is the closest explanation of the proposition’s truth, in Schnieder’s
sense. But it doesn’t tell us why honesty might be good – in virtue of what
this is so. It doesn’t rule out there being anything more informative to say
about this: it doesn’t falsify in advance all claims of the form ‘honesty is
good in virtue of . . . ’. To use a more familiar example, deflationism tell us
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that 〈my glass is full of water〉 is true iff my glass is full of water; but it
doesn’t rule out that my glass is full of water in virtue of being full of H2O,
and it doesn’t therefore rule out that what makes it true that my glass is full
of water is that my glass is full of H2O. The same goes for the referents of
predicates and terms. Deflationism only tells us that ‘Hesperus’ refers to
Hesperus and ‘water’ refers to water, but doesn’t rule out that ‘Hesperus’
refers to Phosphorous and ‘water’ refers to H2O.
This is no problem, because deflationism is a theory of what it is for
propositions to be true, not a theory of which propositions are true. It’s not
its job to tell us anything more informative, just as it’s not functionalism’s
job to tell us which states realise the functional roles which settle what it
is to be a mental state. So merely thinking about the notion of truth itself
won’t reveal anything new, but this is not a surprise and doesn’t stop us
investigating further. Nor does it stop us having to investigate further: if
truths need explanations, the fact that deflationism doesn’t provide us with
them is irrelevant.
So deflationism about truth doesn’t make truthmaking claims trivial.
However, some argue that it makes them first-order claims.8 For instance,
statements about truthmakers for ethical statements are ethical statements –
when you make them you’re making substantive ethical claims, of the same
ethical nature as when you say that torture is bad or charity is good. The
claim that there are moral truths is just the claim that some ethical propos-
itions are true, and this just says that some propositions of the form 〈x is
good〉, 〈x is wrong〉, and so on, are true. Yet this proposition, if deflation-
ism is right, is nothing more than: for some x, x is good or x is wrong or
. . . , where the dots include all ethical predicates. Yet this is an ethical claim,
albeit a very general one – it is about the moral status of objects in general.
It is just as much an ethical claim as the view that all torture is wrong, or
that some abortions are permissible, though it is more general.
It’s important to note that this isn’t because truth ascriptions to moral
sentences and propositions aren’t genuinely about those sentences and pro-
positions. We already saw how deflationism doesn’t entail this. Instead
the idea is just that saying that 〈P〉 is true commits you to believing 〈P〉, if
you know its content, or to coming to believe its content once you learn
it. Moreover, whether 〈P〉 is true is settled entirely by whether P. There is
8See the above quotation from Simon Blackburn, and also Blackburn (1998, pp.294-6),
Kramer (2009, 2017); Dworkin (1996), Price (2011, p.14).
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nothing more to whether 〈torture is wrong〉 is true than whether torture is
wrong.
Price argues that this makes truthmaking non-metaphysical, though he
uses a non-ethical example:
Asking “What makes it true that snow is white?”, or “What
makes ‘Snow is white’ true?”, is just another way of asking what
makes snow white – a reasonable question, in this case, but a
question to be answered in terms of the physics of ice and light,
not in terms of the metaphysics of facts and states of affairs.
There is no additional semantic explanandum, and no distinct-
ively metaphysical question. (Price, 2011, p.14)
Price thinks that deflationism turns truthmaker questions into first-order,
non-metaphysical questions. Blackburn agrees, as we saw above when he
said ‘Nothing else needs to be said, wearing allegedly metaphysical hats’
(Blackburn, 2012, p.195). The idea is that deflationism collapses metaphys-
ical questions into non-metaphysical ones.
However, the fact that these questions are first-order doesn’t mean they
cannot be metaphysical. For a start, many metaphysicians will disagree with
Price’s claim that asking what makes snow white is to be answered by the
physics of ice and light, but not in terms of facts and states of affairs. They
will argue that physics will give us a good causal explanation of snow’s be-
ing white, but not a constitutive explanation of any of the facts involved.
For instance, if the physical explanation of snow’s being white involves cit-
ing atomic truths of the form a is F, metaphysicians like Armstrong will
argue that these truths need truthmakers, and the only way of making sense
of them involves talking about particulars, universals and states of affairs.
While we saw that deflationism blocks one particular route to that argu-
ment, it does not block the debate about states of affairs and universals.
Note also that many first-order issues seem perfectly metaphysical any-
way. For instance, consider a claim like: 〈not-P〉 in virtue of Q. Saying that
this becomes a merely ‘first-order’ issue about why not-P is true doesn’t
make it not metaphysical; for many it invites issues about negative truths
and facts. The same applies to many other kinds of truths whose subject
matter is not that usually studied by the natural sciences, for instance truths
about logical, parthood, time, causation, free will, induction, and so on.
If the subject matter is metaphysical, the fact that truthmaking questions
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are first-order makes no difference to whether they are metaphysical. This
doesn’t mean they really are metaphysical questions – we might argue that
they aren’t for other reasons. The point is that deflationism doesn’t affect
this issue: whether or not truthmaking questions are metaphysical is inde-
pendent of deflationism.
Perhaps the situation is different in the case of ethics and other discip-
lines. For in ethics, the subject matter is ethical and not obviously meta-
physical. We don’t think of people working on first-order ethical questions
as metaphysicians, in the same way we would think this of someone asking
questions about parthood and location. So we might think that deflationism
turns an apparently metaphysical question into a first-order ethical question,
and ethical questions are not themselves metaphysical. Deflationism stops us
thinking that we can ask ethical questions, and then distinctively metaphys-
ical questions about ethics: such questions are just more ethics. So deflation-
ism does seem to make a difference here, by stopping the non-metaphysical
become metaphysical.
I think the best response here is to give up the term ‘metaphysics’ to
whomever wants it most, and argue that nevertheless, we can still ask truth-
making questions about ethics and they still need to be answered. We still
need to say what makes ethical propositions true, i.e. why things in the
world have the ethical properties they have. These questions may be very
general, but they’re still ethical. And deflationism doesn’t make them op-
tional questions, even if in some sense it makes them non-metaphysical.
Another argument here is that by making these questions first-order,
deflationism leaves us no way of understanding the crucial familiar questions
about the naturalness of ethical facts, and so on. If we see properties and
facts as exhausted by Horwich’s schemas, it’s not clear how to make sense
of the view that ethical properties and facts are natural or non-natural. We
might think that there are no first-order ethical methods for deciding these
questions, and so they are illegitimate if deflationism is true.
However, even those who don’t believe in properties and facts as explan-
atory entities can still make sense of distinctions between properties. For
instance, a nominalist may distinguish between a causally active property
F-ness, and an inactive one G-ness. But she doesn’t think F-ness and G-ness
are things which can bear causal relations. Instead she understands the dif-
ference by saying that there are true claims of the form ‘P because x is F’
(where ‘because’ takes a causal reading), but no true claims of the form ‘P
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because x is G’. The causal efficacy of properties can be understood in terms
of true and false causal claims involving predicates.
This sort of strategy can be applied to ethical properties; we simply need
a conception of what it is to be a natural or a non-natural truth, and this will
tell us what it is to be a natural or non-natural property. We can argue what
it is for a truth to be natural, what it is for the claim ‘it is natural that p’ to
be true. But we can do this without mentioning truths, facts and properties.
This is independent of deflationary issues about those things.
This lets us interpret questions about naturalism and non-naturalism.
Whether ethical truths have natural or non-natural truthmakers is settled
by whether the ‘p’ in
x is good in virtue of p
is a natural or a non-natural truth.
This kind of approach is familiar in the literature on expressivism’s treat-
ment of the mind-independence of ethical facts. Blackburn (1998, p.296;
pp.311-2) treats statements about mind-independence as first-order ethical
statements of the form:
x is good and it would be good even if nobody believed it.
This gives us a notion of mind-independence which is independent of defla-
tionary issues about truth, facts and properties. There’s no reason we can’t
extend this to issues about naturalness too. So deflationism does not un-
dermine typical metaphysical questions about properties, by making truth-
making claims first-order.
5.7 Conclusion
So to sum up, deflationism doesn’t make truthmaking questions unintel-
ligible, unanswerable, avoidable, or trivial. For deflationists, truthmaking
claims are simply non-causal explanations of one (bearerless) truth in terms
of another, one way the world is in terms of another. These only derivatively
give us explanations of the truth of truthbearers, and as such truthmaking
is independent of considerations about truthbearers, pace many mainstream
truthmaker theorists. Truthmaking claims, therefore, are intelligible. And
they’re answerable too – explanations can be given. Moreover, they’re not
avoidable: deflationism doesn’t let us off making these explanations.
Deflationism doesn’t stop truthmaker claims being genuinely about lan-
guage, and hence well motivated by facts about language use. Nor does it
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make answers to questions about truthmakers trivial. Nor does it under-
mine them by making them first-order: it does make them first-order, but
this doesn’t undermine their intelligibility or need for answers. Deflation-
ism still lets us formulate our ordinary debates about truthmakers, including
questions about the status of properties relevant to those debates.
As such, non-representationalists’ commitment to deflationism about
truth, facts and properties doesn’t affect what they should say about truth-
making. For instance, metaethical expressivists’ deflationary views don’t
make questions about truthmakers for ethical truths unintelligible, trivial
or otherwise avoidable. Such questions are merely requests for explanations
of ethical truths, and as such are neither unintelligible nor avoidable for the
expressivist.
In the next chapter I will explore this implication further while asking
whether any specific element of either global or local non-representation-
alism affects truthmaking debates. Do any of these elements affect how
non-representationalists should treat traditional metaphysical investigations
into the truthmakers for certain kinds of truths, and related investigations
about the nature of the entities and properties involved? As in this chapter,
I will argue that these elements have little impact.
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chapter 6
PLACEMENT PROBLEMS
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I argued that non-representationalists’ commitment
to deflationism about truth, facts, and properties doesn’t affect how they
should approach metaphysical questions about truthmaking. However, this
is just one of the ways non-representationalism is thought to undermine
metaphysics. In this chapter I will focus on the most distinctive element of
non-representationalism: its suspicion of representational features.
I will begin by sketching out the notion of a placement problem, a con-
venient way of thinking about the metaphysical issues non-representation-
alism is thought to avoid. Then I will articulate what I’ll call the basic
anti-metaphysical idea, a simple way of stating the idea that non-representa-
tionalism avoids metaphysics. The idea is that by avoiding representational
features, non-representationalists can avoid questions about the things in the
world that representational features relate us to.
After dismissing several unsuccessful readings of the basic anti-metaphys-
ical idea, I will argue that we should interpret it in terms of explanatory
scepticism, the view that representational features play no role in explaining
the meaning and use of a given area of language and thought. This yields
what I will call the anti-metaphysical thesis or AMT, which roughly says that
for any discourse D, a non-representationalist explanation of D provides a
non-metaphysical resolution of the placement problem for D. This claim is
the core of non-representationalism’s anti-metaphysical impact.
AMT’s precise content depends on what we count as a non-representa-
tionalist explanation, and its overall impact on metaphysics depends on how
widely we think non-representationalism applies. As we saw in Chapter 4,
localists think that a non-representationalist explanation avoids the subject
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matter of the discourse, and therefore that only some discourses can be ex-
plained in this way. Globalists, on the other hand, think such an explanation
avoids general word-world relations, and therefore that all discourses can be
so explained. As such, we can identify global and local versions of AMT.
I will argue against AMT on two grounds. First, the globalist’s reading of
it is subject to a class of counterexamples, cases where a non-representation-
alist explanation of a discourse doesn’t provide a non-metaphysical resolu-
tion of its placement problem. As such, even if global non-representational-
ism is true, it does not resolve all placement problems in a non-metaphysical
way. Second, AMT is false on both localist and globalist readings, not just
because it has counterexamples but because there are good reasons to believe
its contrary: no placement problem can be given a non-metaphysical resol-
ution by a non-representationalist explanation. After arguing for these two
points, I will draw out some consequences of the discussion, which I will
elaborate on in the concluding chapter.
6.2 Placement problems and the anti-metaphysical thesis
To begin let’s look at what Huw Price calls the ‘matching model’ of meta-
physics (2013, Ch. 2). The model has two sides. On the ‘left’, we have
statements, and on the ‘right’ the world. The idea is that for each statement
on the left, we have to find a truthmaker on the right. (Recall from the pre-
vious chapter that truthmakers can just be bearerless truths, they needn’t be
objects.) This can be difficult, especially if we accept a naturalist restriction
on the available truthmakers, taking them to be exhausted by the truths
studied by the natural sciences. Where we have trouble matching a state-
ment to a natural truthmaker – where ‘it is hard to see what natural facts we
could be talking about’ Price says, this is a placement problem (2013, p.5).
There are two further relevant points about placement problems. The
first is to note that they can concern not just truthmakers but properties
and objects, things corresponding not to sentences but parts of them. For
instance, we might ask what property ‘beautiful’ picks out, or what object
‘the empty set’ refers to. In what follows, I’ll speak only of truthmakers,
but what I say covers properties and objects too. Recall also that in the
previous chapter I pointed out how deflationists about properties will want
to understand truths which mention properties, like the truth that b has the
property F-ness, in terms of ones which don’t, like the truth that b is F. So
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terms picking out properties will be treated in the same way as statements,
in terms of truthmakers.
The second point is that placement problems needn’t be driven by natur-
alism. It may simply be difficult to find truthmakers for certain statements.
Take modal statements. We may object to all the common positions about
truthmakers for these, not on naturalist grounds but simply because nothing
we find plausible could do the job. For instance, we may think there aren’t
enough truths about the actual world to make modal truths true, but that
David Lewis’s real possibilia are too numerous to want to accept. Neither
of these worries need be driven by naturalism, but we still have a placement
problem.
A placement problem, then, occurs when we find it difficult to find a
truthmaker to match with a statement. We can now introduce what I’ll call
the basic anti-metaphysical idea concerning non-representationalism, which
goes like this. Representationalists treat language as representational, and
this involves talking about relations between words on the one hand and
the world on the other. Talking about word-world relations, however, raises
questions about the worldly relata of these relations: what entities, proper-
ties, facts do our words represent? This leads us to placement problems. The
basic anti-metaphysical idea is this: by avoiding representational relations,
non-representationalism doesn’t raise these questions. No mention of the
relations means no questions about the relata, and therefore no placement
problem arises. From now on I will talk about either avoiding a placement
problem or solving it: when I talk about solving the placement problem, I
mean doing so without talking about truthmakers. Either way, truthmaker
questions do not arise for the non-representationalist, if the basic anti-meta-
physical idea is right. In this chapter, I will make precise sense of this basic
idea, and then show that it’s false.
The first thing to do is to reject several bad ways of making sense of the
basic idea. The first of these relies on understanding non-representational-
ism in terms of rejection, as I put it in Chapter 2. If non-representationalists
simply deny that the language in question can be true, that it represents
or refers, and so on, then placement problems don’t arise. If the sentences
don’t state truths, there can be no question of what makes them true. How-
ever, we’ve seen that non-representationalists don’t reject representational
features. Instead their view is explanatory scepticism, that these features play
no role in the best explanation of the meaning and use of the language.
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So the basic anti-metaphysical idea can’t be explained in terms of rejection:
non-representationalists don’t avoid placement problems this way.
The second bad interpretation is to take non-representationalism as in-
volving the view that the language in question states truths that are mind-
dependent. This too would resolve placement problems easily. If there’s
nothing more to, say, a painting’s being beautiful than us finding it so, then
there is no placement problem about beauty. If there’s nothing more to ne-
cessary truth than our decision to use language in a certain way, there is no
placement problem about necessity. And so on.1 However non-representa-
tionalists don’t accept that their view entails mind-dependence. As I said in
Chapter 1 I’m assuming they’re right about this. So this route around place-
ment problems isn’t always available either, since there will be cases where
non-representationalists think they can avoid placement problems yet don’t
accept mind-dependence.
Finally, we shouldn’t read non-representationalism as resolving place-
ment problems by analysing language in the way that many philosophers
since the linguistic turn have done. For instance consider the word ‘noth-
ing’, as in the sentence ‘I started off with nothing and I’ve still got most of
it left’.2 Nobody would want to read ‘nothing’ here as a referring term -
instead it’s a quantifier, and realising this lets us avoid questions about what
this nothing is.3 This manoeuvre is familiar: realising the true logical form
of a proposition lets us avoid unnecessary metaphysical questions. The most
famous example, perhaps, is Russell’s (1905) theory of definite descriptions,
and the metaphysical consequences he claims for it. But this isn’t how non-
representationalists think they avoid placement problems. For instance, an
expressivist doesn’t think that ‘torture is wrong’ expresses a proposition of a
different form. Her point is quite different: to express an ethical proposition
is to express an attitude.
Instead, the only way that non-representationalism will make a differ-
ence here is through its explanatory scepticism: this is its distinctive view
about representational features. The central idea is as follows. Explanatory
scepticism means that we can explain the given area of language – call it a dis-
course for convenience – without treating it as representational. This means
we can explain the discourse without raising questions about the relata of
1 This doesn’t work in all cases, most notably the mental, since saying that what’s true
about the mental depends on minds doesn’t help at all.
2 I owe this lovely example to Seastick Steve’s 2008 album.
3 This is not to say that anyone actually ever thought otherwise. See Oliver (1996).
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representational relations. Non-representationalism avoids these questions,
and hence metaphysical placement problems, by giving its distinctive ‘what
it does and why it’s there’ (hereafter: WDT) theory of the discourse.
The clearest example of this argument is in metaethical expressivism.
Here’s Simon Blackburn stating the argument:
[The WDT theory] is the perspicuous representation that en-
ables the pragmatist to put sufficient weight on the functions
associated with the discourse to avoid putting any weight on
the metaphysical imaginings that it might threaten to engender.
. . . So, for instance, a perspicuous representation of how we
have a descriptive-sounding evaluative language [i.e. a WDT
theory for ethical language] may itself eschew any truck with
description, reference, facts or truth-makers, but use as its only
building blocks humdrum situations of choosing, preferring, re-
commending or needing. Its promise is that with attention to
these activities we come to see how our evaluative descriptions
of things need no truck with the idea that we somehow respond
to an autonomous realm of values: a metaphysical extra that
we inexplicably care about on top of voicing and discussing our
more humdrum concerns. (Blackburn, 2010b, pp.4-5)
Blackburn is saying that a WDT theory for ethical language which doesn’t
use ‘description, reference, facts or truth-makers’ avoids metaphysical ques-
tions about a ‘realm of values’. Elsewhere Blackburn says that on his non-
representationalist approach, ‘metaphysics bows out of the picture’ (2015,
p.850).
Other non-representationalists agree with Blackburn about this. Mi-
chael Williams uses expressivism as an example of the basic anti-metaphys-
ical idea:
Representationalist explanations of meaning tend to inherit the
apparent ontological commitments of the vocabulary under re-
view. A representationalist approach to moral predicates will
tend to commit us ab initio to moral properties, and thus (if
we have naturalistic inclinations) to metaphysical worries about
their character. By contrast, the only antecedent ontological
commitments of use-theoretic [i.e. non-representationalist] ap-
proaches to meaning are to speakers, their utterances, and so on:
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that is, to things that everyone is bound to recognize anyway.
Expressivism’s ontological conservatism gives it obvious attrac-
tions for philosophers with a naturalistic turn of mind. Values
. . . are not metaphysically problematic entities (or properties),
waiting to be detected by some special faculty, distinct from our
normal five senses. (Williams, 2013, p.130)
Price does too:
By focusing on moral talk, rather than moral properties, the ex-
pressivist simply sidesteps the metaphysical conundrums that
trouble her representationalist opponents, realists and anti-real-
ists alike. (Price, 2013, p.157)
Here Price is explicit that expressivism’s anti-metaphysical impact is partly
due to its turning to ‘moral talk’ – i.e. focusing on giving an explanation
of what ethical language does and why it’s there. It’s also crucial that the
expressivist theory is not representationalist unlike its ‘opponents’.
The anti-metaphysical view defended in the quotations above isn’t spe-
cific to ethics and so applies elsewhere. The basic idea is that a non-represent-
ationalist WDT theory can explain the discourse in question without treat-
ing it as representational and thereby without raising metaphysical questions
about the worldly relata of representational relations. Since non-representa-
tional theories in general avoid treating the relevant discourse as representa-
tional, this argument in principle holds in other cases too.
Indeed, Price seems to argue that the anti-metaphysical claim applies
globally.
Term by term, sentence by sentence, topic by topic, the rep-
resentationalist’s semantic ladder leads us from language to the
world, from words to their worldly objects. Somehow, the
resulting multiplicity of kinds of entities – values, modalities,
meanings, and the rest – needs to be accommodated within the
natural realm. To what else, after all, could natural speakers be
related by natural semantic relations?
Without a representationalist conception of the talk, however,
the puzzle takes a very different form. It remains in the lin-
guistic realm, a puzzle about a plurality of ways of talking, of
forms of human linguistic behaviour. The challenge is now
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simply to explain in naturalistic terms how creatures like us
come to talk in these various ways. . . . Without representation-
alism, the joints between topics remain joints between kinds of
behaviour, and don’t need to be mirrored in ontology of any
other kind. (Price, 2013, p.20)
Price is not discussing a specific case here: he’s discussing language in gen-
eral. This is perhaps the best statement of Price’s linguistic non-representa-
tionalist attack on metaphysical inquiry.
We can therefore state what I’ll call the anti-metaphysical thesis or AMT:
Anti-metaphysical thesis (AMT) For any discourse D, a WDT
theory of D which does not treat D as representational provides a
non-metaphysical resolution of the placement problem for D.
Recall that treating as representational is just a nice shorthand for ascribing
representational features. AMT is a universal generalisation. However note
that only global non-representationalists will think that it implies a general
route aroundmetaphysics, since only they believe that non-representational-
ism is true everywhere. Localists will accept the thesis but think that it is not
always relevant since non-representationalism is not true of all discourses.
Interestingly, however, both global and local non-representationalists seem
to accept AMT, despite their different conceptions of what representational
features are.
Since AMT is a generalisation, it is false if it has counterexamples. In
the next section I will show that when we read AMT as a global non-repres-
entationalist does, there is a class of counterexamples to it. This means that
even if global non-representationalism is true, it does not have the global
anti-metaphysical impact claimed for it. In the section after that I will ar-
gue that read as either localists or globalists read it, we have good reason to
think its contrary is true: that no WDT theory avoids metaphysics. This is
a more alarming result for non-representationalists, since it affects localists
and globalists, whereas my first argument against AMT only affects global-
ists.
6.3 Non-metaphysical resolution?
In this section I will argue that there is a class of counterexamples to AMT
when we read it in terms of global non-representationalists’ understand-
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ing of what it is to treat a discourse as representational. Recall how in
Chapter 4 I argued that globalists’ explanatory scepticism is not about re-
lations between language (and thought) and its subject matter, but about
general word-world relations, which are roughly those which explain whole
kinds of terms. As such, globalists will read AMT like so:
Globalist Anti-Metaphysical Thesis (GAMT) For any discourse
D, aWDT theory of D which does not ascribe general word-world
relations to D provides a non-metaphysical resolution of the place-
ment problem for D.
I will now argue that GAMT is false, before answering two objections to
my argument.
The reason GAMT is false is that:
(i) Globalists allow relations to subject matter in their WDT explana-
tions.
(ii) Some discourses (I’ll call them no-exit cases) require such relations in
their WDT theories.
(iii) In such cases, the WDT theory of the discourse does not resolve its
placement problem in a non-metaphysical way.
I will now explain each of these in turn.
My first claim is true simply because globalism only excludes general
word-world relations from its WDT theories. It does not therefore exclude
all relations between words and their subject matter, since not all such rela-
tions are general. We already saw this in action in Chapter 4, where Price
and Williams both allowed that a term like ‘red’ should be explained in
terms of relations with its subject matter. Price thinks terms like these are
‘e-representational’. Price doesn’t take e-representational terms to under-
mine globalism, since he doesn’t count e-representation as a representational
feature.
The second claim is true because there are areas of thought and language
which we can only explain in terms of relations with their subject matter.
Let’s call these no-exit cases: this is because Blackburn uses them to under-
mine globalism in what he calls the no exit problem. There are many words
which seem like no-exit cases: we might think that the word ‘red’ gets its
meaning in virtue of some relationship with red things. We may have sim-
ilar views for words we use to describe our environment and the things in it:
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‘cat’, ‘tree’, ‘pig’, ‘apple’, and so on. Blackburn argues that the language of
‘middle-sized dry goods’ and ‘the coastal waters of science’ are no-exit cases:
If we insisted instead on posing the [WDT] question, how come
that we go in for descriptions of the world in terms of surround-
ing middle-sized dry goods?, then the answer is only going to be
the flat-footed stutter or self-pat on the back: it is because we
are indeed surrounded by middle-sized dry goods. . . . A sim-
ilar fate awaits us, in many people’s view, if we pose [the same]
question about at least the coastal waters of science. How come
we go in for descriptions of the world in terms of energies and
currents? Because we have learned to become sensitive to, meas-
ure, predict and control, and to describe and refer to, energies
and currents. (Blackburn, 2013, pp.78-9)
So point (ii) is plausible: there are no-exit cases.
Blackburn thinks that no-exit cases undermine globalism. In Chapter
4 I argued that this is false, since globalists do not count subject matter
relations as representational features. More importantly, however, no-exit
cases do show us that global non-representationalism cannot have the same
metaphysical impact had by local non-representationalist views like ethical
expressivism. The key point was that expressivism could give us a WDT
theory for ethical language and thought without invoking ethical subject
matter at all. The idea was that if you had worries about the metaphysics of
ethical truths, facts and properties, you could avoid them. Instead of trying
to give theories of those things, step sideways and join the expressivist with
her WDT theory of ethical language which simply doesn’t mention ethical
subject matter at all. She can tell you how ethical language and thought
works, and why we have it, without mentioning ethical truths, facts, and
properties at all. The crucial element here is the sidestep: don’t try to say
what makes ethical statements true, instead say what it is to use an ethical
statement, and why we have such things.
This simply isn’t possible in no-exit cases. Suppose for some reason you
worry about the metaphysics of trees. You step sideways, and aim not to tell
us what trees are but what ‘tree’ does and why we have it. But in outlining
your account, you end up invoking trees, for instance in a causal relation
with our word ‘tree’. Whatever metaphysical issues trees raised will still
be raised by your WDT theory of ‘tree’. So even if your WDT theory of
148
‘tree’ is correct, and even illuminating in a surprising way, it will not avoid
whatever metaphysical issues trees raised. Whatever issues we have ‘placing’
trees in the world, the WDT theory will not solve them.
So while no-exit cases don’t falsify global non-representationalism, they
do show that it cannot non-metaphysically solve all our placement prob-
lems. No-exit cases don’t admit of the kind of WDT theory which dodges
metaphysics: the distinctive non-representationalist WDT manoeuvre has
no metaphysical impact here. So claim (iii) is true too. As such, when read
according to global non-representationalism, AMT is false. WDT theories
cannot give non-metaphysical resolutions of placement problems in no-exit
cases: the metaphysical problems remain.
6.3.1 Objections
Price argues against claim (iii). He argues that no-exit cases do not raise
placement problems in the first place. The fact that the best WDT theory
for ‘tree’ invokes trees is not a problem, because there are no metaphysical
placement problems regarding trees:
But why, precisely, should a global pragmatism need an exit, of
the kind Blackburn and Kraut have in mind? The view that it
does so seems at least in part to be a legacy of the cases with
which the expressivist began, such as that of ethics. There, it
was important that the distinctive ontology of the ethical view-
point – values, moral properties, and the like – not be in view,
from the [pragmatist’s] external standpoint. . . . At least to
the extent that the ethical conundrums arise from a commit-
ment to naturalism, the case of science is different. There isn’t a
placement problem for scientific language, at least at first pass.
So there isn’t any pressure to escape to a theoretical standpoint
from which one doesn’t need to mention such things. (Price,
2013, pp.157-8)
Here Price is responding to Blackburn’s argument that scientific termin-
ology, which in this context includes words describing ‘middle-sized dry
goods’ like trees, cannot be satisfactorily treated using the non-representa-
tionalist WDT approach.
Price’s point here is that scientific terminology cannot raise placement
problems, since the entities and properties posited by science are inherently
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naturalistic, being posited by scientific investigation itself. As such, ques-
tions about that subject matter are just first-order scientific questions, not
metaphysical ones. There are no placement problems in such cases, just or-
dinary scientific questions.
Price’s claim is that there are no terms which (a) are no-exit cases and (b)
raise placement problems. But the only example Price gives is of ‘scientific
language’. This is insufficient: there may be other no-exit cases which are
metaphysically problematic, and moreover Price himself later admits that
scientific language may be one, due to the possibility that it essentially in-
volves modal notions like possibility and causation (2013, p.160). If this is
right, then even scientific language, which is by its very nature meant to
be naturalistically acceptable, may raise material placement problems about
causal relations and possibilities.
Aside from causation and modality, many may think that plenty of what
scientific theories posit is metaphysically problematic and would require a
metaphysical response to place it in the world. For instance, it is still unclear
how we should interpret quantum mechanics, and resolve various issues
which arise there, for instance to do with indeterminacy and observation-
dependence. So quantum mechanics by itself raises placement problems,
metaphysical questions: what makes physicists’ theories of quantum phe-
nomena true? Is there indeterminacy at the quantum level? Do quantum
phenomena depend on observation? These are clearly metaphysical ques-
tions about quantum physics, and they have not yet been answered.
Finally, the fact that there’s no naturalistic ‘pressure’, as Price puts it, to
avoid invoking something in our theory doesn’t mean that it doesn’t raise
metaphysical questions. Consider ‘tree’ again. There are few who might
find trees particularly metaphysically worrying. But we might well still
ask what trees are, and that question remains even after we give the WDT
theory for ‘tree’. The fact that our theory isn’t in metaphysical trouble if we
don’t say what trees are doesn’t mean that there isn’t anything metaphysical
to say about them.
Outside the scientific language Blackburn and Price discuss, there are
plenty of terms which seem likely to be no-exit cases. For a start, causation
seems likely to be a no-exit case. Any naturalistic theory of how humans
come to speak and think in causal terms will face extreme pressure to invoke
causation. Even a story which starts with us perceiving loose and separate
events must involve an account of perception, and causal relations between
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perceivers and the world will likely play an essential role in that account.
So it seems likely that causation is a no-exit case, and therefore leaves the
placement problem for causation unsolved.
Modality is another likely no-exit case. If once again our best WDT the-
ory of modal language invokes perception, it will have to invoke causation.
But in making sense of causation, one may end up using counterfactuals
and other modal claims. If so, modality will be a no-exit case. In fact,
explanation more widely will probably be a no-exit case too. Non-repres-
entationalists want to give explanations of the language they’re interested in,
and in doing so they invoke notions like constitutive explanation, or causal
explanation. These are rudimentary elements of their WDT theories, and
will therefore count as no-exit cases.
Note, though, how central the three above cases are to contemporary
metaphysics: causation, modality, and explanation. Non-representational-
ism cannot get us off the hook in placing these things in the world. The
characteristic shift to a WDT theory will not help. There is still as much
need for an answer to the placement problem as there was before the non-
representationalist gave her theory.
There are many more cases of terms which simply haven’t attracted
much or any non-representationalist attention. For instance, classic meta-
physical issues concerning identity, persistence and mereology haven’t been
addressed. Whether these are no-exit cases of course remains to be seen.
However, the important point here is that non-representationalism as such,
even global non-representationalism, does not determine whether questions
surrounding these cases can be settled simply by WDT theories or whether
they need the usual, metaphysical treatment which Price wants to avoid.
Non-representationalism doesn’t assure us in advance that all placement
problems can be solved in the way metaethical expressivists purport to solve
the placement problem for ethics. And this is precisely because it cannot al-
ways avoid invoking relations between words and their subject matter.
However, the pragmatist philosopher Amie Thomasson makes a separ-
ate argument that no-exit cases do not necessarily give us metaphysical con-
clusions (Thomasson, Forthcoming). She focuses on Blackburn’s discussion
of words like ‘table’ which are about ordinary objects or ‘middle-sized dry
goods’. She argues that the fact that words for ordinary objects are no-exit
cases doesn’t give us reason to think that tables are part of the real ontology of
the world. This doesn’t give us reason to think that our terms for ordinary
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objects describe what’s ‘really’ in the world. For instance, it doesn’t sup-
port the idea that ‘there is a table’ describes the world more accurately than
a mereological nihilist language which instead says ‘there are particles ar-
ranged tablewise’ or an ontological nihilist’s feature-placing language which
says ‘it’s tabling’.
Instead, Thomasson argues, it indicates that ordinary object terms and
perhaps the concepts they express are semantically basic for humans – they
‘cannot be learned or introduced just by way of learning definitions stated
in other terms’ (Forthcoming, pp.9-10). She argues that this is backed by
psychological evidence, and that it explains why ordinary object terms are a
no-exit case. But she denies that this means we’re committed to thinking of
ordinary objects as what really exist, as opposed to mereological simples, or
just ‘stuff’ as the ontological nihilist would have it.4
Thomasson’s point about ordinary object terms may be correct, but it
doesn’t threaten my argument. For Thomasson is not really committed to
the idea that ordinary object terms do form a no-exit case. She admits that
different ontologies, like those of the mereological nihilist and the ontolo-
gical nihilist, can give us theories which are empirically equivalent to an
ordinary object ontology, i.e. which require no change in our empirical
commitments or predictions. If this is the case, and all these theories can
give equally good explanations of ordinary object terms, then this simply
shows that ordinary object language is not a no-exit case. We don’t need to
use ordinary object language to explain it: we can explain it on the basis of
other entities, like particles.
This undermines Thomasson’s claim that ordinary object terms are no-
exit cases because they’re semantically basic. This is false – the right thing
to say is that they only seem like no-exit cases because they’re semantically
basic. It’s hard to see how to explain our language without such terms, but
if the ontological and mereological nihilists’ theories really are empirically
equivalent to ordinary object theories, this must be possible. So Thomasson
doesn’t have a case here of terms which (i) are a no-exit case and (ii) do not
raise metaphysical questions.
I’m not claiming that the fact that some terms form a no-exit case means
that they really do describe the true ontology of the world. My claim is
more modest: in no-exit cases, applying the usual WDT theory approach
4 This isn’t to say that Thomasson thinks that anything really exists, since she’s sceptical
that any sense can be made of the term ‘really’ in these debates.
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does not get us anywhere with regard to the corresponding placement prob-
lem. It may be that there is no ontologically privileged way of describing the
world, but this isn’t settled by the non-representationalists’ WDT theories.
So to conclude this section: when we read the anti-metaphysical thesis
AMT according to global non-representationalism, it turns out to be false.
As such, even if the distinctive ‘what it does and why it’s there’ approach
does let us resolve some placement problems non-metaphysically – namely
those where we don’t need relations to subject matter – this result does not
apply globally. So global non-representationalism does not give us a general
route around metaphysical questions. By exploring what globalism actually
involves, we’ve seen that the basic anti-metaphysical idea – no relations, no
relata – fails in some cases. This is simply because globalism only rules out
general relations, and there are plenty of non-general ones which therefore
raise metaphysical questions about their relata.
6.4 AMT for local non-representationalists
AMT is false when we interpret it using globalists’ conception of repres-
entational features. But what about if we interpret it according to local-
ism? Then it might deliver an anti-metaphysical result: in those cases where
we don’t need to explain a term using relations with its subject matter, our
WDT theory will give a non-metaphysical resolution of the placement prob-
lem. I will now show that this, too, is false. Indeed I will argue that it is
false not because of a handful of counterexamples. It is false because we have
good reason to think that no WDT theory, even one free of relations with
subject matter, can resolve a placement problemwithout doing metaphysics.
Just as globalists read AMT as GAMT, localists will read AMT in terms
of relations with subject matter:
Localist anti-metaphysical thesis (LAMT) For any discourse D,
a WDT theory of D which does not ascribe relations between D
and its subject matter provides a non-metaphysical resolution of
the placement problem for D.
This automatically avoids my no-exit argument against the globalist’s ver-
sion GAMT. But it’s still false, as I will now argue.
Note that a key idea behind the anti-metaphysical thesis is that the WDT
theory offered by the non-representationalist is going to be enough to resolve
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the placement problem. So long as we can avoid the subject matter of the
discourse, our explanation is enough to resolve whatever worries we had
about the truthmakers for the truths of the discourse, or the entities or
properties associated with it, and so on. The distinctive WDT sidestep – ask
not what makes it true but what it does and why we have it – is meant to
resolve the problems we had with finding suitable truthmakers. This is why
non-representationalists emphasise their focus on WDT theories: they take
it to be distinctive of their approach and crucial to the anti-metaphysical
impact they think it has.
This idea is supported by the view that placement problems initially
arise because of facts about human thought and language. On this view,
we begin with data like the fact that humans have thoughts about what is
right and wrong, and talk about such things. The problem arises when we
ask what could make these sentences true. Let’s call this view of placement
problems the linguistic view. (This name ignores the fact that it is not just
language but also thought which motivates these problems, but it is conveni-
ent.)
Price is explicit about this point. He distinguishes the linguistic view of
placement problems from a material view:
On one possible view, the starting point is the object itself. We
are simply acquainted with X, and hence . . . come to wonder
how this thing-with-which-we-are-acquainted could be the kind
of thing studied by science. On the other possible view, the
starting point lies in human linguistic practices, broadly con-
strued. Roughly, we note that humans (ourselves or others)
employ the term ‘X’ in language, or the concept X, in thought
. . . we come to wonder how what these speakers are thereby
talking or thinking about could be the kind of thing studied by
science. (Price, 2013, p.7)
He argues in favour of the latter, the linguistic view. As a result, he ar-
gues that ‘The challenge is now simply to explain in naturalistic terms how
creatures like us come to talk in these ways’, and that once this is done no
puzzle remains (2013, pp.19-20, emphasis added).
Blackburn also defends a linguistic view. He sets up the placement prob-
lem for ethics as follows:
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So the problem is one of finding room for ethics, or of placing
ethics within the disenchanted, non-ethical order which we in-
habit, and of which we are a part. . . . ‘Finding room’ means un-
derstanding how we think ethically, and why it offends against
nothing in the rest of our world-view for us to do so (Blackburn,
1998, p.49)
Here Blackburn is saying that ‘placing ethics’ is first and foremost about
understanding how our ethical thought works. In §6.5 I’ll discuss more
what it means to show that ethics doesn’t ‘offend’ against our world-view.
More recently, Blackburn contrasts his own pragmatist philosophical ap-
proach with approaches which ask questions about the subject matter itself
– those which take the material view, to use Price’s term:
. . . the truth-theoretic approach identifies its problems in terms
of questions of the form ‘what is the ‘truth-maker’ or the fact
involved in something or other?’ A direct answer would be
modeled on a paradigm of successful intellectual inquiry such
as analytical chemistry. You take the substance you are invest-
igating, and take it apart to see how it is made up. ‘Analyt-
ical metaphysics’ looks at the elusive beasts in the philosophical
jungle, such as values, norms, natural laws, alternative possibil-
ities, numbers, and others in the same spirit. Break them apart
and see what they are made up of. This is the paradigm that has
dominated recent philosophy to the point at which other ap-
proaches are invisible to many writers (Blackburn, 2015, p.850)
Blackburn contrasts this approach with his own:
However, there is an alternative tradition, which asks a different
question. It says that it is no good looking to see what laws or
possibilities or values or numbers are ‘made up of’. They are not
substances you can put under a microscope or on a petri dish or
in a retort. They are categories with which we think. The key
to understanding them, therefore, is to see what such thinking
does for us. What is its function and purpose? You might an-
swer that by giving a ‘just-so’ story or evolutionarily plausible
sketch of how such thinking might have arisen, and you could
do that without ever getting a picture of what the apparent sub-
ject matter of such thought ‘is’. Metaphysics bows out of the
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picture; uses and purposes take their place. (Blackburn, 2015,
p.850)
Here we can see the idea that by studying the ‘function and purpose’ of the
language without thinking about its ‘subject matter’, we avoid metaphysics.
Implicit here is the view that the theory of function and purpose – theWDT
theory – is enough to solve any puzzle we faced about the subject matter
itself.
A common point here is that we shouldn’t assume that the language
and thought we’re faced with is representational, so to explain it just is to
give an account of its subject matter. This assumption ignores the various
different non-representational things the language might be doing. It ignores
the functional pluralism that non-representationalists accept: the idea that
different kinds of language can do different things, i.e. that their meaning
and use can be explained by different features.5
We can see how the linguistic view supports AMT. If placement prob-
lems are ultimately about explaining human language and thought, then giv-
ing such an explanation without citing the subject matter of that language
and thought will resolve the placement problemwithout doing metaphysics.
However, this is false. The reason it’s false is that even if placement
problems are motivated by facts about language and thought, they are not
just about explaining those facts in the WDT style non-representationalists
favour. This is because placement problems are not just about the language
and thought itself but what makes it true. And saying what makes a sentence
or belief true is not saying what it does and why it’s there. It is giving an
explanation of the (bearerless) truth stated by that sentence, as we saw in
the previous chapter. Saying what makes a sentence or belief true is simply
explaining a way the world is, and this has nothing to do with whether that
sentence or belief is representational.
So if a sentence or belief is true, there is already a question about what
makes this so, and if it is difficult to answer then we have a placement prob-
lem. Moreover, whether a sentence or belief is true is independent of non-
representationalism, since it doesn’t deny that the sentences and beliefs in
the given domain can be true. So non-representationalism doesn’t affect
whether the truthmaker question is appropriate.
5 This point shows non-representationalists’ Wittgensteinian influences: they often cite
Wittgenstein’s work in the Philosophical Investigations where he argues against the idea that
language all does the same thing. See Blackburn (1990b) and Price (2004) for more on this.
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The WDT theory has no impact on this: it does not give us answers to
the truthmaker questions, and nor does it provide an alternative. For even
if those questions were motivated by language and thought, they were never
questions about how that language and thought works and how it came
about.6
The placement problem for a given discourse may well be about what it
does and why it’s there, in part. However, it is also about truthmakers: we
find placement problems when it’s hard to explain a range of truths. As I
mentioned before, sometimes these problems arise because we want to find
natural truthmakers, but this needn’t always be so. Placement problems
therefore remain even after we give the WDT theory. Even after express-
ivists tell us what ethical language does and why it’s there, we can still ask:
what makes ethical truths true? What explains them?
Does this ignore the plurality of functions different areas of our language
can have? Doesn’t it ignore the fact that our ethical language, for instance,
is not describing worldly states of affairs but instead is expressing attitudes?
No. The plurality of functions that our language has only appears in the
WDT theory: we only mention the differences in what words like ‘good’,
‘chance’, ‘cause’, ‘beautiful’, ‘belief’, and so on do when we’re explaining
what they do and why we use them. But this is entirely independent of
whether those words can be used to express truths. This is precisely be-
cause we’re interpreting non-representationalism in terms of explanatory
scepticism rather than rejection – as saying that representational features
play no explanatory role, rather than that the language in question doesn’t
have them at all. If we take this anti-rejection stance seriously, we find that
truthmaker questions about the discourse in question are left untouched.
They are left unanswered by our WDT theory, but more importantly our
WDT theory doesn’t show us that they needn’t be answered. So long as
we think that truths typically need explanation, and we find it difficult to
explain the relevant truths, the placement problem lingers.
To take an example, consider ethical truths. It is difficult to find truth-
makers for them. Often we explain individual ethical truths like
The specific instance of torture T is wrong
in terms of more general ones
6 As we saw in the previous chapter, Price argues that deflationism entails that questions
about truthmakers are not well motivated by language. While if true it would affect my
argument here, as I argued there, it is false.
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Torture is wrong
We also explain these in terms of yet more general ones, for example that
causing pain is wrong, that not maximising utility is wrong, and so on.
Somewhere our explanation ends, perhaps with a claim like
All other things being equal, pain is bad
What explains this truth? No natural truth comes to mind. There’s no
further natural fact about pain in virtue of which it is bad. If this is so,
then we have two options. Either we find some other non-natural truth to
explain it, or else we treat it as brute. The former route will raise questions
about how we explain that further truth. The latter involves accepting brute
ethical truths. None of the above reasoning is affected by expressivism or its
WDT theory. We’ll return to the placement problem for ethics later.
So even if placement problems are initially motivated by facts about
language and thought, they remain even after non-representationalists give
their WDT theories. This is because (i) truthmaker questions can be mo-
tivated by facts about language and thought, but (ii) they are not questions
about how it works and why we have it, and (iii) non-representationalism
does not answer them, nor does it have any impact on whether they are
legitimate questions. Point (iii) holds because of non-representationalism’s
shift away from rejection views like Ayer’s, to explanatory scepticism.
At this point the non-representationalist might argue that even if the
WDT theory doesn’t answer truthmaker questions, their answers are either
trivial or else first-order questions which don’t require a metaphysical treat-
ment. I discussed both these objections in the previous chapter in relation
to deflationism. Briefly, neither of these points saves us from a metaphysical
response to the placement problem. For truthmaker questions are not al-
ways trivial. Deflationism about truth tells us that 〈honesty is good〉 is true
because honesty is good, but it does not tell us what it is in virtue of which
honesty is good, and nor does it tell us that there are only trivial answers
here. The fact that truthmaker questions are indeed first-order questions
about what explains certain truths has no impact whatsoever on whether
they are metaphysical in any interesting sense. Pointing out that Cartesian
dualism is a first-order claim about the mind makes it no less metaphysical;
pointing out that ethical naturalism is a first-order claim about the ethical
has equally little impact.
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So far, we’ve seen how the linguistic view doesn’t support the localist’s
version of the anti-metaphysical thesis. However there are also good reasons
to doubt the linguistic view in the first place, at least in some cases. It is more
plausible that some of our metaphysical puzzles are not in fact reactions to
human language and thought but instead the phenomena themselves. We
notice that we have sensations and consciousness and ask what these things
could be, and how they fit into the world. We come to believe that the world
has a creator, or a purpose, and ask what could make this so. These issues
don’t begin by us noting how humans talk about sensations, consciousness,
gods. They begin with our (putative) experiences of such things. If this is
right, then the corresponding placement problem is simply independent of
the WDT theory we might give for the language and thoughts in question.7
In any case, I’ve shown that even if the linguistic view is right, it’s only a
short step to metaphysical placement problems about truthmakers. AWDT
theory does not solve this problem or show that we can ignore it. So LAMT
false. Moreover, it’s not false just because there are counterexamples. It is
always false – false in all cases. No WDT theory of a discourse is sufficient
to non-metaphysically resolve its placement problem.
I’m not arguing that all traditional metaphysical approaches to all ele-
ments of placement problems are correct or even intelligible. It may be that
the only coherent or illuminating answers we can get regarding a particular
problem are given by a WDT-theory, or simply by ignoring metaphysical
approaches altogether. Instead I’m just arguing that non-representational-
ism itself doesn’t undermine metaphysical questions. This leaves open that
metaphysical investigations might draw a blank, and thus force us to take a
different approach. For example, metaethical expressivism by itself doesn’t
undermine metaphysical questions about ethics. But this doesn’t mean that
traditional metaphysical approaches to questions like how to explain the su-
pervenience of the ethical on the non-ethical will always be fruitful. It just
means that expressivism itself doesn’t show us that such questions can be
avoided from the beginning.
Moreover, note how none of my argument relied on the specific localist
view about representational features. Unlike my argument against GAMT,
7 Note also that the case of the mental is likely to be a no-exit case anyway. WDT
theories typically talk about the mental states of language users, and if they do that in the
case of words like ‘belief’ and ‘mind’ these will be no-exit cases. While we might try to
offer a behaviourist WDT theory of our language about the mental, if this fails, we have a
no-exit case.
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which relied on globalists’ acceptance of relations with subject matter, my
argument against LAMT is based on more general considerations, namely
that explaining what some language does and why it’s there does not an-
swer or undermine questions about what makes sentences in that language
true. As such, we should not think just that LAMT is false. Rather, the
anti-metaphysical thesis in general is false, and not only because it has some
counterexamples but because no placement problem is resolved by non-rep-
resentationalists’ WDT theories.
So in fact, whether local or global, non-representationalism never has
the anti-metaphysical impact many think it has. We can now tie this back
to the basic anti-metaphysical idea. The idea – no representational relations,
no questions about the relata – is right only if we’re only thinking about
the WDT theory itself. But it is wrong in general. Non-representationalism
doesn’t avoid metaphysics.
6.5 Consequences
So far, then, we’ve seen that even if non-representationalists avoid subject
matter in their WDT theories, truthmaker questions remain. Non-repres-
entationalism plots no route around metaphysics. I now want to draw some
general consequences from this conclusion.
6.5.1 Vindication
The first concerns metaethical expressivism. My argument undermines the
common idea that expressivism vindicates ethical language in a way that
fends off error theory and allows us to treat ethics as naturalistically ac-
ceptable. Expressivists argue that their WDT theory explains how ethical
language expresses attitudes but crucially also shows how this is compatible
with the fact that ethical language ‘looks like’ representational language, ad-
mits of ascriptions of truth, knowledge, and so on. Several expressivists have
argued that this vindicates ethical language by protecting it from error the-
ory, and showing how ethical language can be understood naturalistically.
As Price (2013, p.150) points out, Blackburn defines quasi-realism, the
project of giving the WDT theory described above, as involving this con-
sequence:
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Quasi-realism: a position holding that an expressivist or pro-
jectivist account of ethics can explain and make legitimate sense
of the realist-sounding discourse within which we promote and
debate moral views. This is in opposition to writers who think
that if projectivism is correct then our ordinary ways of think-
ing in terms of a moral truth, or of knowledge, or the inde-
pendence of ethical facts from our subjective sentiments, must
all be in error, reflecting a mistaken realist metaphysics. The
quasi-realist seeks to earn our right to talk in these terms on the
slender, projective basis. (Blackburn, 1994, p.315)
Elsewhere Blackburn argues that quasi-realism can be used to ‘urge that
there is no error in our ordinary ways of thought and our ordinary com-
mitments and passions’ (Blackburn, 1985, p.158), and as we saw above he
takes solving the placement problem for ethics to involve showing how our
ethical thought doesn’t ‘offend’ against our world-view.
Blackburn is not alone in this view. Allan Gibbard claims that expressiv-
ism shows us that ethical concepts ‘aren’t hocus-pocus’, and ‘vindicates con-
cepts that we might otherwise find raise an inescapable anomaly’ (Gibbard,
2003, p.196). Nick Zangwill argues that expressivism shows us ‘not only
why we do moralize, but also why we ought to’ (1993, p.293). Price even
argues that Blackburn’s definition isn’t strong enough: he argues that it
wrongly suggests there could be a version of quasi-realism which is com-
patible with error theory. Price argues that this would simply be a reductio
of expressivism, ‘which is intended to be an interpretation of our ordinary
ways of thinking and talking’ (2013, pp.150-1). So not only does Price think
that expressivism doesn’t entail error theory: he thinks it actually rules out
error theory is false.
However, this is false. Expressivism doesn’t rule out error theory: the
two are completely compatible. All expressivism does is explain the ex-
istence of ethical thought and language. In this sense it makes it non-
mysterious. But it doesn’t show that any ethical sentence is true, no more
than explaining the existence of religious practices shows that any religious
beliefs are true. Earlier we saw that Blackburn aims to show why it doesn’t
offend against anything in our world-view for us to think in ethical terms
(§6.5). However all this can mean here is that the very fact that we have
ethical thoughts is not itself an anti-naturalistic mystery. It doesn’t show
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that any of those thoughts are true, nor crucially that ethical thoughts can
be made true by naturalistic truths.
There is a further idea here: that by understanding that ethical language
functions to express attitudes, we vindicate its use to do this. Here’s a brief
summary of this line of thought, from Huw Price:
The fact that there are no moral properties in the natural world
does not entail that moral talk is in error, if its function is not
to describe such properties.8 (Price, 1997, p.141)
We might read this like so: if there are no moral properties, ethical language
is not in error, since its function is to express attitudes and not describe
those properties. This doesn’t follow. If there are no moral properties, then
by the deflationary reading of properties, nothing is good, bad, permissible,
required, and so on. Hence any sentence calling something good, bad, and
so on, is false. Our language is in error.
At this point, we might point out, as Price does, that ethical language’s
job or function is not to describe ethical properties. But we can only read
this as saying that its best explanation does not mention describing ethical
properties. And we’ve seen that this doesn’t imply that it does not also de-
scribe ethical properties, in a deflationary sense. Moreover it doesn’t imply
that there are ethical properties either. It is neutral on this issue. At best,
it shows us that when we use ethical language to express attitudes, we’re
not making a semantic mistake, using a term to mean something other than
what it really means in our language. But the fact that I don’t make a se-
mantic mistake with an utterance does not mean it is true. So even noting
the function – the ‘what it does’ – of ethical language does not vindicate it.9
The same goes for the idea that expressivism reveals the purpose of our
ethical thoughts and language and thereby vindicates it (Zangwill, 1993,
p.293). This does not entail that any ethical sentence is true. It only shows
us why we have ethical language. It doesn’t justify any particular ethical ut-
terance, and at best it only gives us a practical justification for using ethical
language in the first place. But a practical justification is not an epistemic
one: the fact that it is practically useful for me to have a belief doesn’t entail
8 Price follows this with an argument along the lines I just refuted above: that expressiv-
ism can explain the existence of ethical language in a way compatible with its expressing
attitudes, and hence vindicates it.
9 Compare a Gricean view which says that ‘magic’ expresses beliefs about magic. This
doesn’t vindicate magic-talk, beyond showing that my nephew is not confused about the
meaning of ‘magic’ when he says that his grandmother is magic.
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that it is true. In this case, the fact that it is useful for us to have language
which expresses attitudes doesn’t entail that any of our ethical beliefs are
true.
There is a deeper explanation of this failure to vindicate ethical language.
Expressivists take claims about ethical truth to count as first-order – claims
within ethics. These are just as substantively ethical as claims about the
morality of torture. Whether there are any ethical truths is an ethical mat-
ter, just as whether there are any white ravens is an ornithological matter.
However, expressivists also claim that their WDT theory is entirely free of
ethical language and any mention of ethical subject matter. So it’s not a sur-
prise that their WDT theory is detached from ethical truth in this way, so
that it’s compatible with their theory that there are no ethical truths at all.
I will explore this idea more in my concluding chapter.
Moreover, this consequence isn’t limited to ethics. In general, suitably
detached, subject matter-free WDT theories will fail to vindicate the lan-
guage they are explaining. They will leave it open that there are no truths
in the relevant domain. As such, they will still leave the placement prob-
lem open: they will not tell us what, if anything, makes the relevant truths
true. Even though non-representationalists will argue that such questions
are first-order, this does not mean they are not metaphysical, nor that we
don’t need to answer them in order properly to vindicate the language.
6.5.2 Not naturalism, not non-naturalism?
A similar consequence is that my conclusion undermines the idea that ex-
pressivists can avoid both reductionism and non-naturalists’ commitment
to non-natural ethical facts and properties. For instance, Blackburn argues
that expressivism ‘avoids naturalistic reductions’ (Blackburn, 2009, p.207).
Elsewhere he rejects ‘a reductive naturalism’ which proceeds by ‘identify-
ing moral and evaluative properties with natural properties or clusters of
natural properties’, yet then goes on to profess ‘much less sympathy with
the contemporary alternative that thinks moral properties are quite differ-
ent from natural properties, and that thereupon resurrects the long-dead
corpse of intuitionistic non-naturalism’ (Blackburn, 2015, p.844). In other
words, Blackburn is arguing that his view avoids both reductive naturalism
and non-naturalism.10
10 Gibbard seems more resolutely naturalist. See Gibbard (2003, pp.181ff), (2013,
pp.31ff).
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Price defends a similar idea, saying that his non-representationalist view
gives us an alternative to reductionism and non-naturalism. For instance, he
describes his ‘discourse pluralism’ (an earlier name for non-representation-
alism) in the following way:
The first contrast is therefore with reductionism . . . For the
reductionist moral discourse is legitimate because it actually is
natural discourse, albeit disguised natural discourse. A pluralist
wants both autonomy and legitimacy, whereas a reductionist
is prepared to sacrifice the former in the interests of the latter.
(Price, 1992, p.39)
What Price’s terminology means here is that the discourse pluralist wants
to avoid reduction – and thereby preserve the ‘autonomy’ of ethics, since it
is independent of natural facts in some sense – yet preserve the ‘legitimacy’
of ethical language, in other words not reject it as steeped in error. Price
also contrasts his view with what he calls ‘additive monism’ (Price, 1992,
p.40), the view that there are further, extra non-natural ethical facts which
we describe using genuinely descriptive language. He contrasts his non-
representationalist approach with this.
Reductionism can mean different things. It can be a semantic enterprise:
showing that ethical sentences mean the same as ones featuring only natural
terms. It can also be a metaphysical claim: ethical sentences are made true
by completely natural truths. We can outline corresponding senses of non-
naturalism: denying that ethical sentences mean the same as natural ones,
or that ethical sentences are made true by natural truths.
There are also claims which are perhaps a mix of these, for instance that
ethical predicates refer to natural properties, or that ethical sentences can
be given natural truth-conditions. It is not clear whether these are purely
semantic claims: that ‘water’ refers to H2O and that ‘x is water’ is true
iff x is H2O are not obviously claims about the meanings of those terms.
Someone may understand the term ‘water’ and yet be surprised to learn
that it refers to H2O, and that their sentences using that word have truth
conditions involving H2O.
Expressivism does avoid reducing ethical meaning: it denies that ethical
sentences are equivalent in meaning to any natural sentence. It also denies
that we should understand ethical sentences in terms of representing natural
facts in a certain way. Insofar as we think giving truth-conditions is a way
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of specifying the meaning of a sentence, they will deny that any natural
statement will give the truth-conditions of ethical statements. And insofar
as saying what property a word like ‘good’ refers to says what it means,
they will deny that it refers to any such property. In all these respects, they
will agree with non-naturalists. However, they also disagree with typical
non-naturalists because they think ethical language is best explained in non-
representationalist terms. So expressivism does indeed avoid both naturalist
and non-naturalist claims about ethical meaning.
However, things are not so clear when we turn to the metaphysical ele-
ment of reductionism. This concerns whether ethical sentences are made
true by natural truths. As we’ve seen, such questions are entirely independ-
ent of expressivists’ distinctive, ethics-free WDT theories. Given deflation-
ism, these questions are about what it is in virtue of which things are good,
bad, and so on. And so whether expressivists can avoid this kind of reduc-
tionism depends on whether they think all ethical truths can be explained
by natural ones. If they cannot, they must accept a non-naturalist view.
So it isn’t true that expressivists can avoid both naturalism and non-
naturalism, because they leave unanswered the truthmaker questions whose
answers distinguish those views. The idea that they can avoid these views
is based on the view that their WDT theories are sufficient to resolve the
placement problem, which we’ve seen is false. Expressivists now face the
question: what makes ethical statements true? Whichever way they answer,
they will count as either naturalists or non-naturalists.
However, we might argue that expressivists can now accept non-natur-
alism about ethical truthmakers without getting into metaphysical trouble.
In other words, they can deny that all ethical truths can be explained by
natural ones, yet their view will not entail any untoward metaphysical com-
mitments, anything ‘occult or Platonic or mysterious waiting to puzzle us’
as Blackburn puts it (Blackburn, 2012, p.195). I think there is something to
this idea. However we need to make sense of it very carefully.
To start with, note that expressivism, if it succeeds, manages to avoid
talking about ethics in its WDT theory, and therefore will avoid giving an
account of ethical language and thought in terms of its relation with ethical
subject matter. Therefore, even if they accept that ethical truths are non-
natural, or have no natural truthmakers, they will still not have to give such
things any explanatory role. This is a big advantage. Expressivists don’t have
to show how we can be in the relevant meaning-constituting relations with
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such things, nor how those relations can explain the intrinsic motivating
nature of ethical beliefs, the fact that ethical beliefs seem to motivate us by
themselves, unlike other beliefs which must combine with desires to make
us act.11
However, this doesn’t mean there are no adverse consequences of ac-
cepting non-natural ethical truths. For instance, expressivists will have to
admit that there are some ethical truths which are inexplicable on a natural
basis, and indeed they will want to admit that some of these are simply inex-
plicable, brute truths. They will end up saying that maximising happiness,
for instance, just is good, or that causing pain for enjoyment just is bad.
Moreover, as Toppinen (Forthcoming) argues, expressivists also face the
challenge of explaining the supervenience of the ethical on the non-ethical:
why it is that there can be no change in ethical truths without there being
a change in the non-ethical truths too. Toppinen argues that expressivists
can explain this more easily than non-naturalists, but the important point is
that expressivists are not automatically rescued from such problems by their
ethics-free WDT theory. There is no blanket anti-metaphysical consequence
for expressivists here – just as non-representationalism more generally has
no blanket anti-metaphysical implication. Expressivists cannot simply say:
we avoid reduction, and we also avoid the ontological consequences of non-
naturalism. Instead, they must look at those consequences and resolve them
on a piecemeal basis, like Toppinen does regarding supervenience.
The same goes for questions about mind-independence too. Expressiv-
ists have argued that they too can accept that ethical truth is mind-independ-
ent.12 Sharon Street (2011, p.8) goes so far as to say it’s an essential part of
expressivism. But as with naturalism and non-naturalism, expressivism is
neutral on mind-independence. It can accept it, it can reject it. Moreover, as
Street herself argues, this brings up metaphysical problems for expressivists,
in Street’s case problems about evolution and moral scepticism.
This isn’t to say that all the metaphysical questions about ethics can be
resolved in metaphysical ways. As I said, I am not arguing this, but in-
stead that expressivism by itself doesn’t undermine those approaches. So for
instance this leaves open that in the end, there is no satisfactory metaphys-
ical explanation of supervenience, and that the only illuminating theory
11 Expressivists also avoid the problems associated with naturalist accounts, like Moore’s
open question argument and the Moral Twin Earth problem. See McPherson (2013) for
more on these problems.
12 See e.g. Gibbard (2003, p.186), (Blackburn, 1998, pp.311ff).
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here is the expressivist’s WDT theory. The important point is just that ex-
pressivism by itself doesn’t imply that there’s no satisfactory metaphysical
explanation, nor that we needn’t look for one.
As with vindication, the same result holds in other areas. For instance,
consider causation. A Humean expressivist might think that causal beliefs
(beliefs in causes) are best understood as inferential dispositions: to believe
that A caused B is, perhaps, to be disposed to infer B-type events from A-
type events, or perhaps to be disposed so that one expects to some degree a
B-type event on learning that an A-type event happened.13 This view does
not vindicate causal language: it does not prove that there are causes. Nor
does it avoid reductionism. It leaves us the choice of saying that all causal
truths are explained by non-causal truths, or else are not.
One way of saying that causal truths are explained by non-causal ones is
to defend a so-called constant conjunction view: for As to cause Bs is for As
to be constantly conjoined with Bs, and for a specific a to have caused b is
for a to be of a kind A whose instances are constantly conjoined with those
of a kind B of which b is an instance. Another would be to appeal to coun-
terfactual truths: a caused b iff if a hadn’t occurred, b wouldn’t have, and in
the closest non-actual world where a does occur, b does too. Other views
don’t try to explain causal truths in terms of non-causal ones. For instance,
we could appeal to a primitive, unanalysable causal relation C such that for
a to cause b is for C to relate these two events; or to properties which bestow
causal powers. Or we could accept any of the other theories of causation on
offer. The important thing is this: if we understand these views as answers to
questions about truthmakers for causal statements, then expressivism about
causal language and thought by itself rules out none of these views, and rules
in none of them either. It only affects these views insofar as they purport to
offer explanations of causal language and thought, since expressivism gives
an alternative one. While it is true that often metaphysical views are given
in this spirit, this is not necessary.
What I’ve tried to show is that if we take non-representationalism ser-
iously, we pull apart metaphysics and the project of explaining meaning
and use (which some people call metasemantics), to the extent that the lat-
ter doesn’t avoid, undermine, or trivialise the former. In my concluding
remarks in the next chapter, I will explore this theme more fully.
13 Earlier I argued that causation is a likely no-exit case. Assume for this paragraph that
it isn’t – since if it is, expressivism has no metaphysical impact anyway.
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6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I’ve targeted the basic anti-metaphysical idea, the view that
since non-representationalists avoid representational relations, they avoid
metaphysical questions about what is represented, and what makes our rep-
resentations true. I’ve argued that this idea is false. The best way to in-
terpret it is in terms of the core non-representationalist view, explanatory
scepticism. This yields what I’ve called the anti-metaphysical thesis AMT:
Anti-metaphysical thesis (AMT) For any discourse D, a WDT
theory of D which does not treat D as representational provides a
non-metaphysical resolution of the placement problem for D.
This comes in global and local versions, since globalists and localists disagree
about what it means to treat something as representational.
The global version of this thesis is false because of no-exit cases, cases
where we cannot explain a discourse without invoking its subject matter.
In such cases, our distinctive WDT theory of the discourse raises the very
questions about its subject matter that we wanted to avoid. So even if global
non-representationalism is true, it does not avoid metaphysics in general.
Even more worryingly for non-representationalists, it turns out that
even the localist version of AMT, which automatically avoids problems with
no-exit cases, is false. This is because WDT theories are not enough to re-
solve placement problems. Placement problems may well originate with
questions about language and thought, but there’s no reason to think that
they are just about explaining the existence of that language and thought.
Truthmaker questions remain even on this linguistic view of placement
problems. Moreover, we have plenty of reason to doubt the linguistic view
of placement problems in the first place: plenty of metaphysical worries
arise not as questions about language and thought but from our first-hand
experience of puzzling phenomena.
As such, neither local nor global non-representationalism avoids meta-
physics. The basic anti-metaphysical idea seems reasonable, but only be-
cause it implies that non-representationalists reject representation and sim-
ilar features. If we take non-representationalists seriously when they say
they don’t reject such things but simply ignore them for explanatory pur-
poses, the basic anti-metaphysical idea collapses.
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This has some interesting consequences. It undermines metaethical ex-
pressivists’ aspirations to be neither naturalist nor non-naturalist about the
metaphysics of ethics, and their claims to have vindicated ethical language
in any sense that would let us avoid truthmaker questions. It turns out that
metaethical expressivism offers no answers to these truthmaker questions,
but most importantly does not show us that such questions do not need
answers, or cannot be given them.
This concludes the main body of this thesis. In the next, concluding
chapter, I will summarise the main points I have argued for in this thesis,
and draw some wider conclusions from them.
chapter 7
CONCLUSION
7.1 Main points
Let me briefly summarise what I take to be the key points I have argued for
in this thesis:
1. Non-representationalism should be understood primarily as the view
that representational features play no role in explaining the meaning
and/or use of a given area of language and thought; I’ve been calling
this view explanatory scepticism. We can characterise non-represent-
ationalists’ explanations of a given area of language and thought as
‘what it does and why it’s there’ theories. (Chapter 2)
2. By adopting and defending this view with regard to ethical language
and thought, and giving a suitably neutral reading of representational
features, metaethical expressivists can solve the problem of creeping
minimalism, which we should understand as the problem of distin-
guishing expressivism from representationalism rather than realism.
(Chapter 3)
3. Reading local and global non-representationalism in terms of explan-
atory scepticism, we find that localists and globalists differ over what
features they think count as representational. As such, the debate
between them is merely verbal: localists already accept globalists’
globalism, and globalists already accept localists’ localism. We should
therefore also not assume globalism has the same kinds of impact as
local non-representationalism, nor that it is as radical as it first seems.
We should also consider the local/global debate resolved. (Chapter 4)
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4. Deflationism about truth, facts and properties makes almost no dif-
ference to truthmaker theory. As such, non-representationalists’ com-
mitment to it does not affect their relationship to metaphysical ques-
tions about truthmakers for a given area of language and thought.
(Chapter 5)
5. Non-representationalists’ explanatory scepticism, and their interest
in giving ‘what it does and why it’s there’ theories, does not make
metaphysical questions about the area of language for which they give
that theory (i) avoidable, (ii) unanswerable, (iii) trivial, or (iv) non-
metaphysical. Instead it leaves them untouched and does not affect
whether they need answers. (Chapters 5-6)
6. As such, non-representationalism, properly understood as explanat-
ory scepticism about representational features, does not have the meta-
physical impact often thought for it.
I now want to conclude by briefly discussing a broader consequence of these
points, and pointing to what I think are promising directions for future
work on this topic.
7.2 Non-representationalism and the ‘ism’s
In the previous chapter I concluded by saying that non-representational-
ism does not avoid metaphysical questions about truthmakers for the area
of language and thought under investigation. In particular, I showed how
non-representationalist views are compatible with different views about the
truthmakers for a given range of claims. For instance, metaethical expressiv-
ism is compatible with both naturalism and non-naturalism about ethics,
but also with error theory, the view that there are no ethical truths.
I want to put this point together with my discussion of creeping min-
imalism in metaethics. In Chapter 3 I argued that we should not try to dis-
tinguish expressivism from realism: instead we should distinguish it from
representationalism. The reason I gave there was that we also need to dis-
tinguish expressivism from error theory, which shares with realism a rep-
resentationalist view of ethical thought and language, and that since error
theorists have vastly different views about ethical truths, facts and proper-
ties, the approach offered by Dreier, which is based on these things, would
not satisfactorily do this.
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However, there is a further, deeper reason for not distinguishing between
expressivism and realism, namely that expressivism isn’t really distinct from
realism in the way the problem of creeping minimalism presupposes. The
problem presupposes that expressivism is not realism. However, formulated
as a view about ethical truths and their mind-independence, realism is per-
fectly compatible with expressivism. Expressivism is a claim about what
explains ethical language: realism need not be understood as a claim of this
kind.
Indeed, insofar as we understand popular metaethical positions as claims
about ethical truths and their truthmakers, expressivism is perfectly com-
patible with them all. True, many such positions have been defended in
conjunction with representationalism about ethical thought. But these are
separable, and expressivists have shown us why: because claims about eth-
ical truths and what makes them true need not be understood as attempts
at explaining ethical language and thought. The former claims are first-order
(though I’ve shown that this does not make them non-metaphysical), and
expressivism is second-order.
However, I’m not saying that expressivism entails realism. As we saw
in the previous chapter, some argue that non-representationalist views are
intrinsically realist but in a metaphysics-undermining sense: they vindicate
the language in question, but in a way which makes any further metaphys-
ical theorising redundant. This is realism but not of a metaphysical kind. I
rejected such a view in the previous chapter: expressivism doesn’t vindicate
ethical language in the relevant sense here. So expressivism does not entail
realism in any sense. Instead the two are compatible – but expressivism is
equally compatible with error theory, or mind-dependence views like con-
structivism.
More generally, non-representationalism is not one of the traditional
‘ism’s we come across. It isn’t anti-realist, and it isn’t realist, so long as
we think of the latter as positions about the truth and mind-independence
of the domain in question. But nor does it collapse the debate here, or make
it non-metaphysical. It’s just neutral.
The overarching moral here is this: if we take non-representationalists
seriously in their shift away from rejecting representational features, and
therefore understand their view as concerning the explanatory role of those
features, we deprive it of its metaphysical impact. For the metaphysical
problems some think it avoids are independent of the explanatory role of
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representational features. Recall the basic anti-metaphysical idea: no rep-
resentation, no metaphysical questions about what is represented. This
simply cannot work if non-representationalists do not say ‘no representa-
tion’ but instead ‘in our WDT theory, no representation’. A similar point
applies in the case of truthmaking and deflationism: thinking the latter un-
dermines the former involves thinking that truthmaking is a relation in the
strong sense between language and the world But this is completely optional:
without it, deflationism has no impact on truthmaking.
7.3 Does non-representationalism make a difference?
We might then wonder if non-representationalism is interesting at all, and
whether it has anything interesting to tell us, if it doesn’t have the meta-
physical impact many have argued it has. I think it is interesting and it does
have interesting and important things to say. Indeed I think non-repres-
entationalism is really just getting started: only in the last few years have
philosophers begun to fully appreciate and explore the explanatory nature
of the view and the consequences of this. In this section I will sketch out
why I think non-representationalism makes a difference.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, non-representationalism is going to make a dif-
ference primarily to our explanations of language and thought. Since it is at
its core a view about what explains thought and language, here it will have
its impact. And as such, we can recast the basic anti-metaphysical idea in
a different way. Rather than ‘no representation, no metaphysical questions
about what’s represented’, we get the idea that if we don’t need represent-
ation to explain some area of language and thought, we don’t need its sub-
ject matter to do so. This is very close to the basic anti-metaphysical idea,
except that it draws from non-representationalists’ avoidance of represent-
ational features not a metaphysical consequence but a consequence for our
explanations of thought and meaning, what some would call ametasemantic
consequence. So here we have the basic metasemantic idea: no representa-
tion, no explanatory role for what is represented.
The basic metasemantic idea does not let non-representationalists avoid
metaphysics as such. Note that since global non-representationalists are
happy to use the subject matter of a discourse to explain it, this idea will
simply not apply in their case. Instead it only applies to those kinds of
non-representationalism which do avoid subject matter – and then it doesn’t
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let them avoid metaphysics. But it does let them avoid implausible theories
about what explains our thought and language. I think this point vindicates
much of what non-representationalists have actually argued, although this
is often cashed out as a sweeping metaphysical consequence rather than a
more limited result applying to our explanations of meaning and use. I will
now illustrate this by discussing the key example of non-representational-
ism, metaethical expressivism.
We’ve seen that expressivism does not avoid or otherwise undermine the
question about what makes ethical truths true – whether this includes only
natural truths or non-natural ones as well. But it does have an important
consequence here. It gives us an alternative to typical representationalist
naturalist and non-naturalist explanations of the meaning and use of eth-
ical thought and language. For a naturalist who accepts representationalism
needs to understand ethical thought in terms of representing the world as
having ethical features, and needs to understand those features as natural.
For a non-naturalist representationalist, ethical thought must be explained
in terms of representing the world as having non-natural ethical features.
Both of these views face problems.1 I will not go into these now. The
important thing is that while expressivism doesn’t automatically avoid the
metaphysical problems with these views, it does give a genuine alternative
when it comes to explaining ethical thought and meaning. For expressivism
doesn’t have to explain ethical beliefs in terms of a special subject matter:
a cluster of natural properties, or sui generis non-natural properties, for in-
stance. Nor does it have to explain them in terms of a special representa-
tional relation: representing as good, for instance. Instead it explains them
in terms of familiar, naturalistically describable mental states: intentions,
plans, emotions, and so on.
This does make a difference, at least in principle. And it’s a difference
which expressivists have already emphasised. For instance in a recent paper
discussing Sturgeon and Boyd’s moral realism, Simon Blackburn explicitly
says that he accepts the core tenets of Boyd’s view which concern moral
truth and mind-independence (Blackburn, 2015, p.844). He goes on to give
a critique not of Boyd and Sturgeon’s metaphysical commitments per se
but rather the explanation they give of ethical thought and language, for
instance arguing against Boyd’s causal theory of ethical predicate meaning
(Blackburn, 2015, p.850). Blackburn draws out this idea to present his op-
1 McPherson (2013) gives a nice overview.
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position to representationalism, where he opposes his position, incorrectly
in my view, to ‘metaphysics’. But the idea is clear: expressivism still makes
a difference when it comes to explaining ethical thought and language. It
offers a different kind of view, which may be able to avoid problems with
representationalist ones.
There are two related points of interest here. The first is that my argu-
ment that non-representationalism doesn’t avoid metaphysics may actually
help the view, by making it more appealing to those who see no problem
with metaphysics. If we can combine metaphysical inquiry with non-repres-
entationalist explanations of meaning – and in particular if we needn’t reject
representational features in order to take up such explanations – then non-
representationalism looks more attractive. This applies across the board,
not just ethics.
The second is an interesting potential consequence concerning non-nat-
uralism. In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in metaethical
non-naturalism, the view that there are ethical truths, that they are mind-
independent, but different in kind to natural truths.2 In the previous chapter
I explained this view’s position on truthmakers for ethical truths as the view
that some non-natural truths are brute, inexplicable by anything, including
natural truths. I showed that this is compatible with non-representational-
ism.
Expressivists may have some sympathy for the idea that there are brute
ethical truths that cannot be explained by the natural. So they might not ob-
ject to non-naturalism on these grounds: they may think that even a gener-
ally naturalistic outlook can tolerate such things. However, they can make a
different argument instead. Non-naturalists’ views about ethical truths and
their truthmakers may not be objectionable by themselves, but the view
they must take about what explains ethical thought and language will be,
for naturalistic reasons. This is because the phenomenon of ethical thought
and language is itself a naturalistic phenomenon: it is part of human thought
and language, and crucially, this belongs in the causal, spatiotemporal realm.
As such, non-naturalists have to explain how such naturalistic phenomena
came about, or at least give a sketch of how such an explanation might go.
But their metaphysical materials – i.e. ethical truths – are all non-natural,
causally isolated truths. So it’s hard to see how such an ontology is meant to
2 See Scanlon (2014); Parfit (2011); Shafer-Landau (2010); Cuneo & Shafer-Landau
(2014); Enoch (2011); Dworkin (2011)
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be part of a credible explanation of a natural phenomenon. It’s one thing to
say that ethical truths themselves don’t need a naturalistic explanation: it’s
another to say that ethical thought and language doesn’t either.
Expressivists have a unique advantage here. They can avoid trying to
explain ethical thought and language, a natural phenomenon, in terms of
representational relations with natural features of things, since no such rela-
tions give a good explanation. But they can also avoid the non-naturalists’
explanations, and offer something genuinely naturalistic instead. Since this
is all compatible with different views about what ethical truths are and what
makes them true, expressivism gives us a new dimension in which theories
can differ: they can be realist or not, naturalist or not, and crucially repres-
entationalist or not. The latter choice has previously been seen as part of the
‘realist or not’ choice by those who understand expressivism as denying that
there are ethical truths; and it has been seen as overriding or even collapsing
the other choices by contemporary expressivists. But the truth is that it is
just an additional choice: it reveals a new set of positions in the debate.
This is just one way that non-representationalism can make a difference,
when we understand it in terms of explanatory scepticism. By taking this
route seriously, we can now accommodate metaphysical inquiry alongside
non-representationalist theories of the meaning and use of various areas
of language. We can also focus non-representationalists’ arguments not on
the metaphysical commitments of rival theories per se, but on the commit-
ments they make to explain the language and thought in question. However,
we should recognise that non-representationalists must answer truthmaking
questions, and as such are vulnerable to any problems which their answers
to those questions may face.
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